

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

ORDER AMENDING THE §
DELAWARE UNIFORM RULES §
OF EVIDENCE §

Before **STRINE**, Chief Justice; **VALIHURA**, **VAUGHN**, **SEITZ**, and **TRAYNOR**, Justices, constituting the Court *en banc*.

ORDER

This 28th day of November 2017, it appears to the Court that:

WHEREAS, the Court established a permanent Advisory Committee on Supreme Court Rules, Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rules of Evidence (“Supreme Court Rules Committee”) in May 2016;

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court Rules Committee established the Trial Procedures Advisory Subcommittee (“Trial Procedures Subcommittee”), to, *inter alia*, review the Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence and consider whether the Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence should be amended to incorporate changes made to the Federal Rules of Evidence;

WHEREAS, the Trial Procedures Subcommittee concluded that the Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence should be amended to incorporate stylistic, non-substantive changes made to the Federal Rules of Evidence in 2011;

WHEREAS, the Trial Procedures Subcommittee determined that substantive changes should be made to Delaware Uniform Rule of Evidence 502 and, upon the

consideration and recommendation of a subcommittee to the previous Permanent Advisory Committee on the Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence, Delaware Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B);

WHEREAS, the Trial Procedures Subcommittee has recommended that the Court adopt the attached amendments to the Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence;

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence are amended as set forth in the attached Exhibit A;

(2) The amendments are effective on January 1, 2018 and shall govern in all proceedings commenced thereafter and, insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings then pending;

(3) All courts in this State are directed to review their respective rules and to make such amendments and additions as may be necessary to make them consistent with the attached Rules; and

(4) The Clerk of this Court is directed to transmit a certified copy of this order and exhibit to the clerk for each trial court in each county.

BY THE COURT:



Chief Justice

EXHIBIT A
DELAWARE UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE

Article I. General Provisions

Rule 101. Scope; Definitions.

(a) Scope. These Rules ~~govern~~apply to proceedings in the courts of this State,~~to the extent and~~. The specific courts and proceedings to which the Rules apply, along with the exceptions stated, are set out in Rule 1101.

(b) Definitions. In these Rules:

- (1) “civil case” means a civil action or proceeding;
- (2) “criminal case” includes a criminal proceeding;
- (3) “public office” includes a public agency;
- (4) “record” includes a memorandum, report, or data compilation;
- (5) a “rule prescribed by the Supreme Court” means a rule adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court under its constitutional or statutory authority;
and
- (6) a reference to any kind of written material or any other medium includes electronically stored information.

Comment

This rule largely follows F.R.E. 101, except that it refers to the courts of this State rather than the United States.~~the words “this State” are substituted for the words “the United States and before United States Magistrates.”~~

D.R.E. 101 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. The pre-2017 “Comment” to D.R.E. 101 was revised only as necessary to reflect the 2017 amendments and the current language of F.R.E. 101. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 102. Purpose and Construction.

These Rules shall be construed ~~to secure fairness in administration, elimination of~~so as to administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and ~~promotion of growth and~~promote the development of the law of evidence law, to the end ~~that~~of ascertaining the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.~~and securing a just determination.~~

Comment

This rule tracks F.R.E. 102.

D.R.E. 102 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 103. Rulings on Evidence.

~~(a) Effect~~**(a) Preserving a Claim of erroneous ruling. Error.** A party may not be predated upon claim error in a ruling which to admits or excludes evidence unless only if the error affects a substantial right of the party is affected, and:

(1) if the ruling admits evidence, a party, on the record:

(A) timely objects or moves to strike; and

(B) states the specific ground, unless it was apparent from the context;

or

(2) if the ruling excludes evidence, a party informs the court of its substance by an offer of proof, unless the substance was apparent from the context.

~~(1) (b) Not Needing to Renew an Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or (2) Offer of Proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked. or Offer of Proof.~~ Once the court makes a definitive ruling rules definitively on the record admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before or at trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.

~~(b) Record of offer and ruling~~**(c) Court's Statement About the Ruling; Directing an Offer of Proof.** The court may add make any other or further statement which shows about the character or form of the evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. The court may direct the making of that an offer of proof be made in question and answer form.

~~(e) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to~~**(d) Preventing the Jury from Hearing Inadmissible Evidence.** To the extent practicable, so as to prevent the court must conduct a jury trial so that inadmissible evidence from being is not suggested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of the jury.

~~(de) Taking Notice of Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking~~**Error.** A court may take notice of a plain errors affecting a substantial

~~rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court~~right, even if the claim of error was not properly preserved.

Comment

~~D.R.E. 103 tracks F.R.E. 103. The last sentence of D.R.E. 103(a) was added in 2001 to track F.R.E. 103(a) in effect on December 31, 2000.~~

D.R.E. 103 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. The pre-2017 “Comment” to D.R.E. 103 was revised only as necessary to reflect the 2017 amendments. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 104. Preliminary Questions.

~~(a) Questions of Admissibility Generally. Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of~~(a) In General. The court must decide any preliminary question about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this rule. In making its determination it is admissible. In so deciding, the court is not bound by the evidence rules of evidence, except those with respect to privileges on privilege.

~~(b) Relevancy Conditioned on~~Relevance That Depends on a Fact. When ever the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or in the court’s discretion subject to, the introduction of evidence on whether a fact exists, proof must be introduced sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition, that the fact does exist. The court, in its discretion, may admit the proposed evidence on the condition that the proof be introduced later.

~~(c) Conducting a Hearing of Jury. Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be so conducted when the interests of justice require or, when an accused is a witness, if he~~So That the Jury Cannot Hear It. The court must conduct any hearing on a preliminary question so that the jury cannot hear it if:

- (1) the hearing involves the admissibility of a confession;
- (2) a defendant in a criminal case is a witness and so requests; or
- (3) justice so requires.

~~(d) Testimony by Accused. The accused does not, by~~Cross-Examining a Defendant in a Criminal Case. By testifying ~~upon~~on a preliminary ~~matter,~~

~~subject himself~~question, a defendant in a criminal case does not become subject to cross-examination ~~as to~~on other issues in the case.

(e) **Evidence Relevant to Weight and Credibility.** This Rule does not limit ~~the right of~~ a party's right to introduce before the jury evidence that is relevant to the weight or credibility of other evidence.

Comment

See Rule 1101 and Rule 601.

Rule 104(a) tracks F.R.E. 104(a). It applies to preliminary hearings (called preliminary examination in F.R.E.) in criminal cases as well as to civil cases. See Rule 1101(~~b~~e) as to applicability of these rules to preliminary hearings in criminal cases.

Rule 104(b) largely tracks ~~tracks U.R.E. 104(b) rather than~~ F.R.E. 104(b), except for the addition of the words ~~-. The only difference between this rule and F.R.E. 104(b) is the addition of the words "or "in~~ its ~~the court's~~ discretion." in the second sentence.

Rule 104(c) tracks F.R.E. 104(c).

Rule 104(d) tracks F.R.E. 104(d). The Committee recognized that the rule, as drafted, does not address itself to the question of subsequent use of testimony given by an accused at a preliminary hearing. The Committee decided to leave the resolution of this problem to developing case law. See *Harris v. New York*, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S. Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971); *Walder v. United States*, 347 U.S. 62, 74 S. Ct. 354, 98 L. Ed. 503 (1954); *Simmons v. United States*, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S. Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968); *McCormick*, § 178, pp. 416-418.

Rule 104(e) tracks F.R.E. 104(e).

See Rule 801(d)(2)(E) as to statements made by co-conspirators.

For prior Delaware cases illustrating the law covered by Rule 104(a), see *Kelluem v. State*, Del. Supr., 396 A.2d 166 (1978); *State v. Brown*, Del. Oyer & Term., 36 A. 458 (1896).

D.R.E. 104 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. The pre-2017 "Comment" to D.R.E. 104 was revised only as necessary to

reflect the 2017 amendments. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 105. ~~Limited Admissibility~~ Limiting Evidence That Is Not Admissible Against Other Parties or for Other Purposes.

~~When~~If the court admits evidence ~~which~~that is admissible ~~as to~~against a party or for ~~1a~~ purpose — but not ~~admissible as to~~against another party or for another purpose ~~is admitted,~~— the court, ~~upon~~on timely request, ~~shall~~must restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.

Comment

This rule tracks F.R.E. 105. The present procedure in Delaware is for the court to give a jury instruction when evidence is admitted for a limited purpose and to again give a jury instruction when the jury is charged. The instruction is given only upon request of a party, however. The Committee approved this practice. A close relationship exists between this rule and Rule 403.

The Committee agreed that the rule should not be read to indicate that a limiting instruction in every case will cure any potential prejudice that might be encountered by the admission of the evidence. E.g., *Bruton v. United States*, 389 U.S. 818, 88 S. Ct. 126, 19 L. Ed. 2d 70 (1967). Such a decision is for the court to make under Rule 403 or applicable statutory or constitutional provisions. But see *Harrington v. California*, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S. Ct. 1726, 23 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1969), holding that not all violations of *Bruton* are reversible error. The Committee agreed that a violation of the rule of law set forth in *Bruton* should be avoided if possible and the evidence should not be admitted even though its admission might not be reversible error.

D.R.E. 105 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or ~~Record~~ Recorded Statements.

~~When~~If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement ~~or part thereof is introduced by a party,~~ an adverse party may require ~~him~~the introduction, at that time ~~to introduce,~~of any other part — or any other writing or recorded statement ~~which ought~~— that in fairness ought to be considered ~~contemporaneously with it~~at the same time.

Comment

This rule tracks F.R.E. 106. It is similar to Federal ~~and Delaware~~ Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a)(~~6~~4) and Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 32(a)(4) and Delaware Superior Court Civil Rule 32(a)(4). The Committee rejected the substitution of a “relevance” test for a “fairness” test for what must also be introduced if part of a writing or statement is introduced.

For prior Delaware case illustrating the law covered by this rule, see *Lowber v. State*, Del. Supr., 100 A. 322 (1917).

D.R.E. 106 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. The pre-2017 “Comment” to D.R.E. 106 was revised only as necessary to reflect the 2017 amendments and the current language of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

ARTICLE II. JUDICIAL NOTICE

Rule 201. Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts.

(a) ~~Scope of Rule.~~ This Rule governs ~~only~~ judicial notice of an adjudicative ~~facts~~fact only, not a legislative fact.

~~(b) (b) Kinds of Facts. A That May Be Judicially Noticed.~~ The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it is either:

(1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction ~~of the trial court;~~ or ~~(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to~~ (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.

~~(c) When Discretionary. A (c) Taking Notice.~~ The court:

(1) may take judicial notice, whether requested or not, on its own; or

~~(d) When Mandatory. A court shall~~ (2) must take judicial notice if ~~requested by~~ a party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary information.

(d) Timing. The court may take judicial notice at any stage of the proceeding.

~~(e) (e) Opportunity to Be Heard. A On timely request, a party is entitled upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to on the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request may be made after judicial notice has been taken.~~ (f) — Time of Taking Notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding nature of the fact to be noticed. If the court takes

judicial notice before notifying a party, the party, on request, is still entitled to be heard.

(g) Instructing the Jury. Upon request, the court ~~shall~~must instruct the jury to accept the noticed fact as conclusive ~~any fact judicially noticed.~~

Comment

This rule largely tracks F.R.E. 201 except for 201(fg) (see discussion below). This article is limited to adjudicative facts. In the interests of uniformity, the Committee rejected a proposal that this rule be expanded to cover legislative facts. See Davis, “Judicial Notice,” reprinted in Weinstein, pp. 201-22; McCormick §§ 328, 331; F.R.E. Advisory Committee’s note to article II.

The Committee recognized that courts sometimes judicially recognize legislative facts without giving the parties an opportunity to comment on the facts proposed to be judicially noticed. While recognizing that this may sometimes be unfair, the Committee did not think it should address this problem at this time.

Rule 201(fg) largely tracks F.R.E. 201(fg) except that the words “upon request” were added at the beginning and the last sentence of F.R.E. 201(fg) was deleted. ~~The rule as adopted tracks U.R.E. 201(g) except that U.R.E. 201(g) does not contain the words “upon request.”~~

The purpose of the changes from the F.R.E. is to make clear that a request for a jury instruction is required before reversible error is normally present and to eliminate any distinction between criminal and civil cases.

Article IV, § 19 of the Delaware Constitution states: “Judges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, but may state the questions of fact in issue and declare the law.”

The Committee agreed that once a fact is judicially noticed, no evidence to rebut that fact shall be permitted, but an objection to the taking of judicial notice of a fact should be considered by the judge before he agrees to take judicial notice.

See *Barks v. Herzberg*, 58 Del. 162, 206 A.2d 507 (Supr. 1965), holding that if a judge inquires into facts outside the record he should do so only with full notice to counsel with opportunity to comment.

For prior Delaware cases illustrating the law covered by Rule 201(b), see: Judicial notice not taken: *Wolf v. Keagy*, Del. Super., 136 A. 520 (1927);

Charles Tire Co. v. Owens, Del. Super., 186 A. 737 (1936); Bigger v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, Del. Super., 46 A.2d 137 (1946); Weinberg v. Hartman, Del. Super., 65 A.2d 805 (1949); Jackson v. Hearn Bros., Del. Supr., 212 A.2d 726 (1965); Hutchins v. State, Del. Supr., 153 A.2d 204 (1959); Fahey v. Sayer, Del. Supr., 106 A.2d 513 (1954); Hunter v. Quality Homes, Del. Super., 68 A.2d 620 (1949); LeGates v. Ennis, Del. Super., 180 A. 325 (1935); Downs v. Commissioners of Town of Smyrna, Del. Super., 45 A. 717 (1899); In re Fusco, Del. Orph., 127 A.2d 468 (1956); State v. Tootle, Del. Gen. Sess., 128 A. 484 (1837). See also McGraw v. Corrin, Del. Supr., 303 A.2d 641 (1973); Opinion of the Justices, Del. Supr., 216 A.2d 668 (1966).

[D.R.E. 201 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. The pre-2017 "Comment" to D.R.E. 201 was revised only as necessary to reflect the 2017 amendments. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.](#)

Rule 202. Judicial Notice of Law.

(a) **Judicial Notice of Laws.** Every court in this State ~~shall~~must take judicial notice of the ~~Constitution of the~~ United States Constitution, ~~and~~ case law relating thereto, and the Constitution, common law, case law and statutes of this State.

(1) ~~Judicial~~Every court in this State may take judicial notice ~~may also be taken~~ of the common law, case law and statutes of the United States, and every state, territory and jurisdiction of the United States.

(2) ~~In the case~~Reasonable notice of a request for judicial notice, ~~reasonable notice of the request shall~~ must be given to the adverse parties.

(b) **Information of the Court.** The court may inform itself of ~~such~~the laws ~~in such~~identified in paragraph (a) of this Rule in any manner ~~as that~~ it ~~may deem~~deems proper, ~~and the~~. The court may call upon counsel to aid it in obtaining ~~such~~this information.

(c) **Ruling Reviewable.** The determination of ~~such~~the laws ~~shall~~identified in paragraph (a) of this Rule must be made by the court and not by the jury, ~~and shall be~~. The determination is reviewable on appeal.

(d) **Private Acts, Regulations, Ordinances, Court Records.**

(1) ~~Judicial notice~~(1) The court may ~~be taken~~, without request by a party, take judicial notice of

(A) the private acts and resolutions of the Congress of the United States and of the General Assembly of this State, and of every other state, territory and jurisdiction of the United States, ~~and~~;

(B) the duly enacted ordinances and duly published regulations and determinations of governmental subdivisions or agencies of the United States, of this State and of every other state, territory and jurisdiction of the United States; and

(B)C) the records of the court in which the action is pending and of any other court of this State or federal court sitting in or for this State.

~~(2) Judicial~~ (2) In the following circumstances, judicial notice ~~shall~~must be taken of each matter specified in this rule ~~if~~;

(A) a party requests it, ~~and (A)~~;

(B) the requesting party furnishes the judge~~court~~ sufficient information to enable ~~him~~the court properly to comply with the request; and

~~(B)C)~~ the requesting party has given each adverse party notice ~~thereof~~of the request in the pleadings or at least 20 days before the trial. The judge~~court~~, however, may permit ~~such~~the requesting party to give notice ~~to be given~~ at any time in the interest of justice.

(e) Notice, Information, Ruling on Laws of Foreign Country. A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of a foreign country ~~shall~~must give notice in ~~his~~the pleadings or other reasonable written notice. ~~The court, in~~In determining foreign law, the court may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under these Rules. The court's determination ~~shall be~~is treated as a ruling on a question of law.

Comment

This rule is new and does not appear in the F.R.E. or U.R.E. The material has been covered in the past by 10 Del. C. §§ 4305, 4307, 4308, 4312, 4313 and 4314, which should now be repealed since the provisions of those sections are covered by these rules. It is intended that this rule shall expand and make easier the introduction of evidence of the Constitution, statutes, common law and case law of this State, of the United States and of other states, countries and jurisdictions.

It is the intention of this rule to encourage the admissibility of evidence of law rather than to discourage it. The only limitation imposed is that notice of the law of other jurisdictions sought to be relied upon should be given to all parties at a reasonable time.

This rule provides that the courts of this State shall take judicial notice, with or without request, of the statutory, common and case law of this State and the constitutional law of the United States. Judicial notice of the law of the United States and other jurisdictions of the United States may also be taken. It is based on 10 Del. C. § 4313(a) and the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act.

Rule 202(d) is based on old U.R.E. 9(2) and New Jersey Evidence Rule 9(2)(3).

Rule 202~~3~~(e) is based on [Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 44.1](#) and [Delaware Superior Court Civil Rule, Civil Procedure Rule 44.1](#) and [Del. Criminal Procedure Rule 26.1](#) which are superseded by these rules of evidence.

See Rule 902 for other methods of introducing documentary evidence.

[D.R.E. 202 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. The pre-2017 “Comment” to D.R.E. 202 was revised only as necessary to reflect the 2017 amendments. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.](#)

ARTICLE III. PRESUMPTIONS IN CIVIL CASES

Rule 301. Presumptions ~~in General~~ in Civil [Cases](#) ~~Actions and Proceedings~~ [Generally](#).

(a) **Effect.** In ~~all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by~~ [a civil case, unless a](#) statute or ~~by~~ these Rules [provide otherwise](#), ~~a presumption imposes on~~ the party against whom ~~it~~ [a presumption](#) is directed [has](#) the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than ~~its~~ [the](#) existence [of the presumed fact](#).

