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Case
Summary:
Case Summary: This case stems from a termination of parental rights
petition filed by DFS on January 12, 1998. Quintana, the minor child,
was 21 months old at the time. The case went to trial in Family
Court in December of 1999 and February of 2000. On March 27, 2000,
the Family Court denied the petition. At that time, Quintana was
nearly 4 years old. At trial, mother conceded that she had failed
to plan for her daughter's return to her; however, she argued that
TPR was not in Quintana's best interests. Specifically, she argued
that Quintana had a significant bond with her mother, that she had
a biological link to her mother and that guardianship would provide
permanency to Quintana without severing the parent/child relationship.
The trial court found that despite
mother conceding failure to plan, the grounds had not been met.
Specifically, the court held that each element of § 1103(a)(5)
must be met in order to prevail. In addition, the Family Court held
that TPR was not in Quintana's best interests, specifically focusing
on the biological link between parent and child.
On appeal, DFS argued that guardianship
was not permanency for Quintana. It also argued that the Family
Court erred in its conclusion that all elements of 13 Del. C. §
1103(a)(5) must be met in order to prevail, and Mother conceded
this point. Mother again argued that TPR was not in Quintana's best
interests.
The Delaware Supreme Court held that
the Family Court erred in its analysis of failure to plan. The Court
held that the petitioner must only satisfy one of the elements in
§ 1103(a)(5) in order to prevail. It then found that the records
supported the Family Court's conclusion that termination was not
in Quintana's best interests. Most significantly, the Supreme Court
found that the trial court's decision did consider the importance
of permanency in denying the TPR. The Court held that "adoption
is not in the best interest of the child in this case, but a guardianship
would provide Quintana with the 'safe, stable, custodial environment'
in which to be raised that rises to the level of permanency."
The trial court concluded that this is not "a case where the
child is going to be left in limbo."
From
the Child's Perspective:
The latin definition of limbo in roman catholic theology is a "place
on the border of hell". The American Heritage Dictionary of
the English Language, 3rd ed., 1996. When child welfare experts
talk of limbo and permanency, they speak of assuring a child and
the child's caregiver that they will have a safe, secure and stable
environment to grow up in without fear of removal. Unfortunately,
no lesser legal alternative than termination of parental rights
can ensure Quintana that she will forever reside with her foster
mother. While the foster mother has indicated a commitment to raising
Quintana throughout her childhood, and mother has not requested
a return of custody to her at this time, mother has the right to
petition the trial court for custody for the remainder of Quintana's
minority. It matters not whether DFS has custody or foster mother
has guardianship. Delaware law requires the return of custody to
a parent by a non-parent if that parent can show by a preponderance
of the evidence the he or she is able to provide "adequate
care" for the child. Therefore, a guardianship (whether or
not assisted) in Delaware is not legally secure from modification,
and therefore does not meet the intent of permanency as set out
in the 1997 Adoption and Safe Families Act.
We are also troubled by the Family
Court's heavy reliance on a "biological link" and the
acknowledgement of same by the Delaware Supreme Court. All children
who are the subject of termination of parental rights petitions'
have a "biological link" to their parents. The U.S. Supreme
Court has even held that "mere existence of a biological link
does not merit equivalent constitutional protection". Lehr
v. Robertson, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2993 (1983). Being a parent has little
to do with biology, and much more to do with a "full commitment
to the responsibilities of parenthood . . [such as] participating
in the rearing of [the] child". Id. Equally important is the
permanent caregiver's acknowledgement of the biological link, and
a child's need to know, understand and respect from where he/she
came. However, to make a "biological link" a compelling
factor in a best interests analysis would deprive countless abused
and neglected children in Delaware from experiencing a "forever
family".
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