C.J. No. 16, 2023

The complaint alleged that the judicial officer who presided over the complainant’s arraignment committed judicial misconduct by informing the complainant of his rights, even though the complainant was aware of his rights; determining to enter a plea of “not guilty,” even though the complainant said that his plea was “confession and avoidance;” and failing to respond appropriately to the complainant’s assertions regarding the court’s jurisdiction over the criminal proceedings.

The complaint was dismissed. The complaint that the judicial officer informed the criminal defendant of his rights did not state a claim of judicial wrongdoing, but rather reflected the judicial officer’s fulfillment of judicial responsibilities. The allegations regarding the judicial officer’s decision to record a plea of not guilty and response to the complainant’s statements regarding the court’s jurisdiction were based on the complainant’s disagreement with a legal ruling or asserted matters that were subject to appellate review from a final judgment in the proceeding.

Main Point: A litigant’s disagreement with a judge’s ruling is not a basis for judicial discipline, and the judicial disciplinary process is not a substitute for appellate review.

C.J. No. 14, 2023

The complainant filed a judicial misconduct complaint alleging that a judge insulted his appearance, made an improper comment about how he looked, and treated him like he was intoxicated at a hearing. The complainant stated that the recording of the hearing would support his claims.

The complaint was dismissed. The recording of the hearing reflected that the judge had referred to the complainant’s appearance, which was not ideal, but did not support the complainant’s claim that the judge had insulted his appearance or made an improper comment about how he looked. The judge did not act improperly in asking the complainant if he was under the influence given the importance of the decisions the complainant was making at the hearing.

Main Point: Claims of misconduct that are contradicted by the record will be dismissed.

C.J. No. 13, 2023

The complainant alleged that the judge committed judicial misconduct by requiring her to present evidence of damages, rather than simply granting judgment in the full amount that she requested based on the defendant’s default. The Court on the Judiciary determined that this claim was based on the complainant’s disagreements with the judge’s ruling and could be raised on appeal; the claim therefore was subject to dismissal. The complainant also made conclusory allegations that the judge was racially biased and suffered from physical and neurological ailments. Because the allegations were conclusory and the complaint did not plead facts in the record that supported a rational inference of judicial misconduct, the complaint was dismissed.

Main Point: A complaint must plead nonconclusory facts that support a rational inference of wrongdoing. A litigant’s disagreement with a judge’s ruling is not a basis for judicial discipline.

C.J. No. 11, 2023

A litigant filed a judicial misconduct complaint alleging that a judge had an improper ex parte meeting with the opposing party.

The complaint was dismissed. The record reflected that the judge had notified the parties of the date and time for a case management conference. The complainant failed to appear for the conference. A previous hearing had been rescheduled at the request of the complainant—proof that the complainant knew how to communicate to the court if she had a scheduling conflict. The judge did not engage in an improper ex parte communication with opposing counsel when he proceeded to hold the hearing in open court in the complainant’s absence.

Main Point: Claims of misconduct that are not supported by the record cited by the complainant will be dismissed.

C.J. No. 7, 2023

The complainant filed a judicial misconduct complaint alleging that a judge was biased against him in three cases and threatened to hold him in contempt.

The complaint was dismissed. To state a claim of judicial bias, the record must reflect a basis to believe that the judicial officer had some improper motive to rule against a party. The dockets for two of the cases did not reflect any involvement by the complained-of judge. The complainant did not identify anything in the record of the third case to support his claim of judicial bias. When there was a final judgment in the third case, the complainant could appeal the judge’s rulings.

Main Point: Conclusory and unsupported claims of judicial bias will be dismissed.

C.J. No. 16, 2022

The complainant alleged that the judge who presided over his trial committed judicial misconduct by misstating the testimony of a detective when, after a sidebar to address an objection by the defense that the detective was impermissibly testifying regarding the credibility of a defense witness, the judge inaccurately restated the testimony that the detective had given just before the sidebar. The trial transcript reflected that the detective’s statement before the sidebar differed slightly from the judge’s restatement of that testimony.

The complaint was dismissed. The allegations amounted to a claim that the judge committed a legal error by rereading the testimony, or inaccurately rereading it, rather than having the court reporter reread it. Because that claim could have been raised in a direct appeal, the complaint did not state a claim within the limited jurisdiction of the Court on the Judiciary.

Main Point: The judicial disciplinary process is not a substitute for appellate review.

C.J. No. 15, 2022

The complainant filed a judicial misconduct complaint alleging that a judge was biased against him, allowed the other side to introduce prejudicial evidence, gave a prejudicial jury instruction, and wrongly denied one of his motions.

The complaint was dismissed. Most of allegations were based upon the complainant’s disagreement with judicial rulings, which could be appealed to the Supreme Court. The complainant’s conclusory claims of judicial bias did not establish a basis to believe that the judge had improper motive in ruling against him.

Main Point: The judicial disciplinary process is not a substitute for appellate review.

C.J. No. 10, 2022

A litigant filed a judicial misconduct complaint alleging that a judge ignored the law when the judge granted the opposing parties’ motion to dismiss the litigant’s complaint.

The complaint was dismissed. Although the complainant claimed judicial misconduct, it was clear that the complainant simply disagreed with the judge’s ruling, which could have been appealed to the Supreme Court. The complainant could not use the judicial discipline process as an alternative form of judicial review.

Main Point: The judicial disciplinary process is not a substitute for appellate review.

C.J. No. 8, 2022

A litigant filed a judicial misconduct complaint alleging that a judge exceeded the court’s jurisdiction by issuing orders while her case had been removed to a federal court. The case was later returned to the state court because the federal court did not have jurisdiction. The litigant also alleged that the judge ignored misconduct by the other side’s attorneys and should have recused himself because he was friends with one of those attorneys.

The complaint was dismissed. The litigant could have sought review of the jurisdictional issue in the Supreme Court, but she did not seek appellate review. To the extent she alleged that the other side’s attorneys engaged in misconduct, that claim was not within the Court on the Judiciary’s jurisdiction. The litigant did not plead anything to suggest that the attorneys engaged in misconduct requiring judicial intervention. Finally, she failed to plead any facts to support her claim the judge was friends with one of the opposing side’s attorneys and should have recused himself.

Main Point: The judicial disciplinary process is not a substitute for appellate review. Attorney misconduct falls within the jurisdiction of the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and the Supreme Court, not the Court on the Judiciary.

C.J. No. 5, 2022

A litigant filed a judicial misconduct complaint alleging that a judge had accused the complainant of lying during a hearing.

The complaint was dismissed. The recording of the hearing revealed that although the judge had pointed out inconsistencies in the complainant’s testimony, the judge had not accused the complainant of lying.

Main Point: Claims of misconduct will be dismissed if they are contradicted by the record.

C.J. No. 22, 2021

A litigant filed a judicial misconduct complaint claiming that a judge violated the Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct by ruling against the litigant three times, accepting unauthenticated evidence from the opposing party, failing to investigate claims made by the opposing party, and finding that testimony provided by the opposing party was more credible than testimony provided by the litigant’s father.

The complaint was dismissed. The assertions that the judge ruled against the litigant did not provide a basis to argue that the judge was biased or did not act impartially and fairly. The allegations of the complaint were based upon the litigant’s disagreement with judicial rulings.

Main Point: The fact that a judge ruled against a party, without more, does not demonstrate judicial bias.

C.J. No. 19, 2021

The complainant filed a judicial misconduct complaint alleging that a judge failed to observe his right to proceed pro se, had ex parte communications with the State, violated his right to a speedy trial, and otherwise exhibited a closed mind in handling the litigant’s criminal case.

The complaint was dismissed. The complainant’s claims were not supported by the record. The Court noted that the complainant was understandably frustrated that his case had not yet proceeded to trial but observed that many of the delays were beyond the control of the judicial officer, given the Supreme Court’s emergency orders suspending speedy trial rights in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and the backlog of criminal cases. In any event, the denial of his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds was a matter properly subject to appellate review.

Main Point: The judicial disciplinary process may not be used as an alternative form of appellate review.

C.J. No. 15, 2021

The complainant filed a judicial misconduct complaint claiming that a judge violated the Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct by not granting him relief from the requirement, imposed in a sentence for driving under the influence, that he complete a driver-improvement course. The complaint also alleged that the judge committed judicial misconduct by not ruling on his request for relief.