(b) **Inconsistent Presumptions.** If presumptions are inconsistent, the presumption ~~applies that is~~ founded upon weightier [policy](#) considerations ~~of policy applies~~. If [policy](#) considerations ~~of policy~~ are of equal weight, [then](#) neither presumption applies.

Comment

[Pre-2017](#) Rule 301(a) [was based on](#) ~~tracks~~ U.R.E. 301(a), except the word “civil” was added in the first line.

The Committee rejected F.R.E. 301. F.R.E. 301 was adopted by Congress as a substitute for the proposal of the United States Supreme Court Advisory Committee. The Federal Rule as adopted by Congress embraces the “bursting

bubble” rule. See *Usery v. Turner*, 428 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 2882, 49 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1976).

The rule adopted is similar to the rule proposed by the United States Supreme Court Advisory Committee.

The Committee was aware of the holding in *Bennett v. Andree*, Del. Super., 264 A.2d 353, aff’d, Del. Supr., 270 A.2d 173 (1970) and believes that its holding is not in conflict with the rule set forth herein.

[Pre-2017 Rule 301\(b\)](#) tracks [U.R.E. 301\(b\)](#).

For prior Delaware case illustrating the law covered by this rule, see *Hill v. McKay*, Del. Super., 113 A. 804 (1921).

[D.R.E. 301 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. The pre-2017 “Comment” to D.R.E. 301 was revised only as necessary to reflect the 2017 amendments. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.](#)

Rule 302. Applicability of State Law in Civil Actions and Proceedings.

[Omitted]

Comment

The Committee did not adopt F.R.E. 302 since it covers federal-state diversity, a problem not believed to be of sufficient importance to be addressed by these rules.

Rule 303. Effect of Presumptions in Criminal Cases.

Presumptions in criminal cases shall be as set forth in 11 *Del. C.* § 306.

Comment

This rule is new. It does not follow either the Federal Rules which have no Rule 303 nor U.R.E. 303.

The Committee believed that the provisions of U.R.E. 303 are covered adequately by 11 *Del. C.* § 306.

Rule 304. Res ipsa loquitur.

(a) Definitions.

~~(1) The doctrine of res~~ (1) Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of circumstantial evidence, ~~not affecting the burden of proof, which that~~ permits, but does not require, the trier of ~~the facts~~ fact to ~~draw an inference of~~ infer negligence ~~from~~ based on the ~~happening~~ occurrence of an accident under the circumstances set forth in paragraph (b) of this rule. Res ipsa loquitur does not affect the burden of proof.

(2) As used in this rule, “plaintiff” includes any party who invokes the doctrine, and “defendant” includes any party against whom the doctrine operates.

(b) Applicability. ~~Before the doctrine will be applied~~ Res ipsa loquitur may apply when all of the following ~~must appear~~ circumstances exist:

(1) The accident must be ~~such as, one that~~ in the ordinary course of events; does not happen if those who have management and control use proper care; ~~and~~

(2) The facts ~~are such as to~~ warrant an inference of negligence of such force as to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the defendant; ~~and~~

(3) The thing or instrumentality ~~which that~~ caused the injury must have been under the management or control (not necessarily exclusive) of the defendant or his servants at the time the negligence likely occurred; and

(4) Where the injured person participated in the events leading up to the accident, the evidence must exclude his own conduct as a responsible cause.

(c) When Applicability Determined; Effect.

(1) Whether or not ~~the doctrine is~~ res ipsa loquitur ~~applicables~~ should be determined at the close of the plaintiff’s case.

(2) When ~~the doctrine is~~ res ipsa loquitur ~~applicables~~, the defendant ~~shall~~ is not ~~be~~ entitled to a directed verdict unless evidence has been produced ~~which that~~ will destroy or so completely contradict the inference of negligence on ~~his part, or so completely contradict it~~ the defendant’s part that the jury could not reasonably accept it. The defendant ~~shall~~ is not ~~be~~ entitled to a directed verdict merely because ~~he~~ the defendant has introduced evidence in explanation and ~~such that~~ evidence has not been rebutted.

Comment

This rule is not contained in F.R.E. or U.R.E. It does restate and codify the existing Delaware law.

This rule restates existing Delaware case law. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is merely a rule of circumstantial evidence. Delaware Coach Co. v. Reynolds,

Del. Supr., 71 A.2d 69 (1950); *Skipper v. Royal Crown Bottling Co.*, Del. Supr., 192 A.2d 910 (1963); *Hopkins v. Chesapeake Utils. Corp.*, Del. Supr., 290 A.2d 4 (1972). The doctrine does not give rise to a presumption, but is only an inference of negligence. *Delaware Coach Co. v. Reynolds*, supra; *Scott v. Diamond State Tel. Co.*, Del. Supr., 239 A.2d 703 (1968); *Vattilana v. George & Lynch, Inc.*, Del. Supr., 154 A.2d 565, 567 (1959). The pleading of specific acts of negligence does not preclude reliance on the doctrine. *Vattilana v. George & Lynch, Inc.*, supra; *Hopkins v. Chesapeake Utils. Corp.*, supra. Before the doctrine will apply, 5 elements must be present:

(1) The circumstances must show that the accident would not ordinarily have occurred if those who had management and control of the instrumentality had used proper care. *Delaware Coach Co. v. Reynolds*, supra; *Skipper v. Royal Crown Bottling Co.*, supra; *National Fire Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R.*, Del. Supr., 220 A.2d 217, 220 (1966); *Vattilana v. George & Lynch, Inc.*, supra; *Hopkins v. Chesapeake Utils. Corp.*, supra; *Dillon v. GMC*, Del. Supr., 315 A.2d 732 (1974), aff'd, Del. Supr., 367 A.2d 1020 (1976); *Phillips v. Delaware Power & Light Co.*, Del. Supr., 202 A.2d 131 (1964). Expert testimony may be required to show the degree of care required. *Hornbeck v. Homeopathic Hosp.*, Del. Supr., 197 A.2d 461, 463 (1964).

(2) The instrumentality causing the accident must have been under the control of defendant. *Skipper v. Royal Crown Bottling Co.*, supra; *Vattilana v. George & Lynch, Inc.*, supra; *Slovin v. Gauger*, Del. Supr., 193 A.2d 452 (1963). Exclusive control is not required, however. *Delaware Coach Co. v. Reynolds*, supra; *Phillips v. Delaware Power & Light Co.*, supra; *Ciociola v. Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co.*, Del. Supr., 172 A.2d 252, 259 (1961); *Skipper v. Royal Crown Bottling Co.*, supra.

(3) The doctrine applies only where direct evidence of negligence is absent and unavailable. *Vattilana v. George & Lynch, Inc.*, supra; *Slovin v. Gauger*, supra; *Dillon v. GMC*, supra; *Scott v. Diamond State Tel. Co.*, supra; *Ciociola v. Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co.*, supra.

(4) The accident must not be the fault of plaintiff. *Dillon v. GMC*, supra; *Hopkins v. Chesapeake Utils. Corp.*, supra; *National Fire Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R.*, supra.

(5) There must be a causal connection between defendant's act or omission and the accident. *Vattilana v. George & Lynch*, supra; *Skipper v. Royal Crown*

Bottling Co., supra; Wilson v. Derrickson, Del. Supr., 175 A.2d 400 (1961); Ciociola v. Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra; National Fire Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., supra; Dillon v. GMC, supra.

The applicability of the doctrine should be determined at the close of plaintiff's evidence. Delaware Coach Co. v. Reynolds, supra; Dillon v. GMC, supra. The jury or judge may find against the plaintiff even though the doctrine is present. Hornbeck v. Homeopathic Hosp., supra; Scott v. Diamond State Tel. Co., supra. The law of the place where the injury occurred determines whether res ipsa loquitur will be applied. Hopkins v. Chesapeake Utils. Corp., supra.

The doctrine has also been applied in Williams v. General Baking Co., Del. Super., 98 A.2d 779 (1953); Dickens v. Horn & Hardart Baking Co., Del. Super., 209 A.2d 169 (1965). See also 6 Schwartz, Trial of Accident Cases, §§ 6169, 6171, 6173.

This comment is based on Schwartz, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Delaware, 4 Del. Law Forum 3 (1978).

[D.R.E. 304 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.](#)

ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS

Rule 401. ~~Definition of~~ “Test for Relevant Evidence.”

~~“Relevant evidence” means evidence having~~ Evidence is relevant if:
(a) it has any tendency to make ~~the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable~~ a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.

Comment

This rule tracks F.R.E. 401.

[D.R.E. 401 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.](#)

Rule 402. General Admissibility of Relevant Evidence ~~Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible.~~

~~All relevant~~ Relevant evidence is admissible, ~~except as~~ unless any of the following provides otherwise ~~provided by:~~

· a statute ~~or by;~~
· these Rules; or ~~by~~
· other rules applicable in the eCourts of this State. ~~Evidence which is not relevant~~

Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.

Comment

This rule generally tracks ~~U.R.E. 402.~~F.R.E. 402~~is not appropriate for state courts.~~ The Committee did not believe it was necessary to include a reference to the United States or Delaware Constitutions since evidence not admissible because of some constitutional defect is obviously inadmissible.

D.R.E. 402 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. The pre-2017 “Comment” to D.R.E. 402 was revised only as necessary to reflect the 2017 amendments. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 403. ~~Exclusion of~~Excluding Relevant Evidence ~~on Grounds of~~for Prejudice, Confusion,~~or~~ Waste of Time, or Other Reasons.

~~Although~~The court may exclude relevant~~;~~ evidence ~~may be excluded~~ if its probative value is substantially outweighed by ~~the~~a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, ~~confusion of~~confusing the issues ~~or,~~ misleading the jury, ~~or by considerations of~~ undue delay, ~~waste of time or needless presentation of~~wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.

Comment

This rule tracks F.R.E. 403.

In *Concord Towers, Inc. v. Long*, Del. Supr., 348 A.2d 325 (1975), the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that whether the existence of surprise is reversible error depends on whether the surprise is prejudicial.

It is not intended that this rule will change that rule of law. See also *Bennett v. State*, Del. Supr., 164 A.2d 442 (Supr.1960) and *Hoey v. Hawkins*, Del. Supr., 332 A.2d 403 (1975).

D.R.E. 403 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 404. Character Evidence ~~Not Admissible to Prove Conduct;~~Exceptions; Crimes or Other Crimes Acts.

(a) Character ~~evidence generally~~ Evidence.

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a person's character or ~~a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith~~ character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion, ~~except: the person acted in accordance with the character or trait.~~ **(1)**—Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; or if evidence of a trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by an accused and admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered by the prosecution.

(2) Exceptions for a Defendant or Victim in a Criminal Case. The following exceptions apply in a criminal case:

(A) a defendant may offer evidence of the defendant's pertinent trait, and if the evidence is admitted, the prosecutor may offer evidence to rebut it;

~~(2) Character of alleged victim. Except~~ **(B)** ~~except~~ as otherwise provided by statute, a defendant may offer evidence of ~~a pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or an alleged victim's~~ pertinent trait, and if the evidence is admitted, the prosecutor may:

(i) offer evidence to rebut it; and

(ii) offer evidence of the defendant's same trait; and

(C) in a homicide case, the prosecutor may offer evidence of ~~a~~ ~~character~~ the alleged victim's trait of peacefulness ~~of the alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case~~ to rebut evidence that the ~~alleged~~ victim was the first aggressor;

~~(3) Character of witness~~ **(3) Exceptions for a Witness.** Evidence of ~~the~~ ~~a~~ witness's character ~~of a witness, as provided in~~ may be admitted under Rules 607, 608, and 609.

(b) Crimes, Wrongs, or Other ~~crimes, wrongs or acts~~ Acts.

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of ~~a crime, wrong, or other crimes, wrongs or acts~~ ~~act~~ is not admissible to prove ~~the~~ ~~a person's~~ character ~~of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the~~ character.

(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case. This evidence may be admissible for ~~other~~ ~~another~~ purposes, such as ~~proof of~~ ~~proving~~ motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity ~~or,~~ absence of mistake, or ~~lack of~~ accident.

Comment

D.R.E. 404(a) tracks F.R.E. 404(a) except that the additional words “except as otherwise provided by statute” were added at the beginning of D.R.E. 404(a)(2)(B). These additional words were deemed necessary to make clear that D.R.E. 404(a)(2)(B) does not change the rule enacted by the Delaware General Assembly as 11 Del. C. §§ 3508 and 3509 (enacted by 60 Del. Laws, c. 257, § 1, effective July 11, 1975) relating to the sexual conduct of the complaining witness in prosecutions for rape or rape related offenses.

D.R.E. 404(a)(1) was amended in 2001 to track F.R.E. 404(a)(1) in effect on December 31, 2000. Prior to the 2001 amendment, D.R.E. 404(a)(1) prohibited the use of evidence relating to the character of the accused to show a propensity to act unless the accused offered evidence of good character. In that case, the prosecution has always been allowed to offer evidence of bad character.

~~D.R.E. 404(a)(1) as amended in 2001~~ [D.R.E. 404\(a\)\(2\)\(B\)](#) enumerates a second situation in which the prosecution would be permitted to offer evidence of the character of the accused as reflecting on the accused’s propensity to commit the charged act. Specifically, the 2001 amendment permits the prosecution to offer propensity evidence against the accused if the accused has offered evidence which was admitted under D.R.E. 404(a)(2) as to the propensity of a an alleged victim to commit certain acts. [Prior to the 2017 stylistic amendments, this provision was contained within D.R.E. 404\(a\)\(1\).](#)

D.R.E. 404(b) tracks F.R.E. 404(b) in effect on December 31, 2000, except the provisions of F.R.E. 404(b) pertaining to pretrial notice of the prosecution’s intent to introduce such evidence have been omitted. A party who intends to introduce evidence pursuant to D.R.E. 404(a) or 404(b) should first seek a ruling from the trial judge as to the admissibility of the evidence.

See D.R.E. 412 and 608(a)(2) relating to relevance of rape victim’s past behavior.

For cases clarifying how D.R.E. 404(b) should be applied, see *Renzi v. State*, Del. Supr., 320 A.2d 711 (1974); *Getz v. State*, Del. Supr., 538 A.2d 726 (1988); *DeShields v. State*, Del. Supr., 706 A.2d 502 (1998).

[D.R.E. 404 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. The pre-2017 “Comment” to D.R.E. 404 was revised only as necessary to](#)

[reflect the 2017 amendments. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.](#)

Rule 405. Methods of Proving Character.

(a) ~~By Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which~~ **Opinion.** When evidence of a person's character or a trait of character of a person trait is admissible, proof may be made proved by testimony as to about the person's reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, of the character witness, the court may allow an inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of the person's conduct.

(b) ~~By Specific Instances of e~~ **Conduct.** ~~In cases in which~~ When a person's character or a trait of character of a person trait is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof the character or trait may also be made of proved by relevant specific instances of that person's conduct.

Comment

D.R.E. 405 tracks F.R.E. 405. The words “or by testimony in the form of an opinion” were originally omitted from D.R.E. 405(a) but were added in 2001 to conform D.R.E. 405(a) with existing Delaware practice.

For prior Delaware cases illustrating the law covered by D.R.E. 405(a), see *Spain v. Rossiter*, Del. Super., 120 A. 746 (1923) and *State v. Naylor*, Del. Super., 90 A. 880 (1914).

For prior Delaware case illustrating the law covered by D.R.E. 405(b), see *Robinson v. Burton*, Del. Super., 5 Del. 335 (1851).

[D.R.E. 405 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.](#)

Rule 406. Habit; Routine Practice.

Evidence of ~~the habit of a person's habit or of the routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of an organization's routine practice may be admitted to prove that on a particular occasion the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity acted in accordance~~ with the habit or routine practice. The court may admit this evidence regardless of whether it is corroborated or whether there was an eyewitness.

Comment

This rule tracks F.R.E. 406.

The Committee believes that although this rule permits the admissibility of habit, evidence of habit should be admitted only after careful consideration by the court of whether the conduct is in fact a habit. See the examples set forth in the United States Supreme Court Advisory Committee's note to F.R.E. 406(a).

The Committee rejected U.R.E. Rule 406(b) (not contained in F.R.E.). The Committee believed, as did Congress, that the method of proof of habit and routine practice should be left to the courts on a case-by-case basis and therefore U.R.E. 406(b) should not be adopted.

For prior Delaware case illustrating the law covered by this rule, see *Wilmington City Ry. v. White*, Del. Supr., 66 A. 1009 (1907).

[D.R.E. 406 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.](#)

Rule 407. Subsequent Remedial Measures.

When, ~~after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event,~~ measures are taken ~~which, if taken previously,~~ that would have made ~~the~~ an earlier injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove:

- negligence;
- culpable conduct, ~~a defect in a product;~~
- a defect in a product's or its design; or
- a need for a warning or instruction. ~~This rule does not require the exclusion of~~

But the court may admit this evidence ~~of subsequent measures when offered~~ for another purpose, such as impeachment or — if disputed — proving ownership, control, or the feasibility of precautionary measures, ~~if controverted, or impeachment. An event includes the sale of a product to a user or consumer.~~

Comment

D.R.E. 407 tracks F.R.E. 407. ~~in effect on December 31, 2000 except for the last sentence, which tracks the last sentence of U.R.E. 407. The last sentence of D.R.E. 407 was added in 2001. It provides an incentive to take remedial~~

~~measures before the injury or harm giving rise to the cause of action has occurred.~~

D.R.E. 407 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. The pre-2017 “Comment” to D.R.E. 407 was revised only as necessary to reflect the 2017 amendments. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 408. Compromise ~~and~~ Offers ~~to~~ and ~~Compromise~~ Negotiations.

~~Evidence of~~ (a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible on behalf of any party either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction:

(1) furnishing, promising, or offering ~~— or promising to furnish, or~~ (2) accepting ~~or offering or,~~ promising to accept, or offering to accept — a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting order to compromise ~~a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in~~ the claim; and

(2) conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations ~~is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered~~ about the claim.

(b) Exceptions. The court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as proving a witness’s bias or prejudice ~~of a witness, negating, negating~~ a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.

Comment

This rule generally tracks F.R.E. 408.

This rule modifies existing Delaware case law. See Hudson v. Williams, Del. Super., 72 A. 985 (1908).

