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NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

After the Defendant was arrested, he waived his preliminary hearing in the Family Court and was subsequently indicted on four charges in the Superior Court of Sussex County, including: Kidnapping the first degree, Carjacking in the first degree and two counts of Conspiracy in the second degree.

Defendant filed for a reverse amenability hearing, which was held in July of 2013. In a decision rendered on March 31, 2014, the Honorable Richard F. Stokes denied the request to remand the case back to the Family Court for the State of Delaware and instead maintained jurisdiction in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for Sussex County, and set a trial date for the summer of 2014.

The trial was held in the Superior Court, over six days, in June of 2014. The Defendant was found guilty by a jury of Kidnapping in the first degree, Carjacking in the First degree, and two counts of conspiracy in the second degree. At sentencing, the Defendant received thirty (30) years at Level V, followed by probation. This appeal followed.

This is Appellant's Opening Brief.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

I. **THE DELAWARE CARJACKING STATUTE IS NOT DESIGNED TO CREATE A CONTINUING OFFENSE.**

II. **THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO REDUCE THE KIDNAPPING CHARGE TO UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT.**

III. **IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IF THE CARJACKING STATUTE IS FOUND TO CREATE A CONTINUING OFFENSE, THE DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT BE FOUND GUILTY OF KIDNAPPING UNDER THE *WEBER* REQUIREMENT.¹**

¹ *Weber v. State*, 547 A.2d 948 (Del. 1988).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On or about March 18, 2013, Mrs. Margaret Smith (“Mrs. Smith”) went to Chicken Man in Milford, Delaware where she was sitting in her car eating ice cream. (TK-CC-15, A-9)² While she was eating her ice cream, two young ladies (later identified as Jackie Perez and Junia McDonald) (TK-DD-111, A-10) asked Mrs. Smith for a ride to which she said yes. Mrs. Smith starting driving the girls around the Milford area, stopping at several places. At the last stop, (TK-CC-16, A-11) one of the girls asked for the keys from Mrs. Smith, and she refused. At approximately 12:00 p.m.,(TK-CC-19, A-14) a tussle happened and Mrs. Smith got shoved in the trunk of her 2001 Buick Le Sabre. (TK-CC-17, A-12) The vehicle was being driven around fast with Mrs. Smith in the trunk. Mrs. Smith also had money in her pocketbook and in her clothing (TK-CC-18, A13) in an amount totaling over five hundred dollars (\$500.00).

Mrs. Smith stated that she was in the car for two days and did not receive any food or drink while she was detained. (TK-CC-20, A-15) At the end of the ordeal, Mrs. Smith was found in a graveyard (TK-CC-21, A-16) after being rolled out of the car. Mrs. Smith testified that it was beginning to get light when she was left in the graveyard, and someone saw her after she stayed there a little while (TK-

² “TK” refers to the transcript of the trial. “A” refers to the Appendix.

CC-22, A-17). Mrs. Smith also testified that she couldn't remember who found her in the cemetery.

At approximately 7:00 p.m. on March 20, 2013, Trooper Patrick Schlimer was working patrol at a stationary location at Coverdale Road and Seashore Highway when he observed a tan Buick (TK-BB-130, A-18) bearing Delaware license PHA 122. The vehicle was stopped on Chaplins Chapel Road, (TK-BB-131, A-19) and five (5) people were located in the vehicle: Junia McDonald; Phillip Brewer; Rondaiges Harper (the "Defendant"); Daniaya Smith; and Jackeline Perez. (TK-BB-132, A-20) All occupants were taken to Troop 4 for processing. (TK-BB-133, A-21)

Detective Robert Truitt testified that he had been a State Trooper since January of 1997 and had been assigned to Major Crimes for the last six (6) years (TK-CC-46, A-22) and was the chief investigating officer in this case. (TK-CC-30, A-23) Detective Truitt testified that to the best of his knowledge through the investigation, the Chicken Man store where the girls first approached Mrs. Smith was in Kent County. Detective Truitt further testified that he was not able to determine the exact location of the carjacking act, and that he was not able to determine what roads were taken from Milford to Seaford or Coverdale Crossroads. (TK-CC-55, A-24)