The complaint was dismissed. The docket revealed that a different judge, not the judge named in the complaint, handled the matter. The complaint therefore failed to state a claim against the judge named in the complaint. The court record also reflected that the other judge had sent the complainant a letter summarizing the court’s investigation of the matter, the court’s attempts to contact the complainant, and the complainant’s failure to comply with requests of court staff. The letter also stated the court’s reasons for denying the requested relief. Therefore, to the extent that the complaint asserted misconduct by the other judge, the Court on the Judiciary concluded that the other judicial officer did not unduly delay or fail to act on the complainant’s request for relief, and the allegations were matters that were subject to appellate review.

Main Point: A judicial discipline complaint should be consistent with the court record, and the judicial discipline process is not a substitute for appellate review.

C.J. No. 14, 2021

A litigant filed a judicial misconduct complaint claiming that a judge treated her unfairly by failing to grant the relief she sought, despite the litigant’s presentation of evidence that she should be awarded that relief.

The complaint was dismissed. The allegations in the complaint were based on the litigant’s disagreement with the judge’s legal rulings and the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence. The complaint presented matters that were subject to appellate review and therefore did not state a claim within the limited jurisdiction of the Court on the Judiciary.

Main Point: The judicial discipline process is not a substitute for appellate review.

C.J. No. 12, 2021

A litigant filed a judicial misconduct complaint alleging a judicial officer violated the Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct by requiring the litigant to comply with the court’s rules governing the filing of documents. The litigant also alleged that the judicial officer was unethical.

The complaint was dismissed. Requiring litigants, even pro se litigants, to comply with a court’s rules regarding the filing of documents was not judicial misconduct. And the complainant’s remaining claim related to his disagreement with the judicial officer’s ruling that dismissed a portion of his complaint, a matter properly subject to appellate review.

Main Point: The judicial disciplinary process is not a substitute for appellate review.

C.J. No. 8, 2021

The complainant filed a judicial misconduct complaint alleging that a judge had violated the Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct by re-sentencing him in absentia. This was the second complaint filed by the complainant against judge on the same basis.

The complaint was dismissed. The claims in the complaint were subject to appellate review. Because the complaint was the second based on the same allegation of misconduct, the Clerk was directed to dismiss any further complaint filed by the complainant based on the same facts.

Main Point: Repetitive complaints based on the same allegations of judicial misconduct will be dismissed without further action.

C.J. 6, 2021

A litigant filed a judicial misconduct complaint alleging that a judge had treated her unfairly, favored the other side, and mocked her disability in a proceeding in which the judge granted the other side’s petition for relief.

The complaint was dismissed. Most of the complainant’s claims were based on her disagreement with the judge’s granting of the other side’s petition. She could challenge that decision in the appellate process, and had in fact already filed a notice of appeal. As to the allegation of mockery, the litigant did not indicate when that occurred or provide a transcript or other documentation to support that claim.

Main Point: In alleging misconduct based on a judge’s words or behavior, a complainant should support those allegations with dates of the misconduct and documentation such as transcripts.

C.J. No. 5, 2021

A litigant filed a judicial misconduct complaint alleging that a judge was biased against her. In support of the litigant’s complaint, the litigant cited the judicial officer’s apparent acceptance of the opposing party’s factual representations. The judicial officer had not yet issued a ruling on the matter.

The complaint was dismissed. To support a complaint of judicial bias, the record must reflect a basis to believe that the judicial officer had some improper motive to rule against a party. The complainant’s conclusory allegation of bias was not borne out by the record. And any disagreement with the judicial officer’s findings of fact could be raised on appeal from the judicial officer’s ruling.

Main Point: Conclusory allegations of bias are insufficient to support a finding of judicial misconduct on the basis of bias.

C.J. No. 3, 2021

The complainant filed a judicial misconduct complaint alleging that multiple judges should not have denied his motions for sentence modification and that the denial of his motions was evidence of corruption.

The complaint was dismissed. The complainant could have appealed the denial of his motions for sentence modification, but did not do so. The complainant’s conclusory and unsupported claim of corruption did not state a claim for judicial misconduct.

Main Point: A conclusory and unsupported allegation of corruption does not state a claim for judicial misconduct.

C.J. No. 1, 2021

A litigant filed a judicial misconduct complaint alleging that a judge committed misconduct by ruling on the litigant’s motion before the litigant had a chance to respond the opposing party’s opposition to the motion.

The complaint was dismissed. Although the complaint was framed as a violation of the Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct, it was clear that the complainant simply disagreed with the judicial officer’s ruling. The complainant could not use the judicial discipline process as an additional or alternative form of judicial review.

Main Point: The judicial discipline process is not a substitute for appellate review.

C.J. No. 23, 2020

A litigant filed a judicial misconduct complaint alleging that a judge committed judicial misconduct by making erroneous legal rulings, misrepresenting facts in the case, and accepting “fraudulent” documents. The complaint also alleged wrongdoing by the complainant’s opponent in the litigation and the opponent’s counsel.

The complaint was dismissed. The complaint was based on the litigant’s disagreements with the judicial officer’s factual conclusions and legal rulings and presented issues that were subject to appellate review. The allegations concerning the conduct of the complainant’s opponent and the opponent’s counsel were not within the jurisdiction of the Court on the Judiciary.

Main Point: The judicial discipline process is not a substitute for appellate review. The Court on the Judiciary has jurisdiction over judicial discipline, not over attorney discipline or the conduct of litigants.

C.J. No. 20, 2020

The complainant filed a judicial misconduct claim against the judge who presided over a motions hearing in the complainant’s pending criminal cases. At the hearing, the judge heard three motions—counsel’s motion to withdraw, the complainant’s motion to disqualify counsel, and the complainant’s motion to dismiss. The judge granted the motion to withdraw and denied the motion to dismiss.

The complainant filed a judicial misconduct complaint alleging that the judge could not preside impartially over his cases because he had previously recused himself from a case involving the complainant many years ago. The complainant also alleged that the judge violated the Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct by allowing an attorney to use the judge’s chambers, permitting the State to re-indict him, allowing the State to violate his right to a speedy trial, and “silencing him” during the motions hearing.

The complaint was dismissed. The complainant had failed to move for the judge’s recusal in the underlying matter. There was no evidence that the judicial officer had allowed an attorney to use his chambers and, if he had, why it was improper. Although the complainant had not attached a copy of the transcript of the motions hearing as required by the court’s rules, the court took notice of the audio recording of the motions hearing. There was no evidence that the trial judge restricted the complainant’s ability to participate fully in the hearing. The complainant’s remaining complaints could be litigated in the underlying proceedings or raised on appeal.

Main Point:A trial judge’s rulings that can be challenged in the underlying proceeding or on appeal are not subject to disciplinary proceedings in the Court on the Judiciary.

C.J. No. 19, 2020

A criminal defendant filed a complaint alleging that a judicial officer violated the Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct by telling the prosecutor to ask a witness questions that were damaging to the complainant’s defense. The complainant included a portion of the trial transcript to support his claim.

The complaint was dismissed. A more complete portion of the trial transcript showed that the judicial officer asked the prosecutor to solicit certain information from the witness not to hurt the complainant’s defense, but to reduce the risk of jury confusion or a misunderstanding of the evidence. The complainant could have challenged the judicial officer’s actions on appeal, but did not do so. He could not use the judicial discipline process as an additional or alternate form of appellate review.

Main Point: A complainant should not rely on an incomplete and misleading portion of a transcript to support claims of judicial misconduct. The judicial discipline process is not a substitute for appellate review.

C.J. No. 18, 2020

A litigant filed a judicial misconduct complaint alleging that a judicial officer committed judicial misconduct by presiding over a hearing after being made aware that the complainant had filed a previous complaint against the judicial officer in the Court on the Judiciary. The complaint also alleged that the judicial officer made erroneous evidentiary rulings and factual findings in the case.

The complaint was dismissed. The allegations concerning the evidentiary rulings and the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence were based upon the complainant’s disagreement with a judicial ruling and were matters that were subject to appellate review. Similarly, a complaint that a judicial officer did not recuse from a proceeding involving a party who had filed a judicial misconduct complaint, which ultimately had been dismissed, also did not state a claim of judicial misconduct. Rather, to the extent that the complainant believed that the judicial officer erred by declining to recuse, the complainant could have raised that issue in a procedurally proper request for review of the recusal decision and then, if necessary, on appeal.