D.R.E. 408 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. The pre-2017 “Comment” to D.R.E. 408 was revised only as necessary to reflect the 2017 amendments. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

<p>Rule 409. Payment of<u>Offers to Pay</u> Medical and Similar Expenses.</p>
<p>Evidence of furnishing, or offering or promising to pay, or offering to pay medical, hospital, or similar expenses occasioned by<u>resulting from</u> an injury is not admissible to prove liability for the injury.</p>
<p>Comment</p>
<p>This rule tracks F.R.E. 409.</p> <p>Section 4317 of Title 10, relating to admissibility of evidence of accommodation payments for personal injury, is not affected by the adoption of this rule.</p> <p><u>D.R.E. 409 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.</u></p>
<p>Rule 410. Pleas, Plea Discussions, and Related Statements.</p>
<p>Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of a plea of guilty later withdrawn with court permission, or a plea of nolo contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged or any other crime, or of statements made in connection with, and relevant to, any of the foregoing pleas or offers, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer. However, evidence of a statement made in connection with, and relevant to, a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, a plea of nolo contendere or an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged or any other crime, is admissible in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was made by the defendant under oath, on the record and in the presence of counsel.</p>
<p>Comment</p>
<p>D.R.E. 410 differs in format and scope from F.R.E. 410. First, D.R.E. 410 applies only “against the person who made the plea or offer,” whereas F.R.E. 410 applies “against the defendant who made the plea or <u>participated</u> was a participant in the plea discussions.” Second, under F.R.E. 410(3)<u>(a)(4)</u> statements made in the course of plea discussions with anyone but “an attorney for the prosecuting authority” fall outside the federal exclusionary rule. Finally, F.R.E. 410(i)<u>410(b)(1)</u> expressly permits the admission of a</p>

statement when part of the statement already has been admitted. The Permanent Advisory Committee on the Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence considered such a provision unnecessary in D.R.E. 410. The admission of partial statements is addressed by D.R.E. 106.

The pre-2017 “Comment” to D.R.E. 410 was revised only as necessary to reflect the current language of F.R.E. 410. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 411. Liability Insurance.

Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible ~~upon the issue~~ to prove whether ~~he~~ the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. ~~This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when offered~~ But the court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as ~~proof of~~ proving a witness’s bias or prejudice or proving agency, ownership, or control, ~~or bias or prejudice of a witness.~~

Comment

This rule tracks F.R.E. 411.

This rule is consistent with existing Delaware law. See Connor v. Lyness, Del. Supr., 284 A.2d 473 (1971), overruled on other grounds, Sammons v. Ridgeway, Del. Supr., 293 A.2d 547 (1972).

D.R.E. 411 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 412. Rape Cases; Relevance of Victim’s Past Behavior [Omitted].

Omitted.

Comment

Rule 412, adopted by Congress in 1978 (Pub. L. 95-540), was not recommended for adoption in Delaware because this area of law is adequately covered by 11 Del. C. §§ 3508 and 3509. See Rules 404(a)(2) and 608(a)(~~2~~).

The pre-2017 “Comment” to D.R.E. 412 was revised only as necessary to reflect the 2017 amendments. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 413. Evidence of Similar Crimes in Sexual Assault Cases [Omitted].
Omitted.
Comment
F.R.E. 413, 414, and 415 were adopted by Congress in 1994 (P.L. 103-322, Title XXXII, Subtitle I, § 320935(a), 108 Stat. 2136) over the objection of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, and the Federal Judicial Conference. The Permanent Advisory Committee on the Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence recommended in 2001 that the Delaware Supreme Court not adopt provisions similar to F.R.E. 413, 414, and 415 for several reasons: (1) such propensity evidence is too prejudicial; (2) if such propensity evidence is permitted, the potential for a trial within a trial becomes likely; (3) the empirical data on the relevance of such evidence is conflicting; (4) F.R.E. 413, 414, and 415 were enacted over the objection of the relevant federal rule-making committees; (5) the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in <i>Getz v. State</i> , Del. Supr., 538 A.2d 726 (1988), held that such propensity evidence may conflict with the defendant's right to a presumption of innocence; and (6) the consensus of the Committee was that F.R.E. 413, 414, and 415 were unnecessary in Delaware because the prosecution of accused persons under the existing D.R.E. and relevant statutes, such as 11 Del. C. §§ 3507, and 3513, generally produces fair results.
Rule 414. Evidence of Similar Crimes in Child Molestation Cases [Omitted].
Omitted.
Comment
See Comment to D.R.E. 413.
Rule 415. Evidence of Similar Acts in Civil Cases Concerning Sexual Assault or Child Molestation [Omitted].
Omitted.
Comment
See Comment to D.R.E. 413.
ARTICLE V. PRIVILEGES
Rule 501. Privileges Recognized Only as Provided.

Except as otherwise provided by Constitution or statute, ~~or by~~ court decision, ~~or by~~ these [rules](#) or other rules of court, no person has a privilege to:

- (1) Refuse to be a witness;
- (2) Refuse to disclose any matter;
- (3) Refuse to produce any object or ~~writing~~ [record](#); or
- (4) Prevent another from being a witness or disclosing any matter or producing any object or ~~writing~~ [record](#).

Comment

This rule tracks U.R.E. 501 and draft of F.R.E. 501 except that the words “court decision, ~~or by~~ these [rules](#) or other rules of court” were substituted for the words “these or other rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of this State.”

F.R.E. as adopted by Congress does not include any rules in article V except for a different Rule 501 [and a different Rule 502. With limited exceptions, these rules](#) ~~which~~, in effect, leaves the rules of evidence as to privilege in federal courts as they existed prior to the adoption of the F.R.E. The draft of article V of the F.R.E. as prepared by the United States Supreme Court Advisory Committee and submitted to Congress contained 13 rules which were similar to article V of the U.R.E. and the rules adopted herein. These proposed but not adopted rules are referred to in these comments as “draft rules.” The rationale of Congress in rejecting article V, as presented to it, was that federal law should not supersede the law of the states in the area of privilege. The Committee did not believe this rationale was pertinent as to a state and therefore article V, modeled on the U.R.E. article V, is recommended for adoption in Delaware. The article, as adopted, is consistent (except for minor refinements) with existing Delaware law.

This rule allows for the continuation of privileges or exceptions to privileges specifically provided by the Constitution, by rule or decision of court or by statutes, such as 16 Del. C. § 9089 or 12 Del. C. § 3914 [repealed].

[D.R.E. 501 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. The pre-2017 “Comment” to D.R.E. 501 was revised only as necessary to reflect the 2017 amendments and the current language of the Federal Rules of Evidence. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.](#)

Rule 502. Lawyer-Client Privilege.

(a) Definitions. As used in this rule:

(1) A “client” is a person, public officer or corporation, association or other organization or entity, either public or private, who is rendered professional legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal services from the lawyer. For the purposes of this Rule, “client” shall include, without limitation, officers, directors, and employees of (a) any business entity that is organized under the laws of this State, and (b) any business entity organized under the laws of any nation other than the United States that owns or controls a business entity that is organized under the laws of this State.

(2) A communication is “confidential” if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is made in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication.

(3) A “lawyer” is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to be authorized, to engage in the practice of law in any state or nation. For purposes of this Rule, “lawyer” shall include persons who are employed or engaged by a business entity, to serve as “in house” counsel to that entity and/or to any of its wholly owned or controlled affiliates.

(4) Omitted.

(5) A “representative of the lawyer” is one employed, or reasonably believed by the client to be employed, by the lawyer to assist the lawyer in the rendition of professional legal services.

(b) General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client (1) between the client or the client’s representative and the client’s lawyer or the lawyer’s representative, (2) between the lawyer and the lawyer’s representative, (3) by the client or the client’s representative or the client’s lawyer or a representative of the lawyer to a lawyer or a representative of a lawyer representing another in a matter of common interest, (4) between representatives of the client or between the client and a representative of the client, or (5) among lawyers and their representatives representing the same client.

(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege under this rule may be claimed by the client, the client’s guardian or conservator, the personal representative of a deceased client or the successor, trustee or similar representative of a deceased client or the successor, trustee or similar representative of a corporation, association or other organization, whether or not in existence. A person who was the lawyer or the lawyer’s representative

at the time of the communication is presumed to have authority to claim the privilege but only on behalf of the client.

(d) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule:

(1) Furtherance of crime or fraud. If the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud;

(2) Claimants through same deceased client. As to a communication relevant to an issue between parties who claim through the same deceased client, regardless of whether the claims are by testate or intestate succession or by inter vivos transaction;

(3) Breach of duty by a lawyer or client. As to a communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to the client or by the client to the lawyer;

(4) Accusations against a lawyer. As to a communication necessary for a lawyer to defend in a legal proceeding an accusation that the lawyer assisted the client in criminal or fraudulent conduct;

(5) Document attested by a lawyer. As to a communication relevant to an issue concerning an attested document to which the lawyer is an attesting witness; or

(6) Joint clients. As to a communication relevant to a matter of common interest between or among 2 or more clients if the communication was made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered in an action between or among any of the clients.

(7) Public officer or agency. [Omitted].

Comment

See comment to D.R.E. 501.

The subsections of D.R.E. 502(a) were reordered in 2001 to track U.R.E. 502(a). U.R.E. 502 was based on a draft of F.R.E. 503.

U.R.E. 502(a) (4) was not adopted in Delaware. It was believed that a definition of a representative of a client should be left to case law.

D.R.E. 502(b) tracks U.R.E. 502(b) except that the word “therein” and the words “party in a pending action and concerning” were deleted and the word “in” was inserted in lieu thereof in D.R.E. 502(b)(3). The purpose of this change was to make D.R.E. 502(b)(3) comply with the original draft of the

F.R.E. prepared by the Supreme Court Advisory Committee and to make it clear that D.R.E. 502(b)(3) applies even if no litigation is actually pending.

D.R.E. 502(c) tracks U.R.E. 502(c).

D.R.E. 502(d)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6) track U.R.E. 502(d)(1), (2), (3), (4) (5), and (6). U.R.E. 502(d)(7) was not adopted. The 1980 Committee believed that the Delaware Freedom of Information Act (29 Del. C., Chapter 100) adequately covers the area of privilege as it relates to public officers of agencies. The 1980 Committee also believed that U.R.E. 502(d)(7) would impose too great a burden upon a governmental agency.

For prior Delaware cases illustrating the law covered by this D.R.E., see *State Hwy. v. 62,662.47 Acres of Land*, Del. Super., 193 A.2d 799 (1963); *Texaco, Inc. v. Phoenix Steel Corp.*, Del. Ch., 264 A.2d 523 (1970); *Wallace v. Wilmington & N.R. Co.*, Del. Super., 8 Houst. 529, 18 A. 818 (1889); *Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Zimmer*, Del. Ch., 355 A.2d 709 (1976); *Phillips v. Delaware Power & Light Co.*, Del. Super., 194 A.2d 690 (1963); *Valente v. Pepsico*, 68 F.R.D. 361 (D. Del. 1975); *Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.*, Del. Supr., 188 A.2d 125 (1963); *Wise v. Western Union Tel. Co.*, Del. Super., 178 A. 640 (1935); *State v. Brown*, Del. Oyer & Term., 36 A. 458 (1896).

[D.R.E. 502 was amended in 2017 to clarify that the attorney-client privilege extends to foreign parent entities of Delaware subsidiaries and covers in-house counsel of foreign entities and controlled affiliates.](#)

Rule 503. Mental Health Provider, Physician, and Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege.

(a) Definitions. As used in this rule:

(1) A communication is “confidential” if not intended to be disclosed to third persons, except persons present to further the interest of the patient in the consultation, examination or interview, persons reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication or persons who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the mental health provider, physician or psychotherapist, including members of the patient’s family.

(2) A “mental health provider” is (A) a licensed professional counselor of mental health or licensed associate counselor as authorized under 24 Del. C. §§ 3001-19, or (B) a licensed clinical social worker as authorized under 24 Del. C. §§ 3901-13.

(3) A “patient” is a person who consults or is examined or interviewed by a physician or psychotherapist for treatment or diagnosis.

(4) A “physician” is a person authorized to practice medicine in any state or nation, or reasonably believed by the patient so to be.

(5) A “psychotherapist” is (A) a person authorized to practice medicine in any state or nation, or reasonably believed by the patient so to be, while engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, including alcohol or drug addiction, or (B) a person licensed or certified as a psychologist under the laws of any state or nation, while similarly engaged.

(b) General rule of privilege. A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of the patient’s physical, mental or emotional condition, including alcohol or drug addiction, among the patient, the patient’s mental health provider, physician or psychotherapist, and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the mental health provider, physician or psychotherapist, including members of the patient’s family.

(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the patient, the patient’s guardian or conservator, or the personal representative of a deceased patient. The person who was the mental health provider, physician or psychotherapist at the time of the communication is presumed to have authority to claim the privilege but only on behalf of the patient.

(d) Exceptions.

(1) Proceedings for hospitalization. There is no privilege under this rule for a communication relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if the mental health provider, physician or psychotherapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has determined that the patient is in need of hospitalization.

(2) Examination by order of court. There is no privilege under this rule for a communication made in the course of a court-ordered investigation or examination of the physical, mental or emotional condition of the patient, whether a party or a witness, with respect to the particular purpose for which the examination is ordered unless the court orders otherwise.

(3) Condition an element of claim or defense. There is no privilege under this rule for a communication relevant to an issue of the physical, mental or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which the patient relies upon the condition as an element of the patient’s claim or defense or, after the patient’s death, in any proceeding in which any party relies upon the condition as an element of the party’s claim or defense.

(4) Commission of crime or fraud. There is no privilege under this rule for a communication if the services of the mental health provider, physician or psychotherapist were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the patient knew, or reasonably should have known, was a crime or fraud or mental or physical injury to the patient or another individual.

(5) Danger to self or others. There is no privilege under this rule for a communication in which the patient has expressed an intent to engage in conduct likely to result in imminent death or serious physical injury to the patient or another individual.

(6) Breach of duty. There is no privilege under this rule for a communication relevant to a breach of duty by the mental health provider, physician or psychotherapist.

(7) Appointment of guardian; child abuse cases. There is no privilege under this rule for a communication relevant to a proceeding brought pursuant to 12 Del. C. § 3901 or 16 Del. C., Chapter 9.

Comment

D.R.E. 503 is based on U.R.E. 503, which is based on a draft of F.R.E. 504. See comment to D.R.E. 501. The 2001 amendments to D.R.E. 503 added subsections (a)(2), (d)(4), (d)(5), and (d)(6) and added “mental health provider” throughout the rule where required. Also, the subsections of D.R.E. 503(a) were reordered to track the corresponding provisions of U.R.E. 503(a).

D.R.E. 503(a)(3) tracks U.R.E. 503(a)(3) except that the words “for treatment or diagnosis” were added at the end. These words were added to make clear that only communications rendered during treatment or diagnosis are privileged.

D.R.E. 503(a)(1), (2), (4) and (5) track U.R.E. 503(a)(1), (2), (4) and (5), except that the definition of “mental health provider” is limited to licensed mental health providers recognized by relevant Delaware statutes already granting a confidential communication privilege.

It is intended that D.R.E. 503(a)(1) include assistants who work under the direct supervision of a mental health provider, physician or psychotherapist such as nurses, paramedics, etc.

D.R.E. 503(b) and (c) track U.R.E. 503(b) and (c) and use the words “mental health provider, physician, or psychotherapist” as defined in D.R.E. 503(a).

D.R.E. 503(d)(1) tracks U.R.E. 503(d)(1) and uses the words “mental health provider, physician, or psychotherapist” as defined in D.R.E. 503(a).

D.R.E. 503(d)(2), (3), (4), (5), and (6) track U.R.E. 503(d)(2), (3), (4), (5), and (7). The alternative word “physical” was adopted.

The purpose of D.R.E. 503(d)(7), which does not appear in the F.R.E. or U.R.E., is to make clear that a person alleged to be in need of a guardian or other representative because of advanced age, mental infirmity or physical incapacity cannot assert the privilege in the proceedings in which the guardian is sought and that the privilege is not generally available in child abuse cases.

The Delaware Code contains many statutes that may establish a qualified privilege or call for waiver of a privilege. Consult the index to the Delaware Code for the many statutory provisions that may provide for a qualified confidential communication privilege or waive a privilege already provided for by statute.

RULE 504. Spousal Privilege.

~~(a) *Definition. A communication is confidential if it is made privately by any person to his or her spouse and is not intended for disclosure to any other person.*~~ **Definitions. In this rule:**

(1) “Confidential communication” means a communication that an individual made privately to the individual’s spouse that was not intended for disclosure to any other person.

(2) “Spouse” means a present or former spouse.

~~(b) *General rule of privilege. Any party or witness in any proceeding has a privilege to prevent his spouse from testifying as to any confidential communication between himself and his spouse.*~~ **Competence to testify. An individual may testify for or against a spouse in any proceeding.**

~~(c) *Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the party or witness or by the spouse on behalf of the party or witness. The authority of the spouse to do so is presumed.*~~ **General rule of privilege. An individual has a privilege to refuse to testify and to prevent the individual’s spouse from testifying as to any confidential communication between the individual and the spouse during their marriage.**

~~(d) *Exceptions.* There is no privilege under this rule in a proceeding in which 1 spouse is charged with a wrong against the person or property of (1) the other, (2) a child of either, (3) a person residing in the household of either, or (4) a third person committed in the course of committing a crime against any of them. There is no privilege under this rule in any proceeding brought pursuant to Title 13 of the Delaware Code, or Chapter 9 of Title 10 of the Delaware Code or when the interest of the spouses is adverse.~~ Who may claim the privilege. An individual may claim the privilege on the individual's own behalf. An individual is presumed to have authority to claim the privilege on the spouse's behalf.

~~(e) *Testimony of wife or husband.* A wife or husband may testify for or against each other in any court of this State.~~ Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule in the following types of proceedings:

(1) A proceeding that charges one spouse with a wrong against the person or property of the other spouse.

(2) A proceeding that charges one spouse with a wrong against the person or property of a child of either spouse.

(3) A proceeding that charges one spouse with a wrong against the person or property of a person residing in the household of either spouse.

(4) A proceeding that charges one spouse with a wrong against the person or property of a third person committed in the course of committing a crime against the other spouse, a child of the either spouse, a person residing in the household of either spouse, or the third person.

(5) A proceeding brought under Title 13 of the Delaware Code, or Chapter 9 of Title 10 of the Delaware Code.

(6) Any proceeding when the interests of the spouses are adverse.

Comment

This rule is based on U.R.E. 504 which is based on draft of F.R.E. 505. See comment to Rule 501.