Philip Brewer (“Brewer”), an admitted participant, testified that the tan Buick came to Coverdale that Monday in March and it was occupied by Junia McDonald and Jackie Perez (TK-CC-69, A-25), and that he had made arraignments to meet the girls on Facebook. (TK-CC-70, A-26) After he was picked up, they went and picked up the Defendant (TK-CC-71, A-27), and went to a park and Royal Farms. (TK-CC-72, A-28) They returned to the park where they listened to music until the car battery died. (TK-CC-74, A-29) While waiting for a jump start, the Defendant came and told Brewer that there was someone in the trunk. The Defendant and Brewer opened the trunk and found Mrs. Smith. The girls told them they gave liquor to her (TK-CC-77, A-30) and she wanted to be in the trunk (TK-CC-78, A-31). Brewer further testified that this occurred at about 9:00 p.m. on Monday night (TK-CC-82, A-33), and after the car was jump started, they went and got a hotel room (TK-CC-87, A-34) at the Days Inn at Seaford. (TK-CC-88, A-35) Brewer also testified that Jackie wanted to burn the car with Mrs. Smith in it but Brewer and the Defendant disagreed, and the Defendant suggested they drop her off at the graveyard. (TK-CC-93, A-37) Mrs. Smith was subsequently dropped off at the graveyard (TK-CC-95, A-38) and the four went back to the hotel. (TK-CC-97, A-39) After checking out they drove around until stopped by the police. (TK-CC-98, A-40)

ARGUMENT

I. THE DELAWARE CARJACKING STATUTE IS NOT DESIGNED TO CREATE A CONTINUING OFFENSE.

a. Question Presented.

Is the Delaware carjacking statute designed to create a continuing offense that isn't completed until the victim is released by the offender(s), or is the statute designed to create an offense that is completed when the offender(s) dispossess the victim of his/her vehicle, allowing the prosecution to more easily charge the offender(s) with other crimes subsequent to the completion of the carjacking itself? (TK- DD5-13, A-41-49)

b. Scope and Standard of Review

When the question involved concerns questions on matters of law, “[t]he standard and scope of review is whether the court below erred in formulating or applying legal precepts.”³ This issue was properly preserved in the Court below.

c. Merits of the Argument

³ See *Arnold v. Society for Sav. Bancorp, Inc.*, 650 A.2d 1270, 1276 (Del. 1994); *Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, II, L.P.*, 624 A.2d 1199, 1204 (Del. 1993). See also *Rohner v. Niemann*, 380 A.2d 549, 552 (Del. 1977).

Whether or not the Delaware Carjacking Statute is designed to create a continuing offense is a question of first impression in Delaware. Title 11 was amended in 1999 by Senate Bill No. 12.⁴ According to the legislative history, Senator Robert Marshall, the co-author of the bill along with Representative Nancy Wagner, explained that the amendment was designed to provide help in prosecuting carjacking, which was difficult because it had previously had been classified as a subdivision of both assault and reckless endangering.⁵ What the Senate Bill did was effectively create a new offense of carjacking, separate from assault, reckless endangering and robbery.⁶

It should be of the utmost importance to this decision that the Legislature intended to make carjacking a distinct and separate offense from other related offenses. This line of reasoning is applicable in the present case. Here, the Legislature intended that a Defendant be able to be prosecuted for carjacking and any other separate offenses that have been completed subsequent to or concurrent with the carjacking. Accordingly, the crime of carjacking had been completed when the Co-Defendants dispossessed Mrs. Smith of her car, thus allowing prosecution for subsequent offenses such as kidnapping or unlawful imprisonment.

⁴ Senate Bill No. 12, 140th General Assembly: An Act to Amend Title 11 of the Delaware Code Relating to the Crime of Carjacking.

⁵ *Id.*

⁶ *Id.*

To support this line of reasoning, the Delaware carjacking statute, 11 Del. C. §§ 835-837, provides under the first part that “A person is guilty of carjacking . . . when the person knowingly and unlawfully *takes possession or control of a motor vehicle from another person or from the immediate presence of another person* by coercion, duress or otherwise without the permission of the other person.”⁷ It is this wording used by the Delaware Legislature that infers that the crime of carjacking is completed at the time the owner of has been dispossessed of the vehicle as it is a specific intent offense..