Main Point: The judicial discipline process is not a substitute for appellate review.

C.J. No. 17, 2020

A litigant in a civil matter filed a judicial misconduct complaint alleging that the complainant had a “reason to believe” that a judicial officer was bribed because the judicial officer allegedly ignored evidence and made decisions based on purportedly false testimony provided by the complainant’s opponent in the litigation.

The complaint was dismissed. The complaint was based on the litigant’s disagreements with the judicial officer’s legal rulings and presented issues that were subject to appellate review. The complainant did not support the speculative assertion of bribery with any facts that suggested that bribery occurred; rather, the complainant contended, in conclusory fashion, that bribery must have been involved because the complainant disagreed with the outcome of the litigation.

Main Point: Speculative, conclusory assertions of judicial misconduct are insufficient to survive dismissal. The judicial discipline process is not a substitute for appellate review.

C.J. No. 16, 2020

The complainant filed a complaint alleging that a judicial officer failed to perform his duties. According to the complainant, the judicial officer required the complainant to obtain the court’s permission before he could file additional motions and failed to rule on several, recently filed motions.

The complaint was dismissed. The complainant could have appealed the judicial officer’s previous order that required him to obtain the court’s permission to file additional motions, but he did not do so. He could not use the judicial discipline process as an additional or alternate form of appellate review. In addition, the court docket reflected that the judicial officer had ruled on the recently filed motions. If the complainant disagreed with the judicial officer’s rulings, he could have filed an appeal.

Main Point: The judicial discipline process is not a substitute for appellate review.

C.J. No. 10, 2020

A civil litigant filed a complaint against the judicial officer who presided over the hearing on her motion to dismiss and her trial. The complainant alleged that the judicial officer constantly interrupted her, wrongly denied her motion to dismiss, and instructed the other side’s witness on how to answer one of the complainant’s questions.

The complaint was dismissed. Although the complainant failed to provide a transcript of the relevant hearing, the Court listened to a recording of the hearing. The recording did not support the complainant’s claims. The judicial officer occasionally asked questions or directed the parties to focus their attention on the most important issues, but did not prevent the complainant from presenting her motion to dismiss. The complainant’s allegations concerning the motion to dismiss were based on her disagreement with the judicial officer’s denial of that motion. Disagreement with a judge’s rulings are properly a matter subject to appellate review, not the Court on the Judiciary. The record also reflected that the complainant had appealed the judicial officer’s ruling. She could not use the judicial discipline process as an additional or alternate form of appellate review. Finally, the recording showed that the judicial officer did not tell the witness how to answer one of the complainant’s questions.

Main Point: A litigant’s disagreement with a judicial officer’s ruling is not a basis for judicial discipline. The judicial discipline process is not a substitute for appellate review.

C.J. No. 7, 2020

The complainant filed a complaint alleging that a judge committed judicial misconduct by “abuse of office,” “violation of oath,” and “violation of [the complainant’s] constitutional rights.” The complaint did not identify a case in which the judge allegedly committed misconduct, nor did it allege any facts to explain the basis of the claims of misconduct. After reviewing the dockets in the proceedings in which the complainant had participated, the court determined that the judge identified in the complaint had last been involved more than twenty years before.

The complaint was dismissed. The complaint was stale, failed to describe any facts supporting the claims, and failed to provide a transcript or other documentation to support the claims of misconduct. Without a transcript, supporting documents, or even a description of the alleged misconduct, the complainant did not provide the court with a “fair and accurate account of the context in which the alleged misconduct . . . occurred,” as required by Delaware Court on the Judiciary Rule 5(a).

Main Point: A complaint in the Court on the Judiciary must describe the facts, with supporting documents or a transcript if available, on which the claim of judicial misconduct is based.

C.J. No. 5, 2020

The complainant filed a judicial misconduct complaint against the judge who denied his third motion for a trial continuance. When the complainant expressed reservations with proceeding to trial with his court-appointed attorney, the trial judge assured the complainant that she was familiar with the attorney and vouched for his competency. The complainant alleged that the judge’s failure to grant a continuance indicated that she was biased against him in violation of Canon 1 and Canon 2 of the Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct. He also alleged that the judge’s comments about the competency of counsel violated the judge’s duty to regulate her extra-judicial activities under Canon 3.

The complaint was dismissed. The complainant questioned the judge’s impartiality but failed to identify any facts supporting his claim. The mere fact that the court denied the complainant’s third request for a trial continuance did not reflect that the judge acted impartiality or harbored any bias against the complainant. A challenge to the trial judge’s denial of the motion for a continuance could have been, and was, raised on direct appeal. The court also noted that the judges’ actions did not violate Canon 3 because she was acting in her judicial capacity.

Main Point: The judicial discipline process does not provide a complainant with an additional avenue for appellate review of a judge’s ruling with which the complainant disagrees.

C.J. No. 20, 2019

A defendant in a criminal case filed a judicial misconduct complaint claiming that a judge violated the rules of the Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct by failing to disclose that the judge was affiliated with an organization with which the defendant and the victim in the case were affiliated.

The complaint was dismissed. Fundamentally, the complaint did not allege judicial misconduct but that the conviction was obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights. That was a matter that was subject to appellate review and should have been asserted in the context of the criminal proceedings, either on appeal or in a procedurally proper motion for postconviction relief. The complainant did not allege any facts that suggested that the judge had any personal bias or prejudice concerning the defendant or any personal knowledge of the case from facts outside the record. Moreover, because the defendant, the victim, and other witnesses were all affiliated with the same organization with which the judge allegedly was affiliated, the complaint did not create a reasonable question about the judge’s impartiality in the criminal case for purposes of Rule 2.11 of the Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct.

Main Point: The judicial discipline process is not a substitute for appellate review.

C.J. No. 15, 2019

The complainant, who had reported for jury duty, filed a judicial misconduct complaint against a judge who spoke to the potential jurors. The complainant alleged that the judge was rude to her when she told him that she was hard of hearing and could not hear him. She alleged that this conduct violated Rules 1.1 (compliance with the law), 1.2 (promoting confidence in the judiciary), 2.3 (performing judicial duties without bias, prejudice, or impropriety) and 2.8 (treating litigants, lawyers, and jurors with courtesy) of the Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct.

The complaint was dismissed. The complaint alleged discourteous conduct towards a member of the public, but not the kind of willful and persistent misconduct in office requiring further disciplinary proceedings. The court expressed appreciation of the complainant’s diligent performance of her civic duty.

Main Point: Discourteous conduct towards a member of the public, by itself, is not the kind of willful and persistent misconduct that is subject to disciplinary proceedings in the Court on the Judiciary.

C.J. No. 14, 2019

The complainants, who were involved in a custody and visitation matter, filed a judicial misconduct complaint against the judge. They alleged that the judge violated Delaware law and exhibited bias against them and members of their family in violation of the Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct. They argued that the judge’s bias was demonstrated by the fact that the judge had ruled against them on a number of occasions.

The complaint was dismissed. The allegations in the complaint did not create a rational inference that the judge lacked impartiality. The court noted that the judge had made other rulings in favor of the complainants and their family members. And even after the complainants and their family members had engaged in contempt of court and obstructed court orders, the judge gave them additional opportunities to correct course. It was only after they repeatedly refused to follow court orders that the judge ruled in their opponent’s favor. The complaint in the Court on the Judiciary was based on their disagreement with the judge’s legal rulings. A complaint in the Court on the Judiciary is not a proper vehicle for challenging the merits of a judicial officer’s rulings.

Main Point: Disagreement with a judge’s legal rulings does not establish judicial bias. The judicial discipline process is not a substitute for appellate review.

C.J. No. 8, 2019

The complainant alleged that a judge ignored laws, acted unprofessionally, and exhibited bias in violation of the Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct.

The complaint was dismissed. The complainant questioned the judge’s impartiality, but failed to describe any facts supporting her claim. She also did not provide a transcript or other documentation to support her claim of misconduct. Without a transcript, supporting documents, or even a narrative description of the conduct of which she complained, she had not provided the court with a “fair and accurate account of the context in which the alleged misconduct . . . occurred,” as required by Delaware Court on the Judiciary Rule 5(a). In addition, to the extent that the complainant challenged the judge’s legal rulings, matters subject to appellate review do not state a claim within the limited jurisdiction of the Court on the Judiciary. Instead, disputes about legal rulings should be raised in a timely appeal.