Rule 504(a) tracks U.R.E. 504(a), but was amended in 2017 to clarify that "spouse" includes a former spouse.

~~Rule 504(b) is based on U.R.E. 504(b) but was changed by the Committee so as to be applicable to civil as well as criminal cases and to witnesses as well as parties.~~ Rule 504(b) provides that an individual may testify for or against a spouse in civil as well as criminal cases. This rule removes the common law disability against 1 spouse testifying against the other. Such testimony is

permitted unless the testimony involves a confidential and a privilege is asserted as to it.

~~Rule 504(c) is based on U.R.E. 504 (c) but was changed by the Committee to be consistent with Rule 504(b).~~ Rule 504(c) generally tracks U.R.E. 504(b).

~~Rule 504(d) provides that an individual may claim the privilege on their own behalf and is presumed to have authority to claim the privilege on behalf of their spouse. tracks U.R.E. 504(d) except that “crime” was changed to “wrong” to be consistent with Rule 504(b) and (c) and the last sentence was added to exclude the privilege being claimed in actions between the spouses or relating to the marriage relationship, including actions involving children.~~

Rule 504(e) generally tracks U.R.E. 504(d) except that “wrong” appears instead of “crime” and Rule 504(d)(5) excludes the privilege in proceedings under Title 9 and Chapter 9 of Title 10 of the Delaware Code.

~~Rule 504(e) is new. It is based on 11 Del. C. § 3502 except that it is also applicable to civil as well as criminal cases. This rule removes the common law disability against 1 spouse testifying against the other. Such testimony is now permitted unless the testimony involves a confidential communication and a privilege is asserted as to it. Section 3502 of Title 11 should be repealed since it is covered by this rule.~~

For prior Delaware cases illustrating the law covered by this rule, see *Mole v. State*, Del. Supr., 396 A.2d 153 (1978); *State v. Thompson*, Del. Super., 136 A.2d 336 (1957); *Duonnolo v. State*, Del. Supr., 397 A.2d 126 (1978).

~~It is intended that “spouse” include a former spouse.~~

D.R.E. 504 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. The pre-2017 “Comment” to D.R.E. 504 was revised only as necessary to reflect the 2017 amendments. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 505. Religious Privilege.

(a) Definitions. As used in this rule:

- (1)** ~~A “clergyman is”~~ **“Cleric means”** a minister, priest, rabbi, accredited Christian Science practitioner or other similar functionary of a religious organization, ~~or an individual reasonably believed so to be by the person~~

~~consulting him~~ or a person that an individual who consulted that person for spiritual advice reasonably believed to be a cleric.

(2) ~~A communication is “confidential if~~ “Confidential communication” means a communication made privately and not intended for further disclosure except to other persons present in furtherance of the purpose of the communication.

(b) **General rule of privilege.** ~~A person~~ An individual has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication ~~by the person to a clergyman in his professional character as a spiritual adviser~~ between the individual and the cleric while the cleric is serving as the individual’s spiritual adviser.

(c) **Who may claim the privilege.** ~~The privilege may be claimed by the person, by his guardian or conservator, or by his personal representative if he is deceased. The clergyman may claim the privilege on behalf of the person. His authority so to do is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.~~ The individual may claim the privilege on the individual’s own behalf. The cleric is presumed to have authority to claim the privilege on the individual’s behalf. If the individual is incompetent or deceased, then an authorized personal representative may claim the privilege on the individual’s behalf.

Comment

This rule is based on U.R.E. 505 which was based on draft of F.R.E. 506. See comment to Rule 501.

Rule 505(a) and (b) generally tracks U.R.E. 505(a) and (b).

Rule 505(c) tracks U.R.E. 505(c) except that the last sentence is based on the draft of F.R.E. 506(c) instead of U.R.E. 505(c).

Section 4316 of Title 10 [repealed], relating to exemption of minister of religion from testifying, should be repealed since it is superseded by this rule.

D.R.E. 505 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. The pre-2017 “Comment” to D.R.E. 505 was revised only as necessary to reflect the 2017 amendments. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 506. Political Vote.

(a) **General rule of privilege.** Every person has a privilege to refuse to disclose ~~the tenor of his vote at~~how the individual voted during a political election conducted by secret ballot.

(b) **Exceptions.** This privilege does not apply if the court finds that the ~~vote was cast illegally or determines that the disclosure should be compelled pursuant to the election laws of this State.~~individual voted illegally or compels disclosure pursuant to the election laws of this State.

Comment

This generally rule tracks U.R.E. 506 which is based on draft of F.R.E. 507. See comment to Rule 501.

D.R.E. 506 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. The pre-2017 “Comment” to D.R.E. 506 was revised only as necessary to reflect the 2017 amendments. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 507. Trade Secrets.

~~A person has a privilege, which may be claimed by him or his agent or employee, to refuse to disclose and to prevent other persons from disclosing a trade secret, owned by him, if the allowance of the privilege will not tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice. If disclosure is directed, the court shall take such protective measures as the interest of the holder of the privilege and of the parties and the interest of justice may require.~~

(a) **General rule of privilege.** A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent other persons from disclosing a trade secret owned by the person.

(b) **Who may claim the privilege.** A person may assert the privilege on the person’s behalf. A person’s agent, or employee is presumed to have authority to assert the privilege on the person’s behalf.

(c) **Exception.** A person may not assert the privilege if it would tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice. If disclosure is directed the Court shall take such protective measures as the interests of the holder of the privilege, the interests of the parties and the interests of justice require.

Comment

This rule ~~tracks~~is based on U.R.E. 507 which is based on a draft of F.R.E. 508. See comment to Rule 501.

[D.R.E. 507 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. The pre-2017 “Comment” to D.R.E. 507 was revised only as necessary to reflect the 2017 amendments. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.](#)

**Rule 508. Secrets of State and Other Official Information;
Governmental Privileges.**

(a) Claim of privilege. If the law of the United States creates a governmental privilege that the courts of this State must recognize under the Constitution of the United States, the privilege may be claimed as provided by the law of the United States.

(b) Recognition of privilege. A governmental privilege existing at common law, or created by the Constitution, statute or court rule of this State, shall be recognized.

(c) Effect of sustaining claim. If a claim of governmental privilege is sustained and it appears that a party is thereby deprived of material evidence, the court shall make any further orders the interests of justice require, including striking the testimony of a witness, declaring a mistrial, finding upon an issue as to which the evidence is relevant or dismissing the action.

Comment

Rule 508(a) ~~and (b)~~ and (c) tracks U.R.E. 508 which is based on draft of F.R.E. 509. See comment to Rule 501.

Rule 508(b) is new. The Committee believed that U.R.E. 508(b), which would abolish all governmental privileges except as created by the Constitution or statutes, is undesirable.

For prior Delaware cases illustrating this area of law, see *Morris v. Avallone*, Del. Super., 272 A.2d 344 (1970); *Smith v. Smith*, 18 Del. 365 (1899).

For a statute relating to this area of law, see 29 Del. C., Chapter 100 (Freedom of Information Act).

Rule 509. Identity of Informer.

(a) Rule of privilege. The United States or a state or subdivision thereof has a privilege to refuse to disclose the identity of a person who has furnished

information relating to or assisting in an investigation of a possible violation of a law to a law-enforcement officer or member of a legislative committee or its staff conducting an investigation.

(b) Who may claim. The privilege may be claimed by an appropriate representative of the public entity to which the information was furnished.

(c) Exceptions.

(1) Voluntary disclosure; informer a witness. No privilege exists under this rule if the identity of the informer or his interest in the subject matter of his communication has been disclosed to those who would have cause to resent the communication by a holder of the privilege or by the informer's own action, or if the informer appears as a witness for the government.

(2) Testimony on relevant issue. If it appears in a criminal case that an informer may be able to give testimony which would materially aid the defense, or in a civil case which would be relevant to a fair determination of a material issue on the merits of a case in which a public entity is a party, and the informed public entity invokes the privilege, the court shall give the public entity an opportunity to show in camera facts relevant to determining whether the informer can, in fact, supply that testimony. The showing will ordinarily be in the form of affidavits, but the court may direct that testimony be taken if it finds that the matter cannot be resolved satisfactorily upon affidavit. If the court finds there is a reasonable probability that the informer can give the testimony, and the public entity elects not to disclose his identity, in criminal cases the court on motion of the defendant or on its own motion shall grant appropriate relief, which may include 1 or more of the following: Requiring the prosecuting attorney to comply, granting the defendant additional time or a continuance, relieving the defendant from making disclosures otherwise required of him, prohibiting the prosecuting attorney from introducing specified evidence, and dismissing charges. In civil cases, the court may make any order the interests of justice require. Evidence submitted to the court shall be sealed and preserved to be made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal, and the contents shall not otherwise be revealed without consent of the informed public entity. All counsel and parties are permitted to be present at every stage of proceedings under this subdivision except a showing in camera at which no counsel or party shall have the right to be present.

Comment

Except for Rule 509(c)(2) this rule tracks U.R.E. 509 which is based on draft of F.R.E. 510. See comment to Rule 501.

In Rule 509(c)(2) the words “have the right” were substituted for the words “be permitted” in the last line to indicate that the presence of counsel or parties at an in camera hearing is discretionary with the court. The first sentence was also rewritten to conform this rule to *State v. Flowers*, Del. Super., 316 A.2d 564 (1973).

Proceedings before a grand jury are deemed to be covered by this rule.

For prior Delaware cases illustrating the law covered by this rule, see *Preston v. State*, Del. Supr., 338 A.2d 562 (1975); *Riley v. State*, Del. Supr., 249 A.2d 863 (1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947, 89 S. Ct. 2016, 23 L. Ed. 2d 465 (1969).

This rule follows the rule set forth in *State v. Flowers*, Del. Super., 316 A.2d 564 (1973).

Rule 510. Waiver of privilege or work product; limitations on waiver.

The following provisions apply, in the circumstances set out, to disclosure of information or communications that are privileged under these rules or that are subject to work-product protection.

(a) Waiver by intentional disclosure. A person waives a privilege conferred by these rules or work-product protection if such person or such person’s predecessor while holder of the privilege or while entitled to work-product protection intentionally discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged or protected communication or information. This rule does not apply if the disclosure itself is privileged or protected.

(b) Disclosure; scope of a waiver. When the disclosure waives a privilege conferred by these rules or work-product protection, the waiver extends to an undisclosed communication or information only if:

- (1) the waiver is intentional;
- (2) the disclosed and undisclosed communications or information concern the same subject matter; and
- (3) they ought in fairness to be considered together.

(c) Inadvertent disclosure. A disclosure does not operate as a waiver if:

- (1) the disclosure is inadvertent;
- (2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and

(3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, including following any applicable court procedures to notify the opposing party or to retrieve or request destruction of the information disclosed.

(d) Disclosure Made in a Non-Delaware Proceeding. Notwithstanding anything in these rules to the contrary, a disclosure made in a non-Delaware proceeding does not operate as a waiver if the disclosure is not a waiver under the law of the jurisdiction where the disclosure occurred.

(e) Disclosure to a Law Enforcement Agency. Notwithstanding anything in these rules to the contrary, a disclosure made to a law enforcement agency pursuant to a confidentiality agreement does not operate as a waiver of an existing privilege.

(f) Controlling Effect of a Court Order. Notwithstanding anything in these rules to the contrary, a court may order that the privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the litigation pending before the court – in which event the disclosure is also not a waiver in any other proceeding.

(g) Controlling Effect of a Party Agreement. An agreement on the effect of disclosure in a proceeding is binding only on the parties to the agreement, unless it is incorporated into a court order.

(h) Definition. In this rule:

(1) “work-product protection” means the protection that applicable law provides for documents and tangible things (or their intangible equivalents) prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.

Comment

The revisions to D.R.E. 510 are based on F.R.E. 502, which rule has been the subject of almost 200 law review articles. At least 30 articles are comprehensive discussions of the rule and post-enactment judicial use of the rule. This proliferation of learned journal commentary on inadvertent disclosure of privileged communications parallels the exponential increase in e-discovery requests and responses in major cases. F.R.E. 502 takes a “middle ground” position on inadvertent disclosure, requiring an inquiry into the means taken by counsel to identify and protect privileged communications, unless the parties agree on a different protocol for dealing with inadvertent disclosure. The revised D.R.E. 510 contains similar protection against the admission or use of inadvertently disclosed privileged or protected communications to ensure the integrity of the litigation process in Delaware.

D.R.E. 510 conforms to the federal rule in terms of handling inadvertent disclosure. A leading case interpreting F.R.E. 502 is *Rhoads Industries, Inc. v.*

Building Materials Corp., 254 F.R.D. 216 (E.D. Pa. 2008). At least one Delaware decision deals with claims of waiver of attorney-client privilege through inadvertent disclosure and contains the following discussion:

An inadvertent disclosure of privileged communications will not necessarily operate to waive the attorney-client privilege. In order to determine whether the inadvertently disclosed documents have lost their privileged status, the Court must consider the following factors: (1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure; (2) the time taken to rectify the error; (3) the scope of discovery and extent of disclosure; and (4) the overall fairness, judged against the care or negligence with which the privilege is guarded.

In re Kent County Adequate Public Facilities Ordinances Litigation, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 48, at *24 (Apr. 19, 2008) (Noble, V.C.) (citations omitted). The factors set forth in these decisions are not explicitly codified in D.R.E. 510, as they constitute non-determinative guidelines that may vary from case to case.

As in F.R.E. 502, new D.R.E. 510 also clarifies that when a voluntary disclosure constitutes a waiver of attorney-client privilege as to a communication or information, the scope of the waiver is generally limited to the privileged communication or information disclosed. The rule does not disturb existing Delaware law regarding the scope of waiver of work-product protection by voluntary disclosure. *See Rollins Properties, Inc. v. CRS Sirrine, Inc.*, 1989 WL 158471 (Del. Super. Dec. 13, 1989).

The rule governs only certain waivers by disclosure and is not intended to alter existing law with respect to waiver of privilege or work product protection by other means. *See, e.g., Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.*, 2004 WL 2158051 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2004) (discussing “at issue” exception to attorney-client privilege as form of waiver “where the issue was lack of good faith” (citation omitted)).

Subsection 510(e) codifies the ruling by Chancellor Chandler in *Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc.*, Civ. A. 18553, 2002 WL 31657622 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 2002). *Saito* involved the question of whether the defendant waived its work-product protection as to the documents at issue by sharing them with the SEC in an investigation.

Subsection 510(f) contains the introductory clause, “[n]otwithstanding anything in these rules to the contrary,” in part so that a court may allow the parties in a matter to agree to quick-peek arrangements without pre-production privilege review. Otherwise, the parties to such an arrangement may be deemed to have waived a privilege pursuant to subsection 510(a).

Rule 511. Privileged Matter Disclosed Under Compulsion or Without Opportunity to Claim Privilege.

A claim of privilege is not defeated by a disclosure which was (1) compelled erroneously or (2) made without opportunity to claim the privilege.

Comment

This rule tracks U.R.E. 511 which is based on draft of F.R.E. 512. See comment to Rule 501.

Rule 511(2) should be interpreted as meaning that the disclosure was made without the party seeking the privilege having the opportunity to make a timely objection. An example of this is if the disclosure was blurted out by a witness during examination, or was made outside the presence of the privileged person. Failure to recognize the legal existence of the privilege is not deemed to be a lack of opportunity and therefore a failure to recognize and timely object may result in waiver of the privilege.

Rule 512. Comment Upon or Inference from Claim of Privilege; Instruction.

(a) Comment or inference not permitted. The claim of a privilege, whether in the present proceeding or upon a prior occasion, is not a proper subject of comment by judge or counsel. No inference may be drawn therefrom.

(b) Claiming privilege without knowledge of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to facilitate the making of claims of privilege without the knowledge of the jury.

(c) Jury instruction. Upon request, any party against whom the jury might draw an adverse inference from a claim of privilege is entitled to an instruction that no inference may be drawn therefrom.

Comment

This rule tracks U.R.E. 512 which is based on the draft of F.R.E. 513. See comment to Rule 501.

Rule 513. Reporter’s Privilege.

A reporter may not decline to testify except as provided by statute.

Comment
There is no similar rule in U.R.E. or F.R.E. Thus the rule is needed because of 10 Del. C. §§ 4320-4326, the Delaware Reporters Privilege Act.
Article VI. Witnesses
Rule 601. General Rules ofCompetency <u>to Testify in General</u>.
Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided <u>in unless</u> these rules: <u>provide otherwise</u> .
Comment
The rule tracks U.R.E. 601 and the first sentence of F.R.E. 601. The remainder of F.R.E. 601 was deemed to be inapplicable to a state. This rule is the same as the first sentence of F.R.E. 601.
This rule supersedes the Delaware Dead Man’s Statute, 10 Del. C. § 4302, which should now be repealed.
See Rule 104(a) as to preliminary questions as to qualification of witness.
This rule modifies existing Delaware case law. See State v. Timmons, Del. Gen. Sess., 2 Del. 528 (1833).
For prior Delaware cases illustrating the law covered by this rule, see Connor v. Lyness, Del. Supr., 284 A.2d 473 (1971); Armstrong v. Timmons, Del. Super., 3 Del. 342 (1841).
<u>D.R.E. 601 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.</u>
Rule 602. Lack of<u>Need for</u> Personal Knowledge.
A witness may not testify to a matter unless <u>only if</u> evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he <u>the witness</u> has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the <u>witness’s own</u> testimony of the witness himself. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 703, relating to opinion. This rule does not apply to a witness’s expert testimony <u>by expert witnesses under Rule 703.</u>
Comment
This rule tracks F.R.E. 602.

D.R.E. 602 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 603. Oath or Affirmation to Testify Truthfully.

Before testifying, ~~every~~a witness ~~shall be required to declare that he will~~must give an oath or affirmation to testify truthfully, ~~by oath or affirmation administered. It must be~~ in a form ~~calculated to awaken his conscience and designed to~~ impress ~~his mind with his~~that duty ~~to do so~~on the witness's conscience.

Comment

This rule tracks F.R.E. 603.

See 10 Del. C. §§ 5321-5324 for the usual forms of oaths.

This rule provides additional leeway to the court to prescribe a form of oath which may not be covered by, or be consistent with, 10 Del. C. §§ 5321-5324.

D.R.E. 603 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 604. Interpreters.

An interpreter ~~is subject to the provisions of these Rules relating to qualification as an expert and the administration of~~must be qualified and must give an oath or affirmation to make a true translation.

Comment

D.R.E. 604 tracks F.R.E. 604.