Although the Statute contemplates actions performed by a defendant while in possession of the vehicle, subsequent to the carjacking itself, this acts only as a modifier to account for aggravating circumstances after the crime has been completed for classification purposes only.

Furthermore, when the Legislature was drafting the Carjacking Statute, it considered defenses that may be raised based on the language of the Statute itself and decided which ones a Defendant should not be able to effectively make. For example, 11 Del. C. § 836 provides under subsection (c) that “[i]t is no defense to a prosecution under this section that the offender did not physically drive or operate the motor vehicle, nor is it a defense under this section that the offender did not

⁷ 11 Del. C. §§ 835-837 (emphasis added).

intend to permanently deprive the owner.”⁸ Additionally, Section (d) provides that “[i]t is no defense to a prosecution under subsection (a)(6) of this section, that the accused did not know the age of the person from whom possession or control of the vehicle is taken.”⁹ These subsections show that the Legislature carefully examined the language they chose for the Statute, recognizing certain defenses may be raised, and decided to bar their application.

However, the Legislature actively chose not to provide a bar to a defense that the carjacking is completed when an offender “takes possession or control of a motor vehicle from another person or from the immediate presence of another person by coercion, duress or otherwise without the permission of the other person.” This omission is evidence of the Legislature’s intent that a defendant be permitted to argue that they cannot be found guilty of carjacking if they did not take part in the actual dispossession of the vehicle and thus became involved after the crime had been completed. This is not to say that a defendant cannot be charged with subsequent crimes which defendant did take part in, though.

Additionally, federal caselaw should not be considered controlling or even persuasive on this issue. The federal carjacking statute is worded much differently from and does not closely resemble the Delaware statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 provides that a person is guilty of carjacking when “with the intent to cause death

⁸ 11 Del. C. § 836(c).

⁹ 11 Del. C. § 836(d).

or serious bodily harm [sic] takes a motor vehicle . . . from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation.”¹⁰ The federal statute contains elements of intent to cause death or serious bodily harm at the time the offender demanded or took control of the motor vehicle and the result that serious bodily injury or death actually occur, elements which are not present in the Delaware statute. The inclusion of these two elements makes the federal statute vastly different from the Delaware statute both in wording and purpose. Therefore, federal caselaw interpreting a statute so dissimilar should not be considered in deciding the present case.

In the alternative, if the federal caselaw is deemed persuasive, Defendant lacked adequate specific intent to be convicted of the crime of carjacking. The Supreme Court held in *Holloway v. United States*, that “the mental state required by the statute is measured at the moment that the defendant demands or takes control of the vehicle.”¹¹ Concerning aiding and abetting liability, the First Circuit held that “the government must prove that the [aiding and abetting] defendant intended to cause [what is required under the intent element].”¹² However, the court described the caselaw of aider and abettor liability as “remarkably silent.”¹³ Applying the federal caselaw here, the government would have the burden of

¹⁰ 18 U.S.C. § 2119. Motor vehicles.

¹¹ *Holloway v. United States*, 526 U.S. 1, 8 (1999).

¹² *United States v. Otero-Mendez*, 273 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2001).

¹³ *Ramirez-Burgos v. United States*, 313 F.3d 23, 31 (1st Cir. 2002).

proving that the Defendant had the intent to take possession or control of the motor vehicle from another person. The record lacks a showing of any such intent on the part of the Defendant. For these reasons, the Defendant's carjacking conviction should be overturned.

II. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO REDUCE THE KIDNAPPING CHARGE TO UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT.

a. Question Presented.

Was there sufficient evidence to convict the Defendant of Kidnapping in the First Degree? (TK-DD-29-32, A-56-59)

b. Scope and Standard of Review.

When the question involved concerns the jury's findings of fact, "[u]nder Art. IV, § 11(a) of the Delaware Constitution, this Court will affirm those findings only 'if supported by evidence.' The Court, therefore, must examine the record to determine whether evidence was adduced at trial which substantiates the jury's findings."¹⁴

c. Merits of the Argument.

Defendant was convicted of Kidnapping in the First Degree. However, sufficient evidence existed to reduce the kidnapping charge to the lesser-included offense of Unlawful Imprisonment.