Main Point: A complaint in the Court on the Judiciary must describe the facts, with supporting documents or a transcript if available, on which the claim of judicial misconduct is based. In addition, the judicial discipline process is not a substitute for appellate review.

C.J. No. 7, 2019

The defendant in a criminal case filed a judicial misconduct complaint alleging that the judge was biased against him and conspired with a prosecutor to compensate a witness who testified again him.

The complaint was dismissed. The complainant did not identify any facts to support his claim of bias. He did not allege that the judge had any improper personal reason for being biased against him or in favor of the witness. He also did not allege any facts to support his claim that the judge conspired with the prosecutor.

Main Point: A complainant must support a claim of judicial bias with facts suggesting that the judge had a motive to rule against him for improper reasons.

C.J. No. 6, 2019

The defendant in a criminal case filed a judicial misconduct complaint claiming that the trial judge violated Rule 2.2 (governing impartiality and fairness) of the Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct. The complaint alleged that the judge was not impartial because the judge made statements during a motion to suppress hearing, before all the testimony had been provided, that compared the circumstances at issue in the complainant’s case to the circumstances in the legal precedent cited by the parties. The complaint also alleged that the judge’s use of the word “we” when summarizing the circumstances surrounding the search at issue indicated a lack of impartiality.

The complaint was dismissed. The complainant questioned the judge’s impartiality, but failed to provide any facts suggesting that the judge was biased against him, or had any reason to be. A review of the transcript of the suppression hearing confirmed that the judge engaged with the parties on issues concerning the application of legal precedent to the circumstances of the search at issue, as those circumstances were described in the parties’ briefing and as reflected by testimony provided at the hearing. Similarly, the judge’s use of the word “we” appeared to have been simply a verbal mechanism for summarizing or referring back to the information that had been presented about the search and did not reflect a lack of impartiality. The complainant should have raised his arguments concerning the trial judge’s rulings in an appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, not a complaint in the Court on the Judiciary. He could not use the judicial discipline process as an alternate form of appellate review.

Main Point: A claim of judicial bias must be supported with facts suggesting that the judge had some improper reason, such as a personal interest or bias, to rule against the litigant. The judicial discipline process is not a substitute for appellate review.

C.J. No. 5, 2019

The defendant in a criminal case filed a judicial misconduct complaint claiming that the trial judge violated Rule 2.2 (requiring a judge be faithful to the law) and Rule 2.3 (requiring a judge perform judicial duties free from bias or prejudice) of the Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct. The complaint alleged that the trial judge accepted the guilty plea while knowing it was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.

The complaint was dismissed. The complainant questioned the judge’s impartiality, but failed to provide any facts suggesting that the judge was biased against him, or had any reason to be. A review of the plea transcript contradicted the allegation that the plea was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Nor did it reflect any evidence of bias. The complainant could have raised the arguments regarding his guilty plea in the appellate process. He could not use the judicial discipline process as an alternate form of appellate review.

Main Point: A claim of judicial bias must be supported with facts suggesting that the judge had some motive to rule against the litigant for improper reasons. The judicial discipline process is not a substitute for appellate review.

C.J. No. 4, 2019

The complainant alleged that the trial judge violated Rule 1.1 (requiring a judge comply with the law), Rule 2.2 (requiring a judge be faithful to the law), and Rule 2.3 (requiring a judge perform judicial duties free from bias or prejudice) of the Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct. Specifically, the complainant accused the judge of revoking his in forma pauperis status in violation of Delaware law. The complainant also accused the judge of bias in the complainant’s pending civil matter because the judge had recently denied a motion to modify the complainant’s sentence in an unrelated criminal matter.

The complaint was dismissed. The complainant questioned the judge’s impartiality but failed to provide any facts suggesting that the judge was biased against him, or had any reason to be. The complainant could raise the revocation of his in forma pauperis status on appeal in the civil matter still pending before the trial court. The complainant could not use the judicial discipline process as an alternate form of appellate review.

Main Point: A claim of judicial bias must be supported with facts suggesting that the judge had some motive to rule against the litigant for improper reasons. The judicial discipline process is not a substitute for appellate review.

C.J. No. 3, 2019

A mother filed a complaint against the judge presiding over proceedings involving her children. The mother claimed that the judge’s rulings were wrong and that the judge was biased against her.

The complaint was dismissed. The mother’s disagreement with the judge’s rulings was subject to appellate review, not the judicial discipline process. The mother provided no facts to support her claim that the judge was biased against her. The audio recordings of the hearing did not support the mother’s claims.

Main Point: The Court on the Judiciary has no jurisdiction to consider the merits of a judicial officer’s ruling. The judicial discipline process is not a form of appellate review. A claim of judicial bias must be supported with facts suggesting that the judge had some motive to rule against the litigant for improper reasons.

C.J. No. 2, 2019

The complainant alleged that a judge intimidated her into providing confidential information during a court proceeding and falsified the transcript of the hearing in order to conceal his alleged wrongdoing.

The complaint was dismissed. The complainant did not identify any specific ways in which the transcript differed from her recollection of the hearing, and the Court’s review of the audio recording of the hearing confirmed that the transcript accurately reflected the words spoken during the hearing. A judge’s intimidating conduct toward a litigant or witness, if proven, would violate Rule 2.8(B) of the Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct, but the audio recording of the hearing reflected that the judge remained calm and courteous and did not treat the complainant disrespectfully or use an intimidating tone of voice. The complainant’s allegations that the judge insisted that she provide the confidential information, despite her protests, amounted to a disagreement with the judge’s ruling regarding the evidence that the complainant had to provide in order to obtain the relief she had requested from the court. Those allegations were therefore subject to dismissal.

Main Point: A complaint that is based on a disagreement with a judicial officer’s legal decisions is outside the Court on the Judiciary’s jurisdiction and is subject to dismissal.

C.J. No. 1, 2019

A father filed a complaint against the judge presiding over a case involving his children. He claimed that the judge violated the Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct by: (i) failing to rule on a petition he had filed three years earlier; (ii) giving him insufficient notice of a hearing on a new petition he had filed; (iii) conferring separately with his child during a hearing; and (iv) displaying bias against him.

The complaint was dismissed. First, the Court found that the judge had essentially denied the petition filed three years ago and the father could have filed an appeal at that time if he felt the judge failed to address his petition sufficiently. The father could not use the judicial discipline process as an alternate form of appellate review. Second, while it would have been preferable for the father to receive more notice that a previously scheduled hearing would include discussion of scheduling for his new petition, the new petition was not heard at that time and the father had several months notice of when the new petition would be heard by the court. Third, court rules allowed the judge to speak with the child separately, neither parent objected, and the judge shared the subject matter of the discussion with both parents. Finally, the father failed to provide any facts suggesting that the judge was biased against him, or had any reason to be. The father failed to provide a transcript of the hearing where he claimed the judge was biased, but the audio recording did not support his claim that the judge favored one parent over the other.

Main Point: The judicial discipline process is not a substitute for appellate review. A claim of judicial bias must be supported with facts suggesting that the judge had some motive to rule against the litigant for improper reasons.

C.J. No. 11, 2018

The complainant filed a complaint against the judge who previously sentenced her. She alleged that the judge violated Rules 1.2(A) (requiring a judge to act all times in a manner promoting public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary) and 2.3(B) (requiring a judge to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety) of the Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct. Specifically, she argued that the judge made negative comments about her at sentencing, failed to dismiss her convictions after the victim’s parent made certain statements at sentencing, and violated the United States Constitution by imposing an overly long sentence.

The complaint was dismissed. The complainant questioned the judge’s impartiality, but failed to cite any facts suggesting that the judge had an improper personal reason to be biased against her. The complainant raised or could have raised the other issues on appeal from her convictions or in postconviction proceedings. The complainant could not use the judicial discipline process as an additional or alternative form of appellate review.

Main Point: Complainants must support their claims of judicial bias with facts. The judicial discipline process is not a substitute or additional form of appellate review.