Delaware has implemented a certification procedure for court interpreters providing services in Delaware and has adopted a Code of Professional Responsibility for court interpreters. *See* Administrative Directive No. 107, Del. Supr., Veasey, C.J. (Apr. 4, 1996).

D.R.E. 604 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 605. Judge's Competency ~~of Judges~~ a Witness.

The ~~judge~~ presiding ~~at the trial~~ judge may not testify ~~in that trial~~ as a witness at the trial. ~~No objection~~ A party need ~~be made in order~~ not object to preserve the ~~point~~ issue.

Comment

This rule tracks F.R.E. 605.

Article IV, § 19 of the Delaware Constitution prohibits judges from charging juries with respect to matters of fact (commenting on the facts). Porter v. State, Del. Supr., 243 A.2d 699 (1968).

This rule modifies existing Delaware case law. See Delaware Lodge No. 1 v. Allmon, Del. Super., 39 A. 1098 (1897); State v. Brown, Del. Gen. Sess., 40 A. 938 (1898).

D.R.E. 605 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 606. Juror's Competency ~~of Jurors~~ a Witness.

(a) **At the Trial.** A ~~member of the jury~~ juror may not testify as a witness before ~~that jury in the other jurors at~~ the trial ~~of the case in which he is sitting as~~. If a juror ~~is called so~~ to testify, the ~~opposing court must give a party shall be afforded~~ an opportunity to object ~~out of outside~~ the jury's presence ~~of the jury~~.

(b) **During an Inquiry into the Validity of a Verdict or Indictment.**

(1) Upon Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence. During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify ~~as to about~~ any ~~matter or~~ statement ~~occurring~~ made or incident that occurred during the ~~course of the~~ jury's deliberations ~~or to~~; the effect of anything ~~upon his~~ on that juror's or another juror's vote; or any ~~other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from~~ juror's mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment ~~or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question~~. The court may not receive a juror's affidavit or evidence of a juror's statement on these matters.

(2) Exceptions. A juror may testify about whether:

(A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention ~~or whether any;~~

(B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear ~~upon~~on any juror; ~~or whether~~

(C) a clerical mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form. ~~Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.~~

Comment

This rule tracks F.R.E. 606.

Rule 606(b) modifies existing Delaware case law. See *Watson v. State*, Del. Supr., 184 A.2d 780 (1962).

The 2014 amendment to D.R.E. 606(b) adopts the exception in F.R.E. 606(b)(2)(C), which permits juror testimony in the event “a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form.” The addition of “clerical” in D.R.E. 606(b)(2)(C) is intended to preclude any juror from impeaching his or her verdict by asserting that the entry of the verdict was contrary to the juror’s original intention.

[D.R.E. 606 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.](#)

Rule 607. Who May Impeach a Witness.

~~The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any~~Any party, including the party ~~calling him~~that called the witness, may attack the witness’s credibility.

Comment

This rule tracks F.R.E. 607. This rule modifies existing Delaware case law. See *Concord Towers, Inc. v. Long*, Del. Supr., 348 A.2d 325 (1975).

[D.R.E. 607 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.](#)

Rule 608. ~~Evidence of~~A Witness’s Character ~~and Conduct of Witness~~for Truthfulness or Untruthfulness.

(a) **Reputation or Opinion and reputation evidence of character. Evidence.** Except as ~~provided in 11 Del.C. §§ 3508 and 3509~~ otherwise provided by statute, ~~the a witness's~~ credibility ~~of a witness~~ may be attacked or supported by ~~evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) The evidence may refer only to~~ testimony about the witness's reputation for having a character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, ~~and (2) or by testimony in the form of an opinion about that character. But~~ evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the witness's character ~~of the witness~~ for truthfulness has been attacked.

(b) **Specific instances of conduct.** ~~Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness's credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court,~~ **Instances of Conduct.** Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609 or evidence of bias under Rule 616, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness's conduct in order to attack or support the witness's character for truthfulness. But the court may, on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired into if they are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, ~~be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which of:~~

(1) the witness; or

(2) another witness whose character the witness being cross-examined has testified about.

(3) The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other By testifying on another matter, a witness, does not ~~operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness's~~ waive any privilege against self-incrimination ~~when examined with respect to matters which relate only to credibility~~ for testimony that relates only to the witness's character for truthfulness.

Comment

D.R.E. 608(a) differs from F.R.E. 608. The words "Except as otherwise provided by statute ~~provided in 11 Del. C. §§ 3508 and 3509~~" were ~~added~~ appear at the beginning of D.R.E. 608(a). Sections 3508 and 3509 of Title 11 relate to the evidence as to the sexual conduct of the complaining witness in prosecutions for rape or rape-related offenses. The references in F.R.E. 608 to opinion evidence were originally omitted from D.R.E. 608(a)

but were added in 2001 to conform this rule to existing Delaware practice. See D.R.E. 405.

For prior Delaware cases illustrating the areas of law covered by D.R.E. 608(a), see *Woods v. State*, Del. Supr., 315 A.2d 589 (1973) (guidelines in rape cases) and *State v. Cox*, Del. Gen. Sess., 181 A. 654 (1935).

A witness's bias is never a collateral issue within the meaning of D.R.E. 608(b), and extrinsic evidence is admissible to establish that the witness has a motive to testify falsely. *Weber v. State*, Del. Supr., 457 A.2d 674 (1983). See D.R.E. 616.

A party who intends to introduce evidence on cross-examination pursuant to D.R.E. 608(b) should first seek a ruling from the trial judge as to the admissibility of the evidence.

D.R.E. 608(b) modified prior Delaware case law. See *Williams v. State*, Del. Supr., 301 A.2d 88 (1973) and *Steigler v. State*, Del. Supr., 277 A.2d 662 (1971).

See D.R.E. 404(a)(2) and 412.

[D.R.E. 608 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. The pre-2017 "Comment" to D.R.E. 608 was revised only as necessary to reflect the 2017 amendments. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.](#)

Rule 609. Impeachment by Evidence of [a Criminal Conviction](#) ~~of Crime~~.

(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime ~~shall~~must be admitted but only if the crime (1) constituted a felony under the law under which the witness was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.

(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than 10 years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts

and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than 10 years old, as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent to use ~~such evidence to provide the adverse~~ it so that the party ~~with~~ has a fair opportunity to contest ~~the~~ its ~~use of such evidence.~~

(c) Effect of pardon, annulment or certificate of rehabilitation. Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a subsequent felony, or (2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence.

(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case, allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.

(e) Pendency of appeal. ~~The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render evidence of a conviction inadmissible~~ A conviction that satisfies this rule is admissible even if an appeal is pending. Evidence of the pendency ~~of an appeal~~ is also admissible.

Comment

The Permanent Advisory Committee on the Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence recommended retaining D.R.E. 609 as it existed in 2001, with one minor word change in D.R.E. 609(c), and not adopt F.R.E. 609 in effect on December 31, 2000. The Committee recommended rejecting F.R.E. 609 because it applies a different test of admissibility for felony impeachment between a defendant-witness and a witness. The Committee believed that this rule should be the same for all witnesses. A question as to the admissibility of a felony conviction under DRE 609(a)(1) should first be presented to the trial judge out of the presence of the jury to permit the judge to apply the rule's required balancing analysis.

D.R.E. 609(b) tracks F.R.E. 609(b).

D.R.E. 609(c) tracks F.R.E. 609(c) except it substitutes the word “felony” for the words “crime which was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year.”

D.R.E. 609(d) and (e) track F.R.E. 609(d) and (e).

For cases illustrating the law covered by D.R.E. 609, see *Archie v. State*, Del. Supr., 721 A.2d 924 (1998); *Wilson v. Sico*, Del. Supr., 713 A.2d 923 (1998); *Tucker v. State*, Del. Supr., 692 A.2d 416 (1996) (Table), *Webb v. State*, Del. Supr., 663 A.2d 452 (1995); *Gregory v. State*, Del. Supr., 616 A.2d 1198 (1992).

[D.R.E. 609 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.](#)

Rule 610. Religious Beliefs or Opinions.

Evidence of ~~the~~a witness’s religious beliefs or opinions ~~of a witness on matters of religion~~ is not admissible ~~for the purpose of showing that by reason of their nature his~~to attack or support the witness’s credibility ~~is impaired or enhanced~~.

Comment

This rule tracks F.R.E. 610. This rule modifies existing Delaware case law. See *State v. Townsend*, Del. Super., 2 Del. 543 (1837).

[D.R.E. 610 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.](#)

Rule 611. Mode and Order of ~~Interrogation~~Examining Witnesses and ~~Presentation~~Presenting Evidence.

(a) Control by the Court; Purposes. The court ~~sh~~ould exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of ~~interrogating~~examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to ~~(1) make the interrogation and presentation;~~
(1) make those procedures effective for ~~the ascertainment of~~determining the truth;
(2) avoid ~~needless consumption of~~wasting time; and
(3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.

(b) Scope of Cross-Examination. Cross-examination should ~~be limited to not go beyond~~ the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the witness's credibility ~~of the witness~~. The court may, ~~in the exercise of discretion, permit~~ allow inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination.

(c) Leading Questions. Leading questions should not be used on ~~the~~ direct examination ~~of a witness~~ except as ~~may be~~ necessary to develop ~~his~~ the witness's testimony. Ordinarily, the court should allow leading questions ~~should be permitted:~~

(1) on cross-examination. When; and

(2) when a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party, ~~interrogation may be by leading questions.~~

Comment

This rule tracks F.R.E. 611.

For prior Delaware cases illustrating the areas of law covered by Rule 611(a), see *Wallace v. State*, Del. Supr., 211 A.2d 845 (1965); *Bove v. State*, Del. Supr., 134 A. 630 (1926).

For prior Delaware cases illustrating the areas of law covered by Rule 611(b), see *Steigler v. State*, Del. Supr., 277 A.2d 662 (1971); *Watson v. State*, Del. Supr., 184 A.2d 780 (1962); *Zutz v. State*, Del. Supr., 160 A.2d 727 (1960); *State v. Cox*, 37 Del. 238, 181 A. 654 (1935).

D.R.E. 611 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 612. Writing or Object Used To Refresh a Witness's Memory.

(a) While Testifying. If, while testifying, a witness uses a writing or object to refresh his memory, an adverse party is entitled to have the writing or object produced at the trial, hearing or deposition in which the witness is testifying.

(b) Before Testifying. If, before testifying, a witness uses a writing or object to refresh his memory for the purpose of testifying and the court in its discretion determines that the interests of justice so require, an adverse party is entitled to have the writing or object produced, if practicable, at the trial, hearing or deposition in which the witness is testifying.

(c) Terms and Conditions of Production and Use. A party entitled to have a writing or object produced under this rule is entitled to inspect it, to cross-examine the witness ~~thereon~~about it and to introduce in evidence ~~those~~any portions ~~which that~~ relate to the witness's testimony ~~of the witness~~. If production of the writing or object at the trial, hearing or deposition is impracticable, the court may order it made available for inspection. If ~~it is claimed~~the producing party claims that the writing or object contains matters not related to the subject matter of the testimony, the court ~~shall~~must examine the writing or object in camera, ~~excise any portions not so related~~delete any unrelated portion and order ~~delivery of that~~ the ~~remainder~~rest be delivered to the adverse party ~~entitled thereto~~. Any portion withheld over objections shall be preserved and made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. If a writing or object is not produced, made available for inspection or delivered pursuant to order under this rule, the court ~~shall make~~may issue any order justice requires, ~~but in criminal cases~~. But if the prosecution ~~elects~~does not ~~to comply, the order shall be one striking the~~comply in a criminal case, the court must strike the witness's testimony or, ~~if the court in its discretion determines that the interests of~~ — if justice so ~~require, declaring~~requires — declare a mistrial.

Comment

This rule tracks U.R.E. 612 which differs in form but not in substance from F.R.E. 612. The Committee believed that the Uniform Rule was clearer.

For prior Delaware case illustrating the law covered by this rule, see Terry & Sons v. American Fruit Growers, Inc., Del. Super., 139 A. 259 (1925).

D.R.E. 612 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 613. Witness's Prior ~~Statements of Witnesses~~Statement.

~~Examining Witness Concerning Prior~~ (a) Showing or Disclosing the Statement. ~~In~~ During Examination. When examining a witness ~~concerning~~ about the witness's prior statement ~~made by him, whether written or not, the statement, a party~~ need not ~~be shown nor~~show it or disclose its contents ~~disclosed to him at that time, but on request the same shall be shown or~~ disclosed to opposing counsel to the witness. But the party must, on request, show it or disclose its contents to an adverse party's attorney.

(b) Extrinsic Evidence of a Prior Inconsistent Statement ~~of Witness~~. Extrinsic evidence of a witness's prior inconsistent statement ~~by a witness~~ is ~~not~~ admissible ~~unless only if~~ the witness is afforded given an opportunity to explain or deny the same statement and ~~the opposite an adverse~~ party is afforded given an opportunity to ~~interrogate him thereon, or the interests of examine the witness about it, or if~~ justice ~~otherwise so~~ requires. This ~~provision subdivision (b)~~ does not apply to ~~admissions of a party opponent as defined in an opposing party's statement under~~ Rule 801(d)(2).

(c) Exception. If a witness does not clearly admit that ~~he~~ the witness has made the prior inconsistent statement, extrinsic evidence of ~~such~~ the statement is admissible.

Comment

Rule 613(a) tracks F.R.E. 613(a).

Rule 613(b) tracks F.R.E. 613(b).

Rule 613(c) does not appear in the F.R.E. or U.R.E. It follows the Florida Rules of Evidence except the word “clearly” was substituted for the word “distinctly.”

The purpose of Rule 613(c) is to allow extrinsic evidence to be introduced if a witness hedges and neither admits nor denies a prior inconsistent statement.

For prior case illustrating the areas of law covered by Rule 613(a), see *Jenkins v. State*, Del. Supr., 305 A.2d 610 (1973).

D.R.E. 613 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 614. Court's Calling ~~and Interrogation of Witnesses by Court~~ or Examining a Witness.

(a) Calling ~~by Court~~. The court may ~~call a witness~~ on its own ~~motion~~ or at ~~the suggestion of a party, call witnesses, and all parties are~~ a party's request. Each party is entitled to cross-examine ~~witnesses thus called~~ the witness.

(b) Interrogation ~~by Court~~. ~~The court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party.~~ Examining. The court may examine a witness regardless of who calls the witness.

(c) Objections. ~~Objections~~ A party may object to the court's calling ~~of witnesses by the court or to interrogation by it may be made at the~~ or examining a witness either at that time or at the next ~~available~~ opportunity when the jury is not present.

Comment

This rule tracks F.R.E. 614.

The Committee believed that Rule 614(a) should be used sparingly in jury trials. If a judge proposes to call a witness in a jury trial he should advise counsel out of the presence of the jury and give counsel opportunity to object. The Committee recognized that this rule may be helpful in nonjury trials, especially if a party is appearing pro se. In all cases, however, the parties should be given an opportunity to object to the calling of a witness by the court before the witness is called.

D.R.E. 614 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 615. ~~Exclusion of~~ Excluding Witnesses.

At ~~the~~ a party's request ~~of a party,~~ the court may order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear ~~the testimony of~~ other witnesses, ~~and it may make the order of~~ testimony. Or the court may do so on its own ~~motion.~~ This ~~But this~~ rule does not authorize ~~exclusion of~~ (1) excluding:

- (a) a party who is a natural person, ~~or;~~
- (2b) an officer or employee of a party ~~which~~ that is not a natural person, after being designated as ~~its~~ the party's representative by its attorney; ~~or;~~
- (3c) a person whose presence ~~is shown by~~ a party shows to be essential to ~~the presentation of his cause~~ presenting the party's claim or defense.

Comment

This rule tracks F.R.E. 615 except that “may” was substituted for “~~shall~~ must” in the first line. It was believed that the court should be given latitude as to whether witnesses should be sequestered. It was recognized that in most cases a request for sequestration will be granted but that it is sometimes desirable not to sequester a particular witness, especially an expert witness.

F.R.E. 615(d) has not been included in D.R.E. 615.

For prior cases illustrating the areas of law covered by this rule, see Fountain v. State, Del. Supr., 382 A.2d 230 (1977); Derrickson v. State, Del. Supr., 321 A.2d 497 (1974).

D.R.E. 615 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. The pre-2017 “Comment” to D.R.E. 615 was revised only as necessary to reflect the current language of F.R.E. 615. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 616. Bias of ~~witness~~ Witness

~~For the purpose of attacking the~~ A witness’s credibility ~~of a witness,~~ may be attacked with evidence of the witness’s bias, prejudice or interest ~~of the witness~~ for or against any party to the case ~~is admissible.~~

Comment

D.R.E. 616 tracks U.R.E. 616.

D.R.E. 616 codifies the principle that the bias of a witness is subject to exploration at trial Weber v. State, Del. Supr., 457 A.2d 674 (1983). For a definition of bias, see United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984). For other Delaware cases illustrating how this rule should be applied, see Garden v. Sutton, Del. Supr., 683 A.2d 1041 (1996) and Snowden v. State, Del. Supr., 672 A.2d 1017 (1996).

A party who intends to introduce evidence pursuant to D.R.E. 616 should first seek a ruling from the trial judge as to the admissibility of the evidence.

D.R.E. 616 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

ARTICLE VII. OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY

Rule 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses.

If ~~the~~ a witness is not testifying as an expert, ~~the witness’s~~ testimony in the form of ~~opinions or inferences~~ an opinion is limited to ~~those opinions or inferences which are~~ (a) one that is:

- (a) rationally based on the witness’s perception ~~of the witness and;~~
- (b) helpful to ~~a clear~~ clearly understanding ~~of~~ the witness’s testimony or ~~the determination of~~ to determining a fact in issue; and

(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.

Comment

D.R.E. 701 tracks F.R.E. 701 in effect on December 31, 2000.

D.R.E. 701 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 702. Testimony by ~~Experts~~ Expert Witnesses.

~~If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a~~ A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify ~~thereto~~ in the form of an opinion or otherwise; ~~if (1)~~ if:

(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data;

(2c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(3d) the ~~witness~~expert has reliably applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

Comment

D.R.E. 702 was amended in 2001 to track F.R.E. 702 in effect on December 31, 2000.

D.R.E. 702 is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See also M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. LeBeau, Del. Supr., 737 A.2d 513 (1999) (adopting Kumho Tire and Daubert as the correct interpretation of D.R.E. 702), Nelson v. State, Del. Supr., 628 A.2d 69 (1993).