¹⁴ See *Sussex County, Del. v. Morris*, 610 A.2d 1354, 1360 (Del. 1992); *Storey v. Camper*, 401 A.2d 458, 465 (Del. 1979).

Section 738A of Title 11 provides that a person is guilty of Kidnapping in the First Degree:

[W]hen the person unlawfully restrains another person *with any of the following purposes*: (1) To hold the victim for ransom or reward; or (2) To use the victim as a shield or hostage; or (3) To facilitate the commission of any felony or flight thereafter; or (4) To inflict physical injury upon the victim, or to violate or abuse the victim sexually; or (5) To terrorize the victim or a third person; or (6) To take or entice any child less than 18 years of age from the custody of the child's parent, guardian or lawful custodian; and the actor does not voluntarily release the victim alive, unharmed and in a safe place prior to trial.¹⁵

The unlawful imprisonment statute does not contain this middle element requiring the offender to have unlawfully restrained a person for a certain purpose.¹⁶ Thus if any of listed purposes exist, the offender may be charged with kidnapping.

In the present case, Defendant was convicted of Kidnapping in the first degree, a Class B felony. Upon review of the record, sufficient evidence existed to reduce the kidnapping charge to unlawful imprisonment. According to the statute, “[a] person is guilty of unlawful imprisonment in the second degree when the person knowingly and unlawfully restrains another person.”¹⁷ The offense moves into unlawful imprisonment in the first degree when the person is restrained “under circumstances which

¹⁵ 11 Del. C. § 783A (emphasis added).

¹⁶ 11 Del. C. §§ 781-782.

¹⁷ 11 Del. C. § 781.

expose that person to the risk of serious physical injury.”¹⁸ Based on facts contained in the record, there is evidence that Defendant is guilty of knowingly and unlawfully restraining another person.¹⁹ Whether or not the restraint was under circumstances which exposed that person to the risk of serious physical injury is arguable. However, sufficient evidence does not exist in the record to show that Defendant unlawfully restrained another person for any of the enumerated purposes of the Kidnapping statute. Although the Prosecution infers that the purpose was to facilitate the commission of a felony—carjacking—the evidence in the record and the wording of the statute suggest otherwise.

The record does not sufficiently show that Defendant was aware of the carjacking. If the Defendant was not aware of the carjacking, he could not have had the intent to facilitate the commission of a specific intent felony. However, even if this Court concludes that Defendant was aware of the carjacking, his involvement in the restraint of another person was not done in order to facilitate the commission of the carjacking. The carjacking was completed by the co-defendants several hours before Defendant became involved, and, therefore, his involvement in the restraint of another person could not have been to facilitate the commission of the carjacking. Since no

¹⁸ 11 Del. C. § 782.

¹⁹ See TK-CC-77-79, A- 30-32.

other felonies were allegedly committed, the evidence needed by the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the unlawful restraint of another person by the Defendant was committed for one of the enumerated purposes listed in the second element of the kidnapping statute has not been met.

III. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IF THE CARJACKING STATUTE IS FOUND TO CREATE A CONTINUING OFFENSE, THE DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT BE FOUND GUILTY OF KIDNAPPING UNDER THE *WEBER* REQUIREMENT.

a. Question Presented.

If the Delaware carjacking statute is found to create a continuing offense that isn't completed until the victim is released by the offender(s), can the Defendant be found guilty of kidnapping when the act occurs merely incidental to the crime of carjacking? (TK-20-22, A-50-52)

Was the kidnapping substantial and independent of the underlying crime of carjacking, as required by *Weber v. State*?²⁰ (TK-26-29, A-53-56)

b. Scope and Standard of Review.

When the question involved concerns the jury's findings of fact, “[u]nder Art. IV, § 11(a) of the Delaware Constitution, this Court will affirm those findings only 'if supported by evidence.' The Court, therefore, must examine the record to

²⁰ *Weber v. State*, 547 A.2d 948 (Del. 1988).

determine whether evidence was adduced at trial which substantiates the jury's findings."²¹

When the question involved concerns questions on matters of law, “[t]he standard and scope of review is whether the court below erred in formulating or applying legal precepts.”²²

c. Merits of the Argument.