C.J. No. 8, 2018

For the second time, a complainant filed a complaint against the judge who had accepted her son’s guilty plea and sentenced him. The first complaint was dismissed because: (i) the complainant did not include a transcript of the hearing where she alleged that the misconduct occurred; and (ii) the complaint was based on her disagreement with her son’s guilty plea and sentence, which her son could have challenged in a direct appeal or in a postconviction motion. The second complaint attached a transcript of the hearing where the misconduct allegedly occurred.

The complaint was dismissed. The transcript did not support the complainant’s claims of judicial misconduct. The complainant also acknowledged that her claims of judicial misconduct were based on her disagreement with her son’s guilty plea and sentence, which her son could have challenged on direct appeal or in a postconviction motion. The Clerk was directed to reject any additional complaints that the complainant filed challenging the judge’s handling of her son’s guilty plea and sentence.

Main Point: Complainants should not file multiple complaints challenging the same incident.

C.J. No. 4, 2018

A mother filed a complaint in the Court on the Judiciary against the judge who had accepted her son’s guilty plea and sentenced him. The mother alleged that, during the guilty plea and sentencing hearing, the judge: (i) made cruel and false statements to her; (ii) ignored her pleas regarding her son’s health problems and threw papers at her son during the hearing; and (iii) was prejudiced and close-minded.

The complaint was dismissed. First, the Court found that the complaint was subject to dismissal because the complainant failed to include a transcript of the hearing where the alleged misconduct occurred. Under the Rules of the Court on the Judiciary, a complaint must include any transcript or documents necessary to give the Court a fair and accurate account of the context in which the alleged misconduct occurred. Second, the son could have raised any issues with his guilty plea or sentence on appeal or in a motion for sentence modification.

Main Point: If a complainant attacks a judge’s statements at a hearing, they must include a transcript of that hearing with their complaint to provide a fair and accurate account of the context of the statements. Allegations based on a litigant’s disagreement with a ruling of a judge do not state a claim within the limited jurisdiction of the Court on the Judiciary.

C.J. No. 11, 2017

A husband and wife filed complaints in the Court on the Judiciary against the judge who decided their case against a moving company. They alleged that the judge’s decision was wrong. They also alleged that the judge scolded and humiliated the wife at trial after the wife used the term “girl” to describe an employee of the moving company.

The complaint was dismissed. To the extent the complainants challenged the judge’s decision, the complaint was subject to dismissal because they should have filed an appeal. To the extent the complainants challenged the judge’s behavior, the complaint was subject to dismissal because they failed to provide a transcript or audio recording. Under the Rules of the Court on the Judiciary, a complaint must include any transcript or documents necessary to give the Court a fair and accurate account of the context in which the alleged misconduct occurred.

An audio recording of the trial was obtained to make sure dismissal was appropriate. The audio recording reflected that the judge was trying to help the wife, who was struggling, with her cross-examination of a witness. When rephrasing the wife’s question, the judge referred to witness as a “girl” as the wife had been doing, but then changed the word to “woman.” The judge explained that the word “woman” was more appropriate under the circumstances. The judge did not sound angry or yell at the wife for a long time as the husband and wife claimed.

Main Point: When challenging a judge’s comments at a hearing, a complainant must provide a transcript or recording of the hearing to give the Court a fair and accurate account of the context of the comments. If the transcript or recording contradicts the allegations in the complaint, the complaint may be dismissed.

C.J. No. 16, 2016

For the third time in five years, the defendant in a criminal case filed a judicial misconduct complaint against the judge who presided over his trial and sentenced him. As he did in his previous complaints, which were dismissed after initial review, the complainant alleged that the judge was biased against him and that his convictions and sentence were invalid.

The complaint was dismissed after initial review. The complaint contained no new facts to support a claim of judicial misconduct. Indeed, the docket in the criminal case did not reflect any activity in the case since the complainant had filed his last complaint in the Court on the Judiciary. Because the complainant’s allegations of bias and misconduct had already been addressed in his criminal proceedings and dismissed twice in the Court on the Judiciary, the Court found that the complainant’s repeated filing of judicial misconduct complaints in an attempt to overturn the convictions and sentence was an abuse of the judicial disciplinary process. The clerk was directed to reject any future complaints from the complainant that were based on the same stale facts.

Main Point: A complainant abuses the judicial disciplinary process when he repeatedly files complaints based on the same facts. A complaint who abuses the judicial disciplinary process in this way will not be allowed to continue filing complaints based on the same facts.

C.J. No. 15, 2016

A man and his wife appeared at a hearing to challenge a traffic ticket they had received for riding their bicycles on a sidewalk. The judge upheld the ticket. The man filed a complaint in the Court on the Judiciary claiming that the judge was wrong and that the traffic ticket should not have been upheld because bicycle-riding was not prohibited on the section of sidewalk where the man and his wife had been stopped.

The complaint was dismissed after initial review. The complainant’s allegations did not support a rational inference of judicial misconduct. Also, the traffic rule that the complainant and his wife were found to have violated prohibited anyone twelve or older from riding a bicycle on any sidewalk.

Main Point: Allegations based on a litigant’s disagreement with a ruling of a judge do not state a claim within the limited jurisdiction of the Court on the Judiciary.

C.J. No. 10, 2016

The complainant filed a judicial misconduct complaint against a judge who served on the board of a non-profit charitable organization. In the two-paragraph complaint, the complainant alleged that the non-profit charitable organization had a multi-million-dollar contract with a State agency and that the judge had colluded with other government officials to put another non-profit organization out of business. The complaint attached a copy of a similar complaint filed with the Office of Civil Rights and Public Trust.

The complaint was dismissed after initial review. Under Rule 3.7 of the Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge may serve as a director of a non-profit charitable organization not conducted for economic or political advantages of its members, as long as: (i) it is unlikely that the charitable organization will be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the judge or will be regularly engaged in adversary proceedings in any court; (ii) the judge does not solicit funds for the charitable organization, use or permit the use of the judicial office for such fund solicitation, or personally participate in membership solicitation if the solicitation might reasonably be perceived as coercive or essentially fund-raising; and (iii) the judge does not give investment advice to the charitable organization. In this case, the complaint did not allege that the judge violated any of the provisions of Rule 3.7, and neither the complaint nor the attachment to the complaint provided any information from which the Court could infer that the judge’s participation on the board of the non-profit charitable organization violated any of the provisions of Rule 3.7.

Main Point: Rule 3.7 of the Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct expressly permits judges, subject to certain limitations, to participate in charitable activities. To assert a violation of Rule 3.7, a complainant must allege how a judge’s charitable activities violate the rule.

C.J. No. 9, 2016

The complainant alleged that when he appeared for a trial, he was informed that the trial had been postponed. The complainant waited for more than an hour for a new trial date. According to the complainant, when he complained about the lengthy wait, court staff treated him discourteously and court security officers approached him in an overbearing and threatening matter.

The complaint was dismissed after initial review. The complaint did not allege misconduct on the part of a judicial officer. The complainant was directed to the trial court’s website for information about how to file a complaint concerning the court’s operations.

Main Point: The Court on the Judiciary will not consider a complaint that does not allege misconduct on the part of a judicial officer.

C.J. No. 6, 2016

The complainant alleged that a court commissioner’s issuance of a protection from abuse order was evidence that the commissioner was biased against the complainant.

The complaint was dismissed after initial review. The complainant alleged no facts rationally supporting an inference that the commissioner was biased against the complainant or that the commissioner had any reason to be biased against the complainant. Moreover, the record reflected that the complainant consented to the entry of the order. But even if the complainant had not consented to the entry of the order, the proper course to challenge the order was to appeal the order to a judge.

Main Point: A complainant must support claims of judicial bias with facts rationally supporting an inference that a judicial officer was motivated to rule for or against the complainant for reasons other than the merits of the issues as the judicial officer perceived them. The Court on the Judiciary has no jurisdiction to consider the merits of a judicial officer’s ruling. The judicial discipline process is not a form of appellate review.

C.J. No. 4, 2016

A defendant filed a judicial misconduct complaint claiming that a trial court failed to send him a court order and that the judge who issued the order was responsible for the error.

The complaint was dismissed after initial review because it did not allege a claim of judicial misconduct. To the extent the complainant contended that the delay in sending the order prevented him from filing a timely notice of appeal, his remedy was in filing the appeal and asking the appellate court to excuse the delay because it was caused by court-related personnel.