D.R.E. 702 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 703. Bases of an Expert's Opinion Testimony ~~by Experts~~.

~~The~~ An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the ~~particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived~~

~~by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by~~ case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming ~~opinions or inferences upon~~ an opinion on the subject, ~~the facts or data~~ they need not be admissible ~~in evidence in order~~ for the opinion ~~or inference~~ to be admitted. Upon objection, if the facts or data ~~that are~~ would otherwise be inadmissible ~~shall not be disclosed to the jury by~~ the proponent of the opinion ~~or inference unless the court determines that~~ may disclose them to the jury only if their probative value in ~~assisting~~ helping the jury ~~to~~ evaluate the ~~expert's~~ opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.

Comment

D.R.E. 703 tracks F.R.E. 703 in effect on December 31, 2000, except the words “Upon objection” have been inserted at the beginning of the last sentence of D.R.E. 703. These words were added to ensure that any party who wants to exclude expert basis information from the jury must raise the issue by objection.

See D.R.E. 602.

D.R.E. 703 is consistent with *Gibbons v. Schenley Indus., Inc.*, Del. Ch., 339 A.2d 460 (1975) and *Storey v. Castner*, Del. Supr., 314 A.2d 187 (1973).

[D.R.E. 703 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.](#)

Rule 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issue.

Testimony in the form of an opinion ~~or inference~~ otherwise admissible is not objectionable merely because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.

Comment

D.R.E. 704 tracks F.R.E. 704(a) except for the addition of the word “merely.”

The 1980 Committee added the word “merely” to make it clear that this rule must be read in connection with D.R.E. 701. Thus, testimony on the ultimate issue is not allowed unless admissible under D.R.E. 701.

In 2001, the Permanent Advisory Committee on the Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence considered adopting F.R.E. 704(b) in effect on December 31,

2000. That provision prohibits an expert from stating an opinion about whether a defendant possessed the requisite state of mind or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. The Committee found F.R.E. 704(b) inconsistent with D.R.E. 704 and, therefore, recommended against adopting a similar provision.

This rule may be inconsistent with *Wagner v. Shanks*, Del. Supr., 194 A.2d 701 (1963) and *Matthews v. State*, Del. Supr., 276 A.2d 265 (1971). It is consistent, however, with *Szewczyk v. Doubet*, Del. Supr., 354 A.2d 426 (1976) and *Itek Corp. v. Chicago Aerial Indus., Inc.*, Del. Super., 274 A.2d 141 (1971).

[D.R.E. 704 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.](#)

Rule 705. Disclos~~ure~~ing ~~of the~~ Facts or Data Underlying an Expert's Opinion.

(a) Disclosure of ~~facts or data underlying expert opinion. The~~Facts and Data Underlying an Expert Opinion. Unless the court orders otherwise, an expert may ~~testify in terms of~~state an opinion ~~or inference~~— and give the reasons ~~therefor~~for it — without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, ~~unless. But the court requires otherwise. The~~ expert may ~~in any event~~ be required to disclose ~~the underlying~~those facts or data on cross-examination.

(b) **Objection.** An adverse party may object to the testimony of an expert on the ground that the expert does not have a sufficient basis for expressing an opinion. The adverse party may, before the witness gives an opinion, be allowed to conduct a voir dire examination directed to the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based.

Comment

D.R.E. 705(a) tracks F.R.E. 705 in effect on December 31, 2000.

D.R.E. 705(b) was adopted in 1980 and is not contained in F.R.E. 705 or U.R.E. 705.

[D.R.E. 705 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.](#)

Rule 706. Court-Appointed ~~Experts~~ Expert Witnesses.

(a) Appointment. ~~The court may~~ Process. On a party's motion or on its own ~~motion or on the motion of any party enter an,~~ the court may order the parties to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed; and may ~~request~~ask the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert ~~witnesses agreed upon by~~that the parties; ~~agree on~~ and ~~may appoint~~ expert witnessesany of its own ~~selection.~~ An expert witness shall not be appointed by the court unless the witnesschoosing. But the court may only appoint someone who consents to act. ~~A witness so appointed shall be informed of the witness'~~

(b) Expert's Role. The court must inform the expert of the expert's duties ~~by~~ the. The court may do so in writing; ~~and have~~ a copy ~~of which shall be~~ filed with the clerk; ~~or~~ may do so orally at a conference in which the parties ~~shall~~ have an opportunity to participate. ~~A witness so appointed shall~~ The expert:

(1) must advise the parties of ~~the witness'~~any findings; ~~if any;~~ ~~the witness'~~ depositionexpert makes;

(2) may be ~~taken~~deposed by any party; ~~and the witness~~

(3) may be called to testify by the court or any party. ~~The witness shall be subject to;~~ and

(4) may be cross-examinationed by ~~each~~any party, including ~~at~~the party ~~calling~~that called the ~~witness~~expert.

(bc) Compensation. ~~Expert witnesses so appointed are~~ The expert is entitled to a reasonable compensation ~~in whatever sum, as set by~~ the court ~~may allow.~~ The compensation ~~thus fixed~~ is payable ~~from funds which may be provided by law~~ as follows:

(1) in a criminal ~~cases and~~case or in a civil ~~actions and proceedings~~case involving just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. ~~In, from any funds that are provided by law; and~~

(2) in any other civil ~~actions and proceedings the compensation shall be paid~~case, by the parties in ~~such~~the proportion and at ~~such~~the time ~~as that~~ the court directs; — and ~~thereafter~~the compensation is then charged ~~in~~ like ~~manner as~~ other costs.

(e) Disclosure of (d) Disclosing the Appointment. ~~In the exercise of its discretion, the~~ to the Jury. The court may authorize disclosure to the jury ~~of the fact that the court appointed the expert-witness.~~

(de) Parties' Experts Choice of Their Own Selection. ~~Nothing in this rule~~ Experts. This rule does not limits ~~the~~ a parties y in calling ~~expert witnesses of their~~its own ~~selection~~experts.

Comment

The Committee omitted a previous rule dealing with court appointed expert because it more properly belongs in the Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure and should not be included in the Rules of Evidence. See Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 28.

D.R.E. 706 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

ARTICLE VIII. HEARSAY

Rule 801. Definitions That Apply to This Article; Exclusions from Hearsay.

~~The following definitions apply under this article:~~
(a) Statement. A ~~“statement” is (1) an~~ “Statement” means a person’s oral or ~~assertion,~~ written assertion, ~~or (2) nonverbal conduct of a, if the~~ person, ~~if it is~~ intended by ~~him~~ it as an assertion.

(b) Declarant. ~~A “declarant” is a~~ “Declarant” means the person who ~~makes~~ des ~~a the~~ statement.

(c) Hearsay. “Hearsay” means a statement that:

(1) (c) Hearsay. “Hearsay” is a statement, other than one made by the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; offered; and

(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.

(d) Statements ~~which~~ That a ~~Are n~~ Not h ~~Hearsay.~~ A statement that meets the following conditions is not hearsay ~~if:~~

(1) A Declarant-Witness’s Prior statement by witness ~~Statement.~~ The declarant testifies ~~at the trial or hearing~~ and is subject to cross-examination ~~concerning the~~ about a prior statement, and the statement ~~is:~~

(A) is inconsistent with ~~his~~ the declarant’s testimony, or

(B) in civil cases, is consistent with ~~his~~ the declarant’s testimony and is offered:

(i) to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or that the declarant recently fabricated it or acted from a recent improper influence or motive, or in so testifying; or

(ii) to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a witness when attacked on another ground; or

(C) in criminal cases, is consistent with declarant’s testimony and is permitted under 10 Del. C. § 3507; or

(D) ~~one of identification of a~~ identifies a person.

(2) ~~Admission by party-opponent~~ An Opposing Party's Statement.

The statement is offered against an opposing party and ~~is (A) his own statement, in either his:~~

(A) was made by the party in an individual or a representative capacity; ~~or (B) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement;~~

(B) is one the party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true;

(C) was made by a person whom the party authorized ~~by him~~ to make a statement concerning on the subject, ~~or;~~

(D) a statement was made by ~~his~~ the party's agent or ~~servant concerning employee on~~ a matter within the scope of ~~his agency or employment, made during the existence of the~~ that relationship, ~~and while it existed;~~ or ~~(E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a~~

(E) was made by the party's coconspirator during ~~the course~~ and in furtherance of the conspiracy; provided that the conspiracy has first been established by the preponderance of the evidence to the satisfaction of the court

Comment

D.R.E. 801(a), (b) and (c) track F.R.E. 801(a), (b) and (c).

D.R.E. 801(d) tracks F.R.E. except for Rule 801(d)(1)(A) and (C) and 801(d)(2)(E).

D.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A) and (C) track F.R.E. 801(d)(1) except the words “and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing or other proceeding or in a deposition” are deleted as they appear at the end of F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A). This wording is consistent with the original draft of F.R.E. 801(d)(1) before amendment by Congress. U.R.E. 801(d)(1) is consistent with the adopted language for civil (but not criminal) cases. The words ~~“made after perceiving him”~~ “perceived earlier” as they appear at the end of F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C) were deleted as being unnecessary. The 2014 amendment to D.R.E. 801(d)(1) reflects that the Delaware Supreme Court has detached 11 Del. C. § 3507 from its interpretation of D.R.E. 801(d). *See Richardson v. State*, 43 A.3d 906 (Del. 2012).

D.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E) tracks F.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E) except for the proviso added at the end of D.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E). The additional wording was deemed necessary to protect the rights of an alleged co-conspirator.

[In 2017, D.R.E. 801\(d\)\(1\)\(B\) was amended to incorporate a change to F.R.E. 801\(d\)\(1\)\(B\) that permitted the admission of a testifying witness' prior consistent statements as substantive evidence. This amendment is limited to civil cases.](#)

D.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E) must be applied in a manner consistent with *Bruton v. United States*, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).

This rule modifies D.R.E. 104(a) and (b) as to the establishment of a conspiracy.

Evidence which would otherwise be hearsay, if offered for a limited purpose or if part of the *res gestae*, may be received in evidence. See D.R.E. 104 and 803 and *Kreisher v. State*, Del. Supr., 303 A.2d 651 (1973).

For prior Delaware cases illustrating the law covered by this rule, see *Heldmyer v. Cleaver*, Del. Super., 104 A. 635 (1918); *Cooper v. Baker*, Del. Super., 139 A. 254 (1927); *Husband H. v. Wife H.*, Del. Supr., 358 A.2d 724 (1976); *State v. Boleslowski*, Del. Oyer & Term., 178 A. 431 (1934); *State v. Hamilton*, Del. Gen. Sess., 67 A. 836 (1907); *Perry v. Grier*, Del. Super., 40 A. 1130 (1894); *Cerchio v. Mullins*, Del. Super., 138 A. 277 (1922); *Klair v. Philadelphia B. & W.R.R.*, Del. Super., 78 A. 1085 (1920); *Hollis v. Vandergrift*, Del. Super., 10 Del. 521 (1878); *Geylin v. DeVilleroi*, Del. Super., 7 Del. 311 (1859); *State v. Frantz*, Del. Gen. Sess., 121 A. 652 (1922); *Duonnolo v. State*, Del. Supr., 397 A.2d 126 (1978).

The parol evidence rule is not set forth in the rules of evidence because it is a rule of substantive law, not a rule of evidence. See *Brandywine Shoppe, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.*, Del. Super., 307 A.2d 806 (1973).

[D.R.E. 801 was also amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Those amendments are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.](#)

Rule 802. The Rule Against Hearsay-Rule.

Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these Rules.

Comment

This rule tracks U.R.E. 802 rather than F.R.E. 802 which was deemed to be inapplicable to a state.

D.R.E. 802 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 803. Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of to the Rule Against Hearsay Regardless of Whether the Declarant Immaterial Is Available as a Witness.

The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay-~~rule, even though, regardless of whether~~ the declarant is available as a witness:

- (1) **Present Sense Impression.** A statement describing or explaining an event or condition, made while ~~the declarant was perceiving the event or condition,~~ or immediately ~~thereafter~~after the declarant perceived it.
- (2) **Excited Utterance.** A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement ~~that it caused by the event or condition.~~ that it caused
- (3) **Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition.** A statement of the declarant's then -existing state of mind, ~~emotion, sensation (such as motive, intent, or plan) or emotional, sensory,~~ or physical condition (such as ~~intent, plan, motive, design,~~ mental feeling, pain ~~and, or~~ bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the ~~execution, revocation, identification~~validity or terms of the declarant's will.
- (4) **Statement Made for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment.**
Statements A statement that:
 - (A) is made for ~~purposes of~~ — and is reasonably pertinent to — medical diagnosis or treatment; ~~and describing~~
 - (B) describes medical history, ~~or~~ past or present symptoms, ~~pain~~ or sensations, ~~or the; their~~ inception; or their general ~~character of the cause or external course thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment~~cause.
- (5) **Recorded Recollection.** A ~~memorandum or~~ record ~~concerning~~that:

(A) is on a matter ~~about which at~~ the witness once ~~had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable him~~ knew about but now cannot recall well enough to testify fully and accurately, ~~shown to have been;~~
(B) was made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in ~~his~~ the witness's memory; and ~~to reflect that~~
(C) accurately reflects the witness's knowledge ~~correctly~~.

If admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into evidence or may be received as an exhibit in the court's discretion.

(6) Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. A memorandum, report, record or data compilation, in any form, ~~of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis if:~~

(A) the record was made at or near the time by, — or from information transmitted by, ~~a person — someone~~ with knowledge, ~~if;~~

(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted ~~business activity, and if it was the~~ activity of a business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit;

(C) making the memorandum, report, record or data compilation was a regular practice of that ~~business activity to make the memorandum, report, record or data compilation, all as;~~

(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or ~~other~~ another qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with ~~D.R.E. Rule 902(11), D.R.E. 902~~ or (12) or with a statute permitting certification, ~~unless; and~~

(E) the opponent does not show that the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness. ~~The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.~~

(7) Absence of Entry in Records Kept in Accordance With the Provisions of Paragraph (6) a Record of a Regularly Conducted Activity.

Evidence that a matter is not included in ~~the memoranda, reports, records or data compilations, in any form, kept in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (6) of this rule,~~ a record described in paragraph (6) if:

(A) the evidence is admitted to prove that the ~~nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, report, record or data compilation~~ matter did not occur or exist;

(B) a record was regularly ~~made and preserved,~~ kept for a matter of that kind unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness; and

(C) the opponent does not show that the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.

(8) Public Records and Reports. ~~To the extent not otherwise provided in this paragraph, records, Reports,~~ reports, statements or data compilations, in any form, of a public office or agency setting forth its regularly conducted and regularly recorded activities, or matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law and as to which there was a duty to report, or factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law. ~~The~~But the following are not within this exception to the hearsay rule:

- (A) Investigative reports by police and other law-enforcement personnel;
- (B) investigative reports prepared by or for a government, a public office or an agency when offered by it in a case in which it is a party;
- (C) factual findings offered by the government in criminal cases;
- (D) factual findings resulting from special investigation of a particular complaint, case or incident;
- (E) any matter as to which the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.

(9) Public Records of Vital Statistics. ~~Records or data compilations, in any form, of births, fetal deaths, deaths or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a public office pursuant to requirements of law~~A record of a birth, death, or marriage, if reported to a public office in accordance with a legal duty.

(10) Absence of Public Record or Entry; Use of Public Record or Entry for Testimonial Purposes. ~~(a) To prove the absence of a record, report, statement or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report, statement or data compilation, in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902, or testimony,~~

(A) Testimony —or a certification under Rule 902 — that a diligent search failed to disclose the record, report, statement or data compilation, or entry. ~~(b) —~~a public record or statement if the testimony or certification is admitted to prove that: (i) the record or statement does not exist; or (ii) a matter did not occur or exist, if a public office regularly kept a record or statement for a matter of that kind.

(B) If the prosecutor i~~n~~n a criminal case, a prosecutor who intends to offer a ~~record, report, statement or data compilation that was regularly made and preserved by a public office or agency for testimonial purposes, the prosecutor~~certification provides written notice of that intent at least 14 days before trial, and the defendant does not object in writing within 7

days ~~of receiving the notice~~— unless the court sets a different time for ~~the~~ notice or the objection.

(11) **Records of Religious Organizations.** ~~Statements of births, marriages, divorces, deaths~~ Concerning Personal or Family History. A statement of birth, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, divorce, death, relationship by blood or marriage, or ~~other~~ similar facts of personal or family history, contained in a regularly kept record of a religious organization.

(12) Certificates of Marriage, ~~Baptism~~ Baptism, and Similar Certificates. ~~Statements~~ Ceremonies. A statement of fact contained in a certificate ~~that the maker performed a marriage or other ceremony or administered a sacrament, made by a clergyman, public official or other:~~

(A) made by a person who is authorized by ~~the rules or practices of~~ a religious organization or by law to perform the act certified, ~~and:~~

(B) attesting that the person performed a marriage or similar ceremony or administered a sacrament; and

(C) purporting to have been issued at the time of the act or within a reasonable time ~~thereafter~~ after it.

(13) **Family Records.** ~~Statements~~ A statement of fact ~~concerning about~~ personal or family history contained in a family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on family portraits, engravings on urns, crypts or tombstones, or the like record, such as a Bible, genealogy, chart, engraving on a ring, inscription on a portrait, or engraving on an urn or burial marker.

(14) **Records of Documents Affecting That Affect an Interest in Property.**

The record of a document ~~purporting that purports~~ to establish or affect an interest in property, ~~as proof of if:~~

(A) the record is admitted to prove the content of the original recorded document ~~and, along with~~ its execution signing and its delivery by each person ~~by whom it who~~ purports to have ~~been executed, if signed it;~~

(B) the record is kept in a ~~record of~~ public office; ~~and an applicable~~

(C) a statute authorizes ~~the~~ recording ~~of~~ documents of that kind in that office.

(15) **Statements in Documents Affecting That Affect an Interest in Property.** A statement contained in a document ~~purporting that purports~~ to establish or affect an interest in property if the matter stated was relevant to the ~~purpose of the document,~~ 's purpose — unless later dealings with the property ~~since the document was made have been~~ are inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document.

(16) **Statements in Ancient Documents.** ~~Statements~~ A statement in a document ~~in existence~~ that is at least 20 years ~~or more, the~~ old and whose authenticity ~~of which~~ is established.