In *Weber v. State*, this Court considered the issue of when a Defendant should be convicted of kidnapping in addition to the underlying crime of which they are charged.²³ The Defendant in *Weber* was charged with the underlying crime of assault, and additionally with kidnapping for his restraint of the alleged victim throughout the completion of the underlying crime.²⁴ This Court first looked to the commentary of the Delaware Criminal Code for guidance. The court noted that the commentary for the applicable kidnapping section stated:

[A] person is not guilty of kidnapping under subsection (4) every time he commits the crime of rape or assault. Both of those crimes inevitably involve some restraint of the person. but *much more* is required here before the additional and aggravated offense of

²¹ See *Sussex County, Del. v. Morris*, 610 A.2d 1354, 1360 (Del. 1992); *Storey v. Camper*, 401 A.2d 458, 465 (Del. 1979).

²² See *Arnold v. Society for Sav. Bancorp, Inc.*, 650 A.2d 1270, 1276 (Del. 1994); *Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, II, L.P.*, 624 A.2d 1199, 1204 (Del. 1993). See also *Rohner v. Niemann*, 380 A.2d 549, 552 (Del. 1977).

²³ *Weber v. State*, 547 A.2d 948 (Del. 1988).

²⁴ *Id.*

kidnapping is committed. The State must prove that the restraint *interfered substantially* with the victim's liberty.

Weber at 957 quoting *Delaware Criminal Code with Commentary* § 783 commentary at 228 (1973) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

This Court cited its decision in *Burton v. State*, where it held that "the requirement that the defendant 'interfere substantially' with the victim's liberty insures that where the movement or restraint is *entirely incident* to the underlying crime, there cannot be a kidnapping conviction" under 11 *Del. C.* § 783A.²⁵

Therefore, "in order to allow a conviction for kidnapping in conjunction with an underlying crime such as rape, robbery, or assault, the movement and/or restraint of the victim must be more than incidental to the underlying crime."²⁶ In regard to the burden placed on the State, this Court ruled that "the State must prove the underlying offense and substantial interference which is independent of and not incidental to that underlying offense."²⁷ Finally, this Court clarified that "the dispositive issue is not the degree or duration of the movement and/or restraint, but whether the movement and/or restraint are *incident to* the underlying offense or are *independent of* the underlying offense."²⁸

²⁵ *Weber*, 547 A.2d at 958 (quoting *Burton v. State*, 426 A.2d 829, 834 (Del. 1981)).

²⁶ *Weber*, 547 A.2d at 958.

²⁷ *Id.*

²⁸ *Id.*

Using this analysis, this Court held that “all of Weber's efforts to restrain [the victim] were entirely incident to and not independent of the fight with [the victim]. There is no evidence independent of Weber's assault on [the victim] to support a separate conviction for kidnapping.”²⁹

The *Weber* case is analogous to the present case. Both defendants were subsequently charged with kidnapping that was merely incidental to the underlying crime. Under similar facts to the case at hand, this Court found that the efforts to restrain the victim by *Weber* were entirely incident to and not independent of the underlying assault. Likewise, if this Court holds that the carjacking statute was designed to create a continuing offense not completed until the victim is released and the Defendant's conviction under § 783A is upheld, it should find that the Defendant's role in restraining another person was entirely incident to the underlying crime of carjacking.

²⁹ *Id.* at 959.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE Defendant prays this Honorable Court enter judgment in favor of the Defendant and reverse the conviction below.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ John F. Brady

John F. Brady, Esq.

ID# 2977

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Attorney for Appellant

DATED: December 30, 2014

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR SUSSEX COUNTY

STATE OF DELAWARE

VS.

RONDAIGES A HARPER

Alias: No Aliases

DOB: 03/31/1995

SBI: 00656335

CASE NUMBER:
1303016992

CRIMINAL ACTION NUMBER:

IS13-04-0215

KIDNAP 1ST(F)

IS13-04-0216

CARJACKING 1ST(F)

IS13-04-0214

CONSP 2ND(F)

IS13-04-0217

CONSP 2ND(F)

COMMITMENT

Nolle Prosequi on all remaining charges in this case
SEE NOTES FOR FURTHER COURT ORDER-TERMS/CONDITIONS

SENTENCE ORDER

NOW THIS 25TH DAY OF JULY, 2014, IT IS THE ORDER OF THE
COURT THAT:

The defendant is adjudged guilty of the offense(s) charged.
The defendant is to pay the costs of prosecution and all
statutory surcharges.