Main Point: An isolated incidence of a judicial officer’s alleged failure to ensure that a court decision was provided to a party does not meet the requisite standard of persistence sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court on the Judiciary. To the extent the complainant contended that the delay in sending the order prevented him from filing a timely notice of appeal, his remedy was in filing the appeal and asking the appellate court to excuse the delay because it was caused by court-related personnel.

C.J. No. 3, 2016

The president of a homeowner’s association filed a complaint in the Court on the Judiciary against the judge who granted a telecommunication company’s application to build a cell tower near the residential community. The complainant alleged that the judge’s decision had the appearance of impropriety because the attorney for the telecommunication company was a “social and political acquaintance” of the judge and had likely supported the judge when she ran for elected office a decade earlier.

The complaint was dismissed after initial review. The complainant pled no facts supporting a rational basis to infer that the judge was influenced in any manner by the fact that the telecommunication company’s attorney was an active supporter of the judge’s political campaign a decade earlier or that the judge had any improper reason to rule in favor of the telecommunication company. Judicial disqualification is seldom warranted on the basis of a judge’s political background or party affiliation or on the basis that the judge was a political figure before becoming a judge. Moreover, unlike other states where lawyers regularly donate to judicial candidates, Delaware has a bipartisan judiciary that is appointed, not elected, to judicial office.

Main Point: A judge does not have to disqualify from a case merely because the judge is acquainted with a lawyer involved in the case. Judicial disqualification is seldom warranted on the basis of a judge’s political background or party affiliation or on the basis that the judge was a political figure before becoming a judge.

C.J. No. 1, 2016

The father and mother in a child custody case filed cross petitions for protection from abuse. The father was incarcerated out-of-state. At a hearing, a court commissioner entered an order postponing the proceedings due to the father’s incarceration.

The father filed a judicial misconduct complaint against the commissioner. The father alleged that the commissioner “delayed mailing” the order postponing the proceedings to keep father from filing a timely motion to reargue the order. The father also alleged that the commissioner improperly considered information offered by the mother at the hearing, which the father could not attend because of his incarceration.

The complaint was dismissed after initial review. The complainant did not plead any facts supporting a rational inference that the commissioner was responsible for delay in mailing the postponement order or that the commissioner had any reason to cause such a delay. The complainant also did not allege any facts rationally supporting an inference that anything was discussed at the hearing other than the need to postpone and reschedule the hearing due to the complainant’s incarceration. To the extent the complainant contended that delay in mailing the commissioner’s postponement order prejudiced him because it prevented him from filing a timely motion for reargument of the order, the complainant could have sought relief in an appeal to the judge. The general prohibition against communications between a party and a judge when the opposing party is not present, is not intended to preclude communications concerning matters which are purely procedural and that in no way bear on the merits of a proceeding, such as those pertaining to scheduling. Also, an isolated incidence of an alleged improper communication between a party and a judge occurring in the absence of the opposing party, particularly when the communication is made in a recorded proceeding that is reviewable, is the sort of concern that should be raised on appeal and does not rise to the serious level required to state a claim of judicial misconduct.

Main Point: The prohibition against a communication between a party and a judge in the absence of the opposing party is not intended to preclude communications concerning matters which are purely procedural and that in no way bear on the merits of a proceeding, such as matter pertaining to scheduling. An isolated incidence of an alleged improper communication between a party and a judge, particularly when the communication is made in a recorded proceeding that is reviewable, is the sort of concern that should be raised on appeal and does not rise to the serious level required to state a claim of judicial misconduct.

C.J. No. 15, 2015

The defendant in a criminal case was granted permission to represent himself at trial. The defendant’s former defense attorney remained involved in the case as “standby counsel” to provide advice and guidance to the defendant if the defendant asked for such assistance during the trial. The defendant filed an assortment of letters, motions, and petitions in various courts challenging many aspects of his criminal case. In his complaint in the Court on the Judiciary, the defendant alleged that the trial judge assigned to his criminal case had conspired with other judges, the prosecutor assigned to the case, the defendant’s standby counsel, and various court clerks, to cover up the trial judge’s judicial misconduct and incompetence and to wrongfully convict the defendant of the charges in the criminal case. The defendant alleged that the trial judge’s participation in the alleged conspiracy and cover-up constituted wilful and persistent violations of the Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct. The complaint was dismissed after initial review. The defendant’s allegations of judicial misconduct were not supported by any pled facts or evidence.

Main Point: To state a claim of judicial misconduct based on a judge’s bias against a litigant, there must be pled facts that support a rational reason to believe that the judge had some motive to rule against the litigant for improper reasons. The mere fact that a judge has ruled against a litigant, even repeatedly, does not support a rational inference that the rulings were based on anything other than the underlying merits of the case. A litigant may not use the judicial discipline process as an alternative form of appellate review.

C.J. No. 14, 2015

A father in a child custody case filed a complaint in the Court on the Judiciary against the Judge who presided over the parties’ petitions for custody and petitions for protection from abuse seeking a restraining order. The parties agreed that the petitions for protection from abuse should be resolved by a consent order without a finding of abuse. Under the terms of the consent order, the parties were prohibited from contacting each other for one year.

In his complaint in the Court on the Judiciary, Father claimed that the Judge was biased against him. Father based the allegation on a remark, made by the Judge during one of the custody hearings, which suggested that Father’s lawyer may need to obtain a restraining order against Father. Father contended that there was no basis in the record to make such a suggestion, and that the remark reflected the Judge’s belief that Father was more prone to violence than Mother.

Under the Rules of the Court on the Judiciary, a complaint must include any transcript or documents necessary to give the Court a fair and accurate account of the context in which the alleged misconduct occurred. If a complaint does not include the necessary transcript or documents, the complaint can be dismissed. In this case, Father did not provide the Court with a transcript of the hearing where the alleged remark was made. But to be sure dismissal was appropriate, the Chief Justice listened to an audio recording of the hearing.

The audio recording revealed that, at the end of the hearing, the Judge gave the parties an opportunity to ask questions about what was going to be expected of them going forward. Concerned that the parties would be expected to communicate with each other about the child’s upcoming doctor appointments and knowing that the consent order prohibiting such contact was still in effect, Father asked the Judge two questions about how he should communicate with Mother. In response to the first question, the Judge advised Father that while the consent order was still in effect he should communicate with Mother through Father’s lawyer. When Father asked the same question a second time, the Judge advised Father, in jest, that unless Father’s lawyer obtained a restraining order against Father, Father should communicate with Mother through his lawyer. After listening to the recording, the Chief Justice found it clear that the Judge’s remark was made light-heartedly and was received as such by Father and his lawyer. Because the audio recording did not reflect any indication that the Judge was biased against Father, and because Father’s other allegations of misconduct concerned the merits of the Judge’s rulings and were outside the scope of the Court on the Judiciary, the Chief Justice dismissed the complaint.

Main Point: A Judge’s comments that are alleged to suggest bias or impropriety must be considered in the context in which the comments were made.

C.J. No. 12, 2015

The plaintiff in a personal injury case filed a complaint in the Court on the Judiciary against the Judge who dismissed the case. Plaintiff alleged that the Judge’s rulings in the case constituted an obstruction of justice, which is a felony. Also, the Plaintiff alleged that the Judge violated the Code of Conduct when the Judge allowed an attorney, who purportedly practiced law with the Judge’s brother, to represent the defendant.

The Chief Justice dismissed the complaint after finding that the Plaintiff pled no facts rationally supporting the obstruction of justice claim. It was clear from the face of the complaint that Plaintiff was complaining about the merit of the Judge’s rulings, which were not appropriate for review by the Court on the Judiciary. The Chief Justice noted that there was no evidence that the Judge’s brother, or any relative of the Judge for that matter, practiced law with the attorney who represented the defendant, and that if Plaintiff believed a conflict existed, she could have filed a motion seeking the Judge’s disqualification.

Main Point: The Court on the Judiciary is not the appropriate place to seek a Judge’s disqualification in a case or to attack the merit of a Judge’s rulings.

C.J. No. 10, 2015

The mother in a child custody case filed a complaint in the Court on the Judiciary against a Judge who issued an order deciding that it was in the child’s best interest to change schools. Mother’s complaint challenged the order, claiming that it violated her Constitutional right to send her child to a religious school. Mother also claimed that the order led to the child missing a month of school because the school designated in the order was at capacity and would not enroll the child until there was an opening, and that no other school would accept the child. Moreover, according to Mother, when the Judge received a letter from the school’s legal counsel stating that the school could not admit the child right away, the Judge took no action to resolve the problem until the Judge was contacted by a state legislator to whom Mother turned for assistance.