(17) **Market Reports; and Similar Commercial Publications.** Market quotations, ~~tabulations,~~ lists, directories, or other ~~published~~ compilations, that are generally ~~used and~~ relied upon by the public or by persons in particular occupations.

(18) **Statements in Learned Treatises.** ~~To the extent, Periodicals, or Pamphlets.~~ A statement contained in a treatise, periodical, or pamphlet if:

(A) the statement is called to the attention of an expert witness ~~upon~~ cross-examination, or ~~relied upon~~ relied upon by ~~him in~~ the expert on direct examination, ~~statements contained in published treatises, periodicals or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine or other science or art;~~ and

(B) the publication is established as a reliable authority by the ~~testimony~~ expert's admission ~~of the witness~~ or testimony, by ~~other~~ another expert's testimony, or by judicial notice.

If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but ~~may not be~~ received as ~~exhibits~~ an exhibit.

(19) **Reputation Concerning Personal or Family History.** ~~Reputation~~ A reputation among ~~members of his~~ a person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, ~~—~~ or among ~~his~~ a person's associates, or in the community, ~~—~~ concerning ~~at~~ the person's birth, adoption, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, divorce, death, ~~legitimaey,~~ relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ~~ancestry or other~~ similar facts of his personal or family history.

(20) **Reputation Concerning Boundaries or General History.** ~~Reputation~~ A reputation in a community, ~~—~~ arising before the controversy, ~~as to —~~ concerning boundaries of ~~or customs affecting lands~~ land in the community, ~~and reputation as to events of general history~~ or customs that affect the land, or concerning general historical events important to ~~the~~ at community ~~or,~~ state, or nation ~~in which located.~~

(21) **Reputation as to Concerning Character.** ~~Reputation of~~ A reputation among a person's ~~character among his~~ associates or in the community concerning the person's character.

(22) **Judgment of a Previous Conviction.** Evidence of a final judgment, of conviction if:

(A) the judgment was entered after a trial or ~~upon a plea of~~ guilty (plea, but not ~~upon a plea of~~ a nolo contendere), ~~constituting plea;~~

(B) the conviction was for a felony under the law pursuant to which the person was convicted;

(C) the evidence is admitted to prove any fact essential to ~~sustain~~ the judgment, ~~but not including;~~ and

(D) when offered by the state prosecutor in a criminal prosecution case for ~~purposes~~ a purpose other than impeachment, ~~judgments~~ the judgment was against ~~persons other than~~ the accused. defendant.

The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility.

(23) Judgment as to Judgments Involving Personal, Family, or General History, or Boundaries. ~~Judgments as proof of matters~~ or a Boundary. A judgment that is admitted to prove a matter of personal, family, or general history, or boundaries, if the matter:

(A) was essential to the judgment, ~~if the same would be provable;~~ and

(B) could be proved by evidence of reputation.

(24) [Other exceptions.] [Transferred to D.R.E. Rule 807.]

(25) Business Records in Justice of the Peace Court Civil Cases. In a civil case before a Justice of the Peace, a bill, estimate, receipt or statement of account which appears to have been made in the regular course of business may be admitted into evidence by the Court, if the Justice of the Peace is satisfied that the document is reliable.

Comment

D.R.E. 803(1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (7), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19), (20), (21), (23) and (24) track the corresponding federal rules. D.R.E. 803(5), (8) and (22) do not.

D.R.E. 803(5) tracks F.R.E. 803(5) except that the last sentence was revised in 1980. The revision was made to enable the court to decide whether recorded recollection once admitted as evidence may be received as an exhibit or merely read. It is intended by this change to permit, in the court's discretion, the admission of a recorded recollection as an exhibit regardless of who offered it. The court should weigh whether the admission as an exhibit would unduly influence the jury. D.R.E. 803(5) should be read more broadly than its literal language. A recorded statement should qualify for admission even if it was recorded by another party if it appears that the statement does in fact reflect the prior knowledge of the witness.

D.R.E. 803(6) was amended in 2001, tracking a similar amendment to F.R. E. 803(6) in effect on December 31, 2000, to permit satisfying the foundational requirements for the admissibility of a business record through certification as an alternative to the expense and inconvenience of producing a time-consuming foundational witness. This amendment is consistent with existing

Superior Court practice. This amendment should be interpreted with reference to D.R.E. 902(11) and 902(12) providing for the self-authentication of domestic and foreign records under the certification procedures provided for in D.R.E. 803(6).

D.R.E. 803(6) does not make admissible records created for the litigation such as the report of a medical doctor retained to examine a party at the request of the opposing party. Likewise, a toxicologist's report on the presence of drugs would not be admissible because of D.R.E. 803(8). *But see* 10 Del. C. § 4330-32; 21 Del. C. § 4177(h).

See Rule of Civil Procedure 33(c) relating to discovery of business records.

D.R.E. 803(8) tracks U.R.E. 803(8), which was believed to be preferable over F.R.E. 803(8).

New D.R.E. 803(10) tracks Justice Scalia's dicta in *Melendez-Dias v. Massachusetts*, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). Justice Scalia stated that drug chemistry reports could be admitted if the prosecution first notified the accused of its intent to use drug chemistry reports in its case in chief, and the accused did not demand that the drug chemist appear and testify in court. *Melendez-Dias*, 557 U.S. at 325-26.

The provisions of D.R.E. 803(18) are not intended to change the provisions of 18 Del. C. § 6807 relating to the evidence to be considered by a medical malpractice review panel.

D.R.E. 803(21) deals only with hearsay issues concerning reputation and opinion. See D.R.E. 404, 405 and 608 for substantive issues.

D.R.E. 803(22) tracks F.R.E. 803(22) except that the words "~~constituting~~ a felony under the law pursuant to which the person was convicted" were substituted for the words "~~adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 2 years~~the conviction was for a crime punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than a year." See D.R.E. 609(a) for similar treatment.

Nothing in D.R.E. 803(22) should prohibit the admission of evidence of a plea of guilty to any crime where such plea constitutes an admission under D.R.E. 801(d)(2). *Boyd & Reed v. Hammond*, Del. Supr., 187 A.2d 413 (1963).

D.R.E.803(24) was transferred to D.R.E. 807, which was adopted in 2001, tracking a similar change to the federal rules.

For prior Delaware cases illustrating the law covered by this rule, see *Carpenter v. Greene*, Del. Supr., 396 A.2d 150 (1977); *Halko v. State*, Del. Supr., 204 A.2d 628 (1964); *Garrod v. Good*, Del. Supr., 203 A.2d 112 (1964); *Cloud v. State*, Del. Supr., 154 A.2d 680 (1959); *Curren v. State*, Del. Supr., 122 A.2d 126 (1956); *State v. Long*, Del. Oyer & Term., 123 A. 350 (1923); *In Re Kemp's Will*, Del. Supr., 186 A. 890 (1935); *Derrickson v. State*, Del. Supr., 321 A.2d 497 (1974); *Rice v. Simmons*, Del. Supr., 2 Del. 309 (1837); *Wilkins v. Wilmington*, Del. Supr., 42 A. 418 (1895); *State v. Boleslowski*, Del. Oyer & Term., 178 A. 431 (1934); *Grossman v. Delaware Elec. Power*, Del. Supr., 155 A. 806 (1929); *Johnson v. State*, Del. Supr., 253 A.2d 206 (1969); *Millman v. Millman*, Del. Supr., 359 A.2d 158 (1976); *State v. Henson*, Del. Supr., 319 A.2d 43 (1974); *Watts v. Delaware Coach Co.*, Del. Supr., 58 A.2d 689 (1948); *Ayers v. Quillen & Sons*, Del. Supr., 188 A.2d 510 (1963); *State v. Tucker*, Del. Gen. Sess., 139 A. 253 (1927); *Hooven v. Hooven*, Del. Supr., 130 A. 495 (1925); *Kreisher v. State*, Del. Supr., 303 A.2d 651 (1973).

[D.R.E. 803 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. The pre-2017 "Comment" to D.R.E. 803 was revised only as necessary to reflect the 2017 amendments and the current language of F.R.E. 803. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.](#)

Rule 804. Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay- When the Declarant is Unavailable as a Witness.

(a) ~~Definition of unavailability~~ Criteria for Being Unavailable. A declarant is considered to be unavailable as a witness ~~includes situations in which~~ if the declarant:

- (1) Is exempted ~~by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege~~ from testifying ~~concerning about~~ the subject matter of the declarant's² statement because the court rules that a privilege applies; ~~or~~
- (2) ~~Persists in refusing~~ Refuses to testify ~~concerning about~~ the subject matter ~~of the declarant's statement~~ despite ~~an order of the~~ a court order to do so; ~~or~~
- (3) Testifies to ~~a lack of memory of~~ not remembering the subject matter ~~of the declarant's statement;~~ or;

~~(4) Is unable to~~ Cannot be present or ~~to~~ testify at the trial or hearing because of death or a then ~~existing~~ infirmity, physical illness, or mental illness ~~or infirmity~~; or

(5) Is absent from the trial or hearing and the ~~proponent of the declarant's~~ statement's proponent has ~~been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other reasonable means~~ not been able, by process or other reasonable means to procure the declarant's attendance.

~~A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the declarant's exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of the declarant's statement for the purpose of preventing the witness~~ But this subdivision (a) does not apply if the statement's proponent procured or wrongfully caused the declarant's unavailability as a witness in order to prevent the declarant from attending or testifying.

(b) Hearsay exceptions.

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:

(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross or redirect examination.

(2) Statement under belief of impending death. A statement made by a declarant while believing that the declarant's death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be the declarant's impending death.

(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was, at the time of its making, so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless the declarant believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.

(4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A statement concerning the declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption or marriage, ancestry or other similar fact of personal or family history, even though declarant had no means of

acquiring personal knowledge of the matter stated; or (B) a statement concerning the foregoing matters, and death also, of another person, if the declarant was related to the other by blood, adoption or marriage or was so intimately associated with the other's family as to be likely to have accurate information concerning the matter declared.

(5) Other exceptions.

[Omitted].

(6) Forfeiture by wrongdoing. A statement offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.

Comment

D.R.E. 804(a) tracks F.R.E. 804(a)(1), (2), (3) and (4). D.R.E. 804(a)(5) was modified in 1980 to track the draft of F.R.E. 804(a)(5) as proposed by the United States Supreme Court Advisory Committee instead of F.R.E. 804(a)(5) as adopted by Congress. D.R.E. 804(a)(5) as adopted omits the words "or in the case of a hearsay exception under subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4), his attendance or testimony" which were added by Congress to the original draft of U.R.E.

D.R.E. 804(b)(1) tracks F.R.E. 804(b)(1).

D.R.E. 804(b)(2) was revised in 1980 so as to track the draft of F.R.E. 804(b)(2) as proposed by the United States Supreme Court Advisory Committee instead of F.R.E. 804(b)(2) as adopted by Congress. The words "In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil action or proceeding" at the beginning of F.R.E. 804(b)(2) were omitted. D.R.E. 804(b)(2) as adopted therefore applies to all criminal and civil proceedings.

D.R.E. 804(b)(3) as adopted in 1980 tracks F.R.E. 804(b)(3). The Committee decided against adopting the language of U.R.E. 804(b)(3). In applying D.R.E. 804(b)(3), care should be taken not to violate the rule in *Bruton v. United States*, 389 U.S. 818, 88 S. Ct. 126, 19 L. Ed. 2d 70 (1967).

D.R.E. 804(b)(4) tracks F.R.E. 804(b)(4). D.R.E. 804(b)(4) as adopted in 1980 modified the case law in *Pote v. Farren*, Del. Super., 129 A. 238 (1924), which held that the declaration be made after the controversy arose. It does not change the rest of the ruling.

D.R.E. 804(b)(5) was omitted since the Committee found in 1980 that it was the same as D.R.E. 807 (formerly D.R.E. 803(24)).

D.R.E. 804(b)(6) tracks F.R.E. 804(b)(6)

For prior Delaware cases illustrating the law covered by this rule, see *Barnes v. State*, Del. Supr., 352 A.2d 409 (1975); *Rogers v. Rogers*, Del. Super., 66 A. 374 (1907); *State v. Virden*, Del. Gen. Sess., 118 A. 597 (1922); *Gardner v. State*, Del. Gen. Sess., 47 A.2d 310 (1946); *Gibson v. Gillespie*, Del. Super., 152 A. 589 (1928); *Hall v. Dougherty*, Del. Super., 10 Del. 435 (1878); *Stille v. Layton*, Del. Super., 2 Del. 149 (1837); *Ward v. State*, Del. Supr., 395 A.2d 367 (1978); *State v. Trusty*, Del. Oyer & Term., 40 A. 766 (1898); *State v. Oliver*, Del. Oyer & Term., 7 Del. 585 (1855).

[D.R.E. 804 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.](#)

Rule 805. Hearsay Within Hearsay.

Hearsay ~~included~~-within hearsay is not excluded ~~under~~by the rule against hearsay ~~rule~~ if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the ~~hearsay rule~~ provided in these rules.

Comment

This rule tracks F.R.E. 805.

[D.R.E. 805 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.](#)

Rule 806. Attacking and Supporting the Declarant's Credibility ~~of Declarant~~.

When a hearsay statement, — or a statement ~~describ~~ed in Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), — or (E), — has been admitted in evidence, the declarant's credibility ~~of the declarant~~ may be attacked, and ~~if attacked may be~~then supported, — by any evidence ~~which that~~ would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness. ~~Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with his hearsay statement, is not subject to any requirement that he may have been afforded an opportunity to deny or~~The court may admit evidence of the declarant's

inconsistent statement or conduct, regardless of when it occurred or whether the declarant had an opportunity to explain or deny it. If the party against whom ~~a hearsay~~the statement ~~has been~~was admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party ~~is entitled to~~may examine ~~him~~the declarant on the statement as if ~~under~~on cross-examination.

Comment

This rule tracks F.R.E. 806.

D.R.E. 806 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 807. Residual Exception.

(a) In General. Under the following circumstances, a hearsay statement is not excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is ~~A~~ statement not specifically covered by a hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804 but having:

(1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness ~~is not excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that: (A) The statement;~~

(2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact; ~~(B) the statement~~

(3) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence ~~which~~that the proponent can ~~procure~~obtain through reasonable efforts; and ~~(C) the general~~

(4) admitting it will best serve the purposes of these Rules and the interests of justice ~~will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party, sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it.~~

(b) Notice. The statement is admissible only if, before the trial or hearing, the proponent's ~~intention~~ gives an adverse party reasonable notice of the intent to offer the statement and ~~the~~its particulars ~~of it~~, including the declarant's name and address ~~of the declarant~~, so that the party has a fair opportunity to meet it.

Comment

This Rule was transferred from former D.R.E. 803(24) in 2001 and tracks F.R.E. 807 in effect on December 31, 2000. *See Demby v. State*, Del. Supr., 695 A.2d 1152 (1997).

D.R.E. 807 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

ARTICLE IX. AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION

Rule 901. ~~Requirement of Authentication~~Authenticating or IdentificationIdentifying Evidence.

(a) ~~In General Provision.~~ ~~The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by.~~ To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the ~~matter in question~~item is what ~~it~~the proponent claims it is.

~~(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the~~ (b) Examples. The following are examples ~~of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of this rule only — not a complete list — of evidence that satisfies the requirement:~~ (1)

(1) Testimony of a Witness ~~W~~with Knowledge. Testimony that ~~a matter~~an item is what it is claimed to be.

(2) Nonexpert Opinion ~~on~~About Handwriting. ~~Nonexpert~~A nonexpert's opinion ~~as to the genuineness of that~~ handwriting is genuine, based ~~upon~~on a familiarity with it that was not acquired for ~~purposes of~~ the current litigation.

(3) Comparison by ~~Trier or~~an Expert Witness. ~~Comparison by or the Trier of Fact.~~ A comparison with an authenticated specimen by an expert witness or the trier of fact ~~or by expert witnesses with specimens which have been authenticated.~~

(4) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. ~~Appearance~~The appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken ~~in conjunction~~together with all the circumstances.

(5) Opinion About a Voice ~~Identification.~~ ~~Identification of a.~~ An opinion identifying a person's voice, — whether heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording, ~~by opinion~~ — based ~~upon~~on hearing the voice at any time under circumstances ~~connecting~~that connect it with the alleged speaker.

- (6) Evidence About a Telephone Conversations.** ~~Telephone conversations, by~~ Conversation. For a telephone conversation, evidence that a call was made to the number assigned at the time ~~by the telephone company to~~ to:
- (A) a particular person ~~or business, if (A) in the case of a person,~~ if circumstances, including self-identification, show that the person answering ~~to be was~~ the one called; ~~;~~ or ~~(B) in the case of a~~
 - (B) a particular business, if the call was made to a ~~place of~~ business and the ~~conversation call~~ related to business reasonably transacted over the telephone.
- ~~(7)~~ **(7) Evidence About Public Records or Reports.** Evidence that ~~a writing authorized by law to be recorded or filed and in fact~~ :
- (A) ~~a document was~~ recorded or filed in a public office; ~~as authorized by law;~~ or
 - (B) a purported public record, ~~report, or statement or data compilation, in any form,~~ is from the ~~public~~ office where items of this ~~nature~~ kind are kept.
- (8) Evidence About Ancient Documents or Data Compilation.** ~~Evidence that~~ Compilations. For a document or data compilation, ~~in any form,~~ (A) ~~evidence that it~~ :
- (A) is in ~~such a~~ condition ~~as to create~~ that creates no suspicion ~~concerning about~~ its authenticity; ~~;~~
 - (B) was in a place where ~~it~~, if authentic, it would likely be; ~~;~~ and ~~(C) has been in existence~~
 - (C) is at least 20 years ~~or more at the time it is old when~~ offered.
- (9) Evidence About a Process or System.** Evidence describing a process or system ~~used to produce a result~~ and showing that ~~the process or system~~ it produces an accurate result.
- (10) Methods Provided by a Statute or Rule.** Any method of authentication or identification ~~provided~~ allowed by a statute or ~~provided by in~~ the Constitution of this State.

Comment

The mere authentication of evidence under this rule does not necessarily mean the evidence is admissible under other rules.

D.R.E. 901 tracks F.R.E. 901 in effect on December 31, 2000, except that D.R.E. 901(b)(10) tracks U.R.E. 901(b)(10) because F.R.E. 901(b)(10) was inappropriate for state use.

D.R.E. 901(b)(3) is not limited just to handwriting.