The Chief Justice dismissed the complaint after finding nothing in the complaint suggesting that the Judge committed judicial misconduct when ruling that the school transfer was in the best interest of the child. The Chief Justice concluded that Mother’s claim of religious bias offered no facts supporting such a conclusion and was not supported by the record, and that Mother could have raised her First Amendment claim in an appeal from the Judge’s order. Although sympathetic to the difficulty Mother faced when she learned that the school would not admit the child right away, the Chief Justice noted that Mother did not file a motion seeking clarification of the Judge’s order. Also, Mother stated in the complaint that when a request for guidance was made on her behalf by the state legislator, the Judge responded immediately.

Main Point: To bring a matter to the attention of a Judge or to seek relief in a case, a litigant should file an appropriate motion or petition in the court or case. The Court on the Judiciary does not conduct appellate review of a Judge’s decision. An allegation of judicial misconduct presenting no facts supporting the allegation does not state a claim for judicial discipline.

C.J. No. 9, 2015

The father in a child custody case filed a complaint in the Court on the Judiciary against the Commissioner who dismissed Father’s petition for protection from abuse seeking a restraining order against the mother for her alleged abuse of the parties’ child. Father also filed a motion in the Court on the Judiciary seeking the identity of an “unnamed judicial officer with the same pattern of practice” as the Commissioner. Father’s motion was based on a matter reported by the Delaware Child Death Review Commission concerning a judicial officer’s failure to report a case of suspected child abuse. The Chief Justice dismissed the motion and ordered it stricken on the basis that Father had not alleged a connection to the matter addressed in the Child Death Review Commission’s report, and that Father could not use the judicial discipline process to obtain confidential information to which he was not entitled.

In his complaint in the Court on the Judiciary, Father claimed that the Commissioner’s dismissal of Father’s protection from abuse petition ignored Father’s allegations of child abuse. Father also claimed that the Commissioner was biased against male litigants, and that during the hearing on Father’s petition, the Commissioner violated Delaware’s Judicial Guidelines for Civil Hearings Involving Self-Represented Litigants. Those guidelines, which were adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court in 2011, provide guidance to judges in cases where one or both of the litigants are self-represented.

The Chief Justice dismissed the complaint after finding that Father’s allegations of legal error and abuse of discretion did not invoke the jurisdiction of the Court on the Judiciary. The allegations in the complaint did not support a rational inference of wilful or persistent judicial misconduct. The complaint pled no facts rationally supporting an inference that the Commissioner was biased against male litigants. Delaware’s Judicial Guidelines for Civil Hearings Involving Self-Represented Litigants do not create additional standards for imposing judicial discipline.

Main Point: Alleged violations of Delaware’s Judicial Guidelines for Civil Hearings Involving Self-Represented Litigants do not invoke the jurisdiction of the Court on the Judiciary. Alleged errors in a judge’s rulings are subject to appellate review, not review by the Court on the Judiciary. A litigant must plead facts to support a rational inference of judicial bias.

C.J. No. 5, 2015

The father in a custody and visitation case filed a complaint in the Court on the Judiciary against the Commissioner who ruled on a petition filed by the mother against the father for his alleged failure to obey a temporary custody and visitation order.

Mother filed the petition when Father failed to return the children after a visitation. At a hearing on the petition, Father testified that the children were at risk in Mother’s care. After finding no credible evidence to support Father’s claim that the children were at risk in Mother’s care, the Commissioner ruled that Father’s refusal to return the children violated the parties’ temporary custody and visitation order. The Commissioner found Father in contempt of the order and ordered him to return the children to Mother. Father did not appeal the Commissioner’s order.

In his complaint in the Court on the Judiciary, Father claimed that the hearing on Mother’s petition violated his right to due process, and that the Commissioner’s order returning the children to Mother placed the children in harm’s way. The Chief Justice dismissed the complaint after finding nothing in the complaint supporting a rational inference that the Commissioner engaged in misconduct when hearing the petition. Father’s objection to the Commissioner’s order was a matter for appellate review.

Main Point: In the absence of anything in the complaint supporting a rational inference of wilful or persistent misconduct justifying the imposition of judicial discipline, a party’s disagreement with a judge’s rulings cannot form the basis of a complaint in the Court on the Judiciary. A litigant may not use the judicial discipline process as a substitute for appellate review.

C.J. No. 3, 2015

The complaint in the Court on the Judiciary was filed by a litigant who filed a court case seeking the return of personal property from a state correctional officer. The correctional officer was represented by a deputy attorney general. The judge granted the correctional officer’s motion to dismiss the litigant’s case. Instead of appealing the dismissal to a higher court, the litigant filed a complaint against the judge. The litigant accused the judge and the deputy attorney general of conspiring to violate the litigant’s constitutional rights. After reviewing the complaint and the other documents filed by the litigant, the Chief Justice found that the litigant offered no facts supporting his claims of a conspiracy between the deputy attorney general and the. judge who dismissed the case, and that the litigant could have raised his legal claims of constitutional error in an appeal

Main Point: A litigant may not use the judicial discipline process as a substitute for appellate review.

C.J. No. 2, 2015

The complaint in the Court on the Judiciary was filed by an out-of-state litigant who represented herself in a civil case in Delaware. The litigant filed her court documents with the help of a private document delivery service. The litigant mistakenly instructed the document service to deliver a pleading to the judge’s chambers instead of to the court clerk as required under the rules. When the litigant called to make sure that the court had received the pleading and was told the pleading had not been filed, the litigant became upset and began sending emails accusing the judge, the judge’s staff, and the court clerk of mishandling the pleading. In response to the litigant’s emails, the judge sent a letter advising the parties that they were required to obey the court’s filing rules.

Court staff eventually located the litigant’s 500-page pleading, but found that it was unbound and lacked a title page and a certificate of service. The pleading was returned to the litigant with instructions to correct it and re-file it with the court clerk. The litigant again became upset and sent a series of emails to the judge’s staff and court clerk. The litigant disputed that the pleading was filed without a title page and accused the court of tampering with the document.

The judge held a teleconference with the parties. During the teleconference, the judge told the litigant that she would be held in contempt of court if she did not stop sending harassing emails to the court. After the teleconference, the litigant filed a motion asking the judge to remove himself from the case because it was clear he was biased against her. The litigant also filed a complaint in the Court on the Judiciary.

In her complaint in the Court on the Judiciary, the litigant accused the judge of bullying her during the teleconference and of “aiding and abetting the tampering” of her pleading. After reviewing the complaint and supporting documents, which included a transcript of the teleconference, the Chief Justice found no evidence of bullying by the judge and no evidence of document tampering. In the Order dismissing the complaint, the Chief Justice found that the judge properly admonished the litigant for her inappropriate conduct.

Main Point: A judge’s admonishment of a litigant during a teleconference for leveling baseless charges of “document tampering” against the judge and court personnel was not actionable in the Court on the Judiciary. Nothing in the complaint and supporting documents supported the litigant’s charges that she was bullied by the judge during the teleconference or that the judge or court staff tampered with the litigant’s document.

C.J. No. 1, 2015

The complaint in the Court on the Judiciary arose from a legal battle between a homeowner and his Homeowners’ Association (“HOA”) over the trimming of trees and shrubbery on the homeowner’s property. The complaint against the judge in the case was filed by the homeowner’s lawyer.

Under a settlement agreement and consent order, the homeowner agreed to trim the trees and shrubbery on his property, and the HOA agreed to dismiss its lawsuit against the homeowner. When the homeowner didn’t trim the trees and shrubbery by the agreed-upon date, the HOA filed a petition claiming that the homeowner was in violation of the consent order. After a hearing, the judge ruled that the homeowner was in violation of the consent order and awarded attorney’s fees to the HOA. The judge also encouraged the parties and their counsel to work together to resolve the case by coming up with a list of what work needed to be done and where. Unfortunately, counsel failed to bring the parties into agreement.

Eventually, the homeowner’s counsel filed a letter advising the judge and the HOA’s counsel that no further proceedings were necessary because the homeowner had transferred ownership of the property to his wife, who was not a party to the consent order. The HOA opposed the transfer, calling it a sham transaction, and asked the judge to make the homeowner’s wife a party in the case.