It is not intended that D.R.E. 901 abolish the necessity of showing the chain of custody of exhibits in criminal proceedings. *But see* 10 Del. C. §§ 4330-32; 21 Del. C. § 4177(h).

D.R.E. 901 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 902. Evidence That Is Self-authenticating.

~~Extrinsic~~ The following items of evidence are self-authenticating; they require no extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required with respect to the following in order to be admitted:

(1) Domestic Public Documents ~~Under Seal~~ That Are Sealed and Signed.

A document ~~bearing~~ that bears:

(A) a seal purporting to be that of the United States, ~~or of;~~ any state, district, commonwealth, territory, or insular possession ~~thereof, or of the~~ United States; the former Panama Canal Zone, ~~or;~~ the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, ~~or of;~~ a political subdivision, of any of these entities; or a department, ~~officer or~~ agency ~~thereof,~~ or officer of any entity named above; and

(B) a signature purporting to be an execution or attestation ~~or execution.~~

(2) Domestic Public Documents ~~Not Under Seal~~ That Are Not Sealed but Are Signed and Certified. A document ~~purporting to bear~~ that bears no seal if:

(A) it bears the signature ~~in his official capacity~~ of an officer or employee of any entity ~~included in paragraph (1) hereof, having no seal, if a~~ named in Rule 902(1)(A); and

(B) another public officer ~~having~~ who has a seal and ~~having~~ official duties ~~in the district or political subdivision of the officer or employee~~ within that same entity certifies under seal — or its equivalent — that the signer has the official capacity and that the signature is genuine.

(3) Foreign Public Documents. A document ~~purporting that purports~~ to be executed signed or attested ~~in his official capacity~~ by a person who is authorized by ~~the laws of~~ a foreign country ~~to make the execution or attestation, and~~ 's law to do so. The document must be accompanied by a final certification ~~as to that certifies~~ the genuineness of the signature and official position ~~(A) of the executing or attesting person, or (B) signer or~~

attester — or of any foreign official whose certificate of genuineness ~~of signature and official position~~ relates to the execution signature or attestation or is in a chain of certificates of genuineness ~~of signature and official position~~ relating to the execution signature or attestation. ~~A final~~ The certification may be made by a secretary of a United States embassy or legation; by a consul general, ~~consul,~~ vice consul, or consular agent of the United States; or by a diplomatic or consular official of the foreign country assigned or accredited to the United States. If all parties have been given a reasonable opportunity ~~has been given to all parties~~ to investigate the document's authenticity and accuracy ~~of official documents~~, the court may, for good cause ~~shown~~, either:

- (A) order that ~~they~~ it be treated as presumptively authentic without final certification; or
- ~~permit them~~ (B) allow it to be evidenced by an attested summary with or without final certification.

(4) Certified Copies of Public Records. A copy of an official record ~~or report or entry therein, or~~ — or a copy of a document ~~authorized by law to be recorded or filed and actually~~ that was recorded or filed in a public office, ~~including data compilations in any form, as authorized by law — if the copy is~~ certified as correct by:

- (A) the custodian or ~~other~~ another person authorized to make the certification, ~~by;~~ or
- (B) a certificate ~~complying that complies~~ with subdivision Rule 902(1), (2), or (3) ~~of this rule~~ or complying with any law of the United States or of this State.

(5) Official Publications. ~~Books, pamphlets~~ A book, pamphlet, or other publications purporting to be issued by a public authority.

(6) Newspapers and Periodicals. Printed materials purporting to be ~~newspapers or periodicals~~ a newspaper or periodical.

(7) Trade Inscriptions and the Like. ~~Inscriptions, signs, tags or labels~~ An inscription, sign, tag, or label purporting to have been affixed in the course of business and indicating origin, ownership, or control ~~or origin~~.

(8) Acknowledged Documents. ~~Documents~~ A document accompanied by a certificate of acknowledgment that is lawfully executed ~~in the manner provided by law~~ by a notary public or ~~other~~ another officer who is authorized ~~by law~~ to take acknowledgments.

(9) Commercial Paper and Related Documents. Commercial paper, ~~signatures thereon and~~ a signature on it, and related documents ~~relating thereto,~~ to the extent ~~provided~~ allowed by general commercial law.

(10) Presumptions Created by Under Law. Any signature, document or other matter declared by any law of the United States or, or anything else that a federal statute or law of this State declares to be presumptively or prima facie genuine or authentic.

(11) Certified Domestic Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. The original or a duplicate copy of a domestic record of regularly conducted activity that would be admissible under Rule 803(6) if accompanied by a written declaration of its that meets the requirements of Rule 803(6)(A)-(C), as shown by a certification of the custodian or other another qualified person, in a manner complying with any law of the United States or that complies with a federal statute or a law of this State., certifying that the record (A) was made at or near the time of the occurrence of the matters set forth by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge of those matters; (B) was kept in the course of the regularly conducted activity; and (C) was made by the regularly conducted activity as a regular practice. A party intending to offer a record into evidence under this paragraph must provide written notice of that intention to all adverse parties, Before the trial or hearing, the proponent must give an adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to offer the record — and must make the record and declaration certification available for inspection sufficiently in advance of their offer into evidence to provide an adverse party with — so that the party has a fair opportunity to challenge them.

(12) Certified Foreign Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. In a civil case, the original or a duplicate copy of a foreign record of regularly conducted activity that would be admissible under that meets the requirements of Rule 803(6) if accompanied by a written declaration of its custodian or other qualified person, in a manner complying with any law of the United States or 902(11), modified as follows: the certification, rather than complying with a federal statute or a law of this State, certifying that the record (A) was made at or near the time of the occurrence of the matters set forth by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge of those matters (B) was kept in the course of the regularly conducted activity; and (C) was made by the regularly conducted activity as a regular practice. The declaration must be signed in a manner that, if falsely made, would subject the maker to a criminal penalty under the laws of in the country where the declaration is signed. A party intending to offer a record into evidence under this paragraph must provide written notice of that intention to all adverse parties, and must make the record and declaration available for inspection sufficiently in advance of their offer into evidence to provide an

~~adverse party with a fair opportunity to challenge them~~ certification is signed. The proponent must also meet the notice requirements of Rule 902(11).

Comment

D.R.E. 902(1), (2), (3), 4(A), (5), (6), (7), (8), ~~and~~ (9) track F.R.E. Rule 902(1), (2), (3), 4(A), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9), ~~;(11), and (12).~~

D.R.E. 902(4)(B) tracks F.R.E. 902(4)(B) except that it omits the reference to a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court and includes a reference to State law.

~~D.R.E. 902(4) and (10) tracks U.R.E. 902(4) and (10) since F.R.E. 902(4) and (10) were deemed inappropriate for state use.~~

~~In D.R.E. 902(4) the words “of this rule” were added for clarity.~~

D.R.E. 902(10) tracks F.R.E. 902(10) except that it includes a reference to State law.

D.R.E. 902(11) and (12) track F.R.E. 902(11) and (12) except that they omit the reference to Supreme Court rules and include a reference to State law.

D.R.E. 902 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. The pre-2017 “Comment” to D.R.E. 902 was revised only as necessary to reflect the 2017 amendments and the current language of F.R.E. 902. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 903. Subscribing Witness’s Testimony ~~Unnecessary.~~

~~The testimony of a~~ A subscribing witness’s testimony is ~~not~~ necessary to authenticate a writing ~~unless only if~~ required by the laws of the jurisdiction ~~whose laws govern the~~ that governs its validity ~~of the writing.~~

Comment

This rule tracks F.R.E. 903.

D.R.E. 903 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

ARTICLE X. CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, RECORDINGS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS

Rule 1001. Definitions That Apply to This Article.

~~For purposes of~~In this article ~~the following definitions are applicable:~~

~~(1) Writings and recordings.~~ “Writings” and “recordings” consist(a) A
“writing” consists of letters, words, sounds ~~or~~, numbers, or their equivalent,
~~set down by handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photographing,~~
~~magnetic impulse, mechanical or electronic recording, or other form of data~~
~~compilation set down in any form.~~

~~(2) Photographs.~~(b) A “recording” consists of letters, words, sounds,
numbers, or their equivalent recorded in any manner.

~~“Photographs” include still photographs, X-ray films, video tapes and motion~~
~~pictures.~~(3) Original(c) A “photograph” means a photographic image or its
equivalent stored in any form.

(d) An “original” of a writing or recording ismeans the writing or recording
itself or any counterpart intended to have the same effect by athe person
~~executing or issuing it. An “original” of a photograph includes the negatives or~~
~~any print therefrom. If data are stored in a computer or similar device, any~~
~~printout or other output readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately,~~
~~is an “original.”~~(4) Duplicate.who executed or issued it. For electronically
stored information, “original” means any printout — or other output readable
by sight — if it accurately reflects the information. An “original” of a
photograph includes the negative or a print from it.

(e) A “duplicate” ismeans a counterpart produced by ~~the same impression as~~
~~the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of photography, including~~
~~enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording~~a
mechanical, photographic, chemical, electronic, or by chemical reproduction
~~or by other equivalent techniques which~~process or technique that
accurately reproduces the original.

Comment

This rule tracks F.R.E. 1001 except that in D.R.E. 1001 (a)~~(1)~~ the word
“sounds” was added as it was in U.R.E. 1001(5).

For prior Delaware cases illustrating the law covered by this D.R.E., see Ewart
v. Morrell, Del. Super., 5 Del.126 (1848); Heldmyer v. Cleaver, Del. Super.,
104 A. 635 (1918); Bartholomew v. Edwards, Del. Super., 6 Del. 247 (1856);
Jefferson v. Conoway, Del. Supr., 5 Del. 16 (1848).

D.R.E. 1001 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only.
The pre-2017 “Comment” to D.R.E. 1001 was revised only as necessary to
reflect the 2017 amendments. There is no intent to change any result in
ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 1002. Requirement of Original.

~~To prove the content of a writing, recording or photograph, the~~ An original writing, recording, or photograph is required, ~~except as otherwise provided~~ in order to prove its content unless these Rules or ~~by~~ a statute provides otherwise.

Comment

~~This rule tracks U.R.E. 1002 instead of F.R.E. 1002 which was believed to be inapplicable to a state.~~

This rule tracks F.R.E. 1002 except that its reference to statutory law is broader and not limited to federal statutory law.

For prior Delaware cases illustrating the law covered by this rule, see *State v. Bower*, Del. Gen. Sess., 40 A. 939 (1898); *Smith v. State*, Del. Supr., 352 A.2d 765 (1976) (holding that the best evidence rule does not apply to evidence of the absence of a writing or its contents).

D.R.E. 1002 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. The pre-2017 “Comment” to D.R.E. 1002 was revised only as necessary to reflect the 2017 amendments. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 1003. Admissibility of Duplicates.

A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as ~~an~~ the original unless ~~(1)~~ a genuine question is raised ~~as to~~ about the original’s authenticity ~~of the original~~, or ~~(2) in~~ the circumstances make it ~~would be~~ unfair to admit the duplicate ~~in lieu of the original~~.

Comment

This rule tracks F.R.E. 1003.

It is not intended that this rule will dispense with requirements for explaining the reasons a duplicate is being tendered in lieu of an original in any situation where the absence of the original might suggest that it is no longer effective or has been destroyed with an intent to revoke. The distinction between admission into evidence and admission to probate of wills is not abrogated by the rule. (This comment tracks comment to U.R.E. 1003.)

D.R.E. 1003 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 1004. Admissibility of Other Evidence of Contents.

~~The~~An original is not required, and other evidence of the contents of a writing, recording, or photograph is admissible if:

(1) ~~Originals Lost or Destroyed. All~~a) all the originals are lost or ~~have been~~ destroyed, ~~unless~~and not by the proponent ~~lost or destroyed~~ ~~them~~acting in bad faith; ~~or~~

(2) ~~Original Not Obtainable. No~~b) an original ~~cannot~~ be obtained by any available judicial process ~~or procedure; or~~;

(3) ~~Original in Possession of Opponent. At a time when an original was under the control of~~c) the party against whom ~~the original would be~~ offered, ~~he had control of the original;~~ was at that time put on notice, by ~~the pleading, pleadings~~ or otherwise, that the ~~contents~~original would be a subject of proof at the trial or hearing; and ~~he does not~~fails to produce ~~the original~~it at the trial or hearing; or

(4) ~~Collateral Matters. The~~d) the writing, recording, or photograph is not closely related to a controlling issue.

Comment

This rule tracks F.R.E. 1004.

D.R.E. 1004 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 1005. Copies of Public Records to Prove Content.

The ~~contents~~proponent may use a copy to prove the content of an official record, — or of a document ~~authorized to be~~that was recorded or filed ~~and actually recorded or filed, including data compilations in any form, if~~in a public office as authorized by law — if these conditions are met: the record or document is otherwise admissible, ~~may be proved by; and the copy, is~~ certified as correct in accordance with Rule 902(4) or is testified to be correct by a witness who has compared it with the original. If ~~no such~~ copy ~~which complies with the foregoing cannot~~can be obtained by ~~the exercise of~~ reasonable diligence, then the proponent may use other evidence ~~o~~to prove the ~~contents may be given~~content.

Comment

This rule tracks F.R.E. 1005.

Sections 4305 [repealed], 4306 [repealed], 4307 [repealed], 4308 [repealed] and 4314 [repealed] of Title 10 should be repealed since the contents thereof are covered by the Evidence Rules.

See Rule 202 for judicial notice of law.

[D.R.E. 1005 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.](#)

Rule 1006. Summaries [to Prove Content.](#)

The ~~contents~~proponent may use a summary, chart, or calculation to prove the content of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs ~~which~~that cannot be conveniently ~~be~~ examined in court ~~may be presented in the form of a chart, summary or calculation.~~ The proponent must make the originals, or duplicates, ~~shall be made~~ available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time ~~and~~or place. ~~The~~And the court may order ~~that they be produced~~the proponent to produce them in court.

Comment

This rule tracks F.R.E. 1006.

[D.R.E. 1006 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.](#)

Rule 1007. Testimony or ~~Written Admission~~Statement of a Party to Prove Content.

~~Contents of writings, recordings or photographs may be proved~~The proponent may prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph by the testimony ~~or,~~ deposition, or written statement of the party against whom ~~offered or by his written admission, without accounting for the nonproduction of~~ the evidence is offered. The proponent need not account for the original.

Comment

This rule tracks F.R.E. 1007.

[D.R.E. 1007 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.](#)

Rule 1008. Functions of Court and Jury.

~~When the admissibility of other evidence of contents of writings, recordings or photographs under these rules depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the question whether the condition has been fulfilled is ordinarily for the court to determine in accordance with the provisions of Rule 104.~~

~~However, when an issue is raised (1) whether the~~ Ordinarily, the court determines whether the proponent has fulfilled the factual conditions for admitting other evidence of the content of a writing, recording, or photograph under Rule 1004 or 1005. But in a jury trial, the jury determines — in accordance with Rule 104(b) — any issue about whether:

(a) an asserted writing, recording, or photograph ever existed, ~~or (2) whether;~~

(b) another ~~writing, recording or photograph~~ one produced at the trial or hearing is the original; or

(3) whether ~~other evidence of contents correctly~~ accurately reflects the ~~contents, the issue is for the trier of fact to determine as in the case of other issues of fact~~ content.

Comment

This rule tracks F.R.E. 1008.

D.R.E. 1008 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Article XI. MISCELLANEOUS RULES

Rule 1101. Applicability of Rules and Definitions.

(a) Rules applicable. Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this Rule, these Rules apply to all actions and proceedings in all the courts of this State.

(b) Rules inapplicable. The Rules ~~other than~~ except for those ~~with respect to privileges~~ on privilege — do not apply into the following ~~situations~~:

(1) the court's ~~(1) Preliminary questions of fact. The determination of questions of fact under Rule 104(a), on a preliminary~~ question of fact governing admissibility ~~of evidence when the issue is to be determined by the court under Rule 104(a);~~

(2) grand jury. ~~Proceedings before grand juries.~~ proceedings;

(3) in preliminary hearings in criminal cases; and

~~(3)-(4)~~ miscellaneous proceedings ~~Proceedings for such as:~~

- ~~extradition or rendition; detention hearing in~~
- ~~issuing an arrest warrant, criminal hearings, summons or search warrant;~~
- ~~sentencing or;~~
- ~~granting or revoking probation; issuance of warrants for arrest,~~
- ~~detention hearing in criminal summonses and search warrants;~~
- ~~and proceedings with respect hearings;~~
- ~~considering whether~~ to release on bail or otherwise; ~~and~~
- ~~(4) Contempt proceedings. Contempt~~ contempt proceedings in which the court may act summarily.

~~(e) Preliminary hearings. In preliminary hearings in criminal cases the court is not bound by these Rules of Evidence except with respect to privileges.~~ **(c) Definition.** As used throughout these Rules, the term “writing” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.

Comment

D.R.E. 1101 is applicable to all the courts of this State.

Prior D.R.E. 1101(c), now D.R.E. 1101(b)(3), was added to make it clear that the procedures now being followed in preliminary hearings in criminal cases are not changed by these Rules. See Superior Court Criminal Rule 5.1 and Schramm v. State, Del. Supr., 366 A.2d 1185 (1976).

Prior D.R.E. 1101(d), now D.R.E. 1101(c), which was added in 2001, includes a definition of “writing,” which tracks the definition of “record” found in U.R.E. 101(3). The definition was added to this rule because the Delaware Rules of Evidence do not contain a definitions rule similar to U.R.E. 101, and the Permanent Advisory Committee on the Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence wanted to define the word “writing,” as it is used throughout all of the rules, to accommodate modern technological innovations in communications and record keeping.

D.R.E. 1101 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. The pre-2017 “Comment” to D.R.E. 1101 was revised only as necessary to reflect the 2017 amendments. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.

Rule 1102. Title.

These Rules shall be known as the Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence and may be cited: D.R.E.

Comment

This rule tracks U.R.E. 1102 and F.R.E. 1103. F.R.E. 1102 is deemed to be inappropriate to a state.

Rule 1103. Effective Date.

These Rules shall take effect on July 1, 1980. These Rules apply to actions, cases and proceedings brought after the rules take effect. These Rules also apply to further procedures in actions, cases and proceedings then pending, except to the extent that application of these Rules would not be feasible, or would work injustice, in which event former evidentiary principles apply.

Comment

This rule (which does not exist in F.R.E. or U.R.E.) is based on the federal enacting legislation Pub. L. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926.

F.R.E. 1103 is the same as Rule 1102.