Following a hearing, the judge found that the homeowner, on the advice of his lawyer, transferred the property to his wife to prevent the enforcement of the consent order. The judge awarded attorney’s fees to the HOA. Also, the judge indicated that he would ask the Office of Disciplinary Counsel to look into the conduct of the homeowner’s lawyer and determine if the lawyer violated the Delaware Lawyers Rules of Professional Conduct.

In his complaint alleging judicial misconduct, the homeowner’s lawyer claimed that the judge was biased against him and that the homeowner did not receive a fair trial. After reviewing the complaint and the supporting documents to the complaint, which included the trial transcripts, the Chief Justice found that the record revealed no personal bias on the part of the judge. The Chief Justice found that the judge was remarkably patient in the face of exasperating, time-wasting, and unreasonable conduct by the parties and their lawyers. In the Order dismissing the complaint, the Chief Justice explained that a judge is required to manage the conduct of parties and lawyers and must hold parties and lawyers accountable when they engage in behavior that interferes with the proceedings. The Chief Justice concluded that if the homeowner or his lawyer believed that the homeowner did not receive a fair trial, the homeowner could raise those claims on appeal.

Main Point: A judge’s ruling that a party or the party’s lawyer engaged in unreasonable conduct is not actionable in the Court on the Judiciary when there is no factual basis supporting a rational inference that the judge was biased or committed misconduct.

C.J. No. 10, 2014

The complaint in the Court on the Judiciary was filed by one of the parties in a dispute between two neighbors over sewer and water lines that ran across their adjacent properties. After a trial, the judge ruled for one of the parties on the legal issue but awarded no damages. Unhappy with the judge’s ruling in the case, the party filed a complaint claiming that the judge was biased against him and tried to force the parties to settle the case. The party alleged that the judge acted annoyed and angry during the party’s presentation, and that the judge’s tone of voice and facial expressions caused him to abandon some of his arguments, which deprived him of a fair trial.

After reviewing the complaint and the trial transcripts submitted by the party, the Chief Justice dismissed the complaint after concluding that it was based on the party’s disagreement with the judge’s rulings, which were subject to appellate review. The Chief Justice found that the trial transcripts demonstrated that the party was given ample time to make both written and oral arguments and that the judge patiently listened and reviewed the lengthy record so that both parties were treated fairly and given full opportunity to be heard. The Chief Justice noted that a judge may encourage parties to settle a case and that the judge’s suggestions that the parties settle their property dispute was not judicial misconduct. The Chief Justice also found that there was no indication in the complaint or the transcripts that the judge was biased against the party or that the judge’s views were influenced by anything other than the merits of the issues in the case.

Main Point: In the absence of anything in the complaint and supporting papers supporting a rational inference of wilful or persistent misconduct justifying the imposition of judicial discipline, a party’s disagreement with the rulings of the judge cannot form the basis of a complaint in the Court on the Judiciary.

C.J. No. 9, 2014

A defendant in a criminal case filed a complaint in the Court on the Judiciary against the judge who denied the defendant’s motion seeking a modification of sentence. The defendant claimed that the judge’s denial of the motion was improper because the motion was based on the defendant’s immediate need for medical treatment. The Chief Justice dismissed the complaint after finding that the defendant’s claim was based on his disagreement with the judge’s decision, which the defendant could have appealed. The Chief Justice also noted that, to the extent the defendant was claiming that he had a compelling need for immediate medical attention that he was not receiving in prison, the defendant could file a civil case and request a hearing, but that the defendant’s remedy was not in the judicial discipline process in the Court on the Judiciary.

Main Point: A complaint in the Court on the Judiciary against the judge who denied an incarcerated defendant’s motion for modification of sentence was not the correct procedural device to remedy a claim that the prison was depriving the defendant of adequate medical care.

C.J. No. 7, 2014

The complaint was filed by a tenant in a landlord tenant case. The tenant was arrested when the police found marijuana in her apartment. The tenant’s lease prohibited any drug-related criminal activity in the rental unit and on the property. The lease was clear that a single violation of the drug provision would be good cause to terminate the lease. Following the tenant’s arrest, the landlord filed an action to terminate the lease and evict the tenant.

The tenant’s eviction case was scheduled before her criminal case. At the hearing in the eviction case, the tenant testified that the lease should not be terminated because the criminal charges against her were based on an illegal search, seizure, and arrest. The judge in the eviction case found that, whether or not the search, seizure and arrest were illegal, the tenant had violated the provision in the lease forbidding illegal drug activity in the apartment. The judge terminated the lease and awarded possession of the apartment to the landlord. The tenant appealed the judge’s decision to a three-judge panel and a new trial was scheduled. Before the new trial in the eviction case took place, the charges against the tenant in the criminal case were dismissed.

At the new trial in the eviction case, the tenant testified that she kept marijuana in her apartment only for her personal use, which she thought was legal, and that the dismissal of the criminal charges against her proved that she did not violate the lease. The three-judge panel ruled that the tenant’s admitted use of marijuana in the apartment violated the provision in the lease prohibiting illegal drug activity in the apartment. The three-judge panel terminated the lease and awarded possession of the apartment to the landlord.

In her complaint in the Court on the Judiciary, the tenant claimed that the judge in the eviction case was prejudiced against her. The Chief Justice dismissed the complaint after finding that the tenant had not supported her claim of prejudice with any facts that the judge was not impartial. The Chief Justice concluded that the tenant’s complaint was based on her disagreement with the judge’s decision that the tenant had violated the terms of the lease.

Main Point: In the absence of anything in the complaint and supporting papers supporting a claim of bias, a party’s disagreement with the rulings of the judge cannot form the basis of a complaint in the Court on the Judiciary.

C.J. No. 6, 2014

A defendant in a criminal case filed a complaint in the Court on the Judiciary against the judge who presided over the defendant’s trial and sentencing. The defendant accused the judge of racial discrimination and of plotting with the defendant’s trial counsel and the prosecutor to convict the defendant “any way they could.” Also, the defendant claimed that the judge stated at trial that she would “deny any and all future motions” filed by the defendant “without even examining the merit of the motions.” The Chief Justice reviewed the trial transcript and found no place where the judge stated or even suggested that she would “deny any and all future motions . . . without even examining the merit of the motions.” The Chief Justice dismissed the complaint on the basis that the general accusation of racial discrimination was not based on specific facts and that the claim of an alleged plot to “deny any and all future motions” was frivolous.

Main Point: A complaint based on facts not reflected in the record will be dismissed as frivolous.

C.J. No. 5, 2014

The CEO of an insurance company filed a complaint in the Court on the Judiciary against the judge who granted an order allowing the state insurance commissioner to seize the company. The CEO filed a motion asking the judge to remove himself from the case because the judge was biased. After a hearing, the judge denied the motion.

In his one-page complaint in the Court on the Judiciary, the CEO listed instances when the judge was biased against him. The Chief Justice found that the complaint did not include facts suggesting that the judge had a motive to rule against the CEO for improper reasons and that, at best, the complaint alleged that the judge at times reacted curtly to the CEO during court proceedings. The Chief Justice further found that the judge was confronted by the need to address the CEO’s improper behavior several times during the proceedings, and that the judge’s occasional terseness was understandable and did not violate the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Chief Justice dismissed the complaint after finding that the CEO raised issues that were based on his disagreement with the judge’s rulings, which could be reviewed on appeal.

Main Point: The judge’s occasional terseness in response to a litigant’s repeated improper courtroom behavior did not violate the Code of Conduct.

C.J. No. 1, 1999

The complaint in the Court on the Judiciary was filed by a plaintiff who was unsuccessful in a medical malpractice case and a legal malpractice case filed against the lawyer who represented him in the medical malpractice case. The same judge presided over both cases. The plaintiff appealed the judge’s decisions in both cases but was unsuccessful.

In his complaint in the Court on the Judiciary, the plaintiff claimed that the judge should not have presided over both cases. The Chief Justice dismissed the complaint after finding that the plaintiff had not alleged any facts that the judge was biased, and that the complaint was an attempt by the plaintiff to seek another review of the decisions in the malpractice cases.

Main Point: A judge may preside over multiple cases involving the same party. In the absence of a factual basis supporting a rational inference of bias on the part of the judge, a judge who presides over multiple cases involving the same party is not subject to judicial discipline.