AS TO IS13-04-0215- : TIS
KIDNAP 1ST

The defendant shall pay his/her restitution joint/severally
as follows: See attached list of payees.

Effective July 25, 2014 the defendant is sentenced
as follows:

- The defendant is placed in the custody of the Department
of Correction for 25 year(s) at supervision level 5 with
credit for 493 day(s) previously served

- The level 5 time imposed in today's sentence takes into
consideration all time previously served.

AS TO IS13-04-0216- : TIS
APPROVED ORDER 1 July 25, 2014 11:07

CERTIFIED
AS A TRUE COPY
Attest: Joyce M. Callen's
Prothonotary
Per: Jess M. Williams
Clerk

STATE OF DELAWARE
VS.
RONDAIGES A HARPER
DOB: 03/31/1995
SBI: 00656335

CARJACKING 1ST

- The defendant is placed in the custody of the Department of Correction for 25 year(s) at supervision level 5
 - Suspended after 5 year(s) at supervision level 5
 - For 6 month(s) supervision level 4 WORK RELEASE
 - Hold at supervision level 5
 - Until space is available at supervision level 4 WORK RELEASE
 - Followed by 2 year(s) at supervision level 3
- Probation is concurrent to any probation now serving.

**AS TO IS13-04-0214- : TIS
CONSP 2ND**

- The defendant is placed in the custody of the Department of Correction for 2 year(s) at supervision level 5
 - Suspended for 1 year(s) at supervision level 3
- Probation is concurrent to criminal action number S13-04-0216 .

**AS TO IS13-04-0217- : TIS
CONSP 2ND**

- The defendant is placed in the custody of the Department of Correction for 2 year(s) at supervision level 5
 - Suspended for 1 year(s) at supervision level 3
- Probation is concurrent to criminal action number S13-04-0216 .

SPECIAL CONDITIONS BY ORDER

STATE OF DELAWARE

VS.

RONDAIGES A HARPER

DOB: 03/31/1995

SBI: 00656335

CASE NUMBER:

1303016992

The defendant shall pay any monetary assessments ordered during the period of probation pursuant to a schedule of payments which the probation officer will establish.

Should the defendant be unable to complete financial obligations during the period of probation ordered, the defendant may enter the work referral program until said obligations are satisfied as determined by the Probation Officer.

Have no contact with the victim(s) Margaret Smith , the victim's family or residence.

Pursuant to 29 Del.C. 4713(b)(2), the defendant having been convicted of a Title 11 felony, it is a condition of the defendant's probation that the defendant shall provide a DNA sample at the time of the first meeting with the defendant's probation officer. See statute.

Must comply with any special conditions imposed at any time by the supervising officer, The Court, and/or The Board of Parole.

Obtain and remain gainfully employed.

Pay restitution on a schedule to be established by the Probation Officer.

Be evaluated for substance abuse and follow any recommendations for counseling, testing or treatment deemed appropriate.

Have no contact with codef. Phillip Brewer

Have no contact with codef. Jackeline Perez

APPROVED ORDER 3 July 25, 2014 11:07

STATE OF DELAWARE
VS.
RONDAIGES A HARPER
DOB: 03/31/1995
SBI: 00656335

Have no contact with codef. Junia McDonald

NOTES

The restitution ordered in this matter is to be paid jointly and severally with codefendant Phillip Brewer (ID#1303016994). Should codefendants Junia McDonald (ID#1304002931) and Jackeline Perez (ID#1304002943) be adjudicated guilty at a future date, they should also pay the restitution ordered jointly and severally with the defendant.



JUDGE RICHARD F STOKES

FINANCIAL SUMMARY

STATE OF DELAWARE
VS.
RONDAIGES A HARPER
DOB: 03/31/1995
SBI: 00656335

CASE NUMBER:
1303016992

SENTENCE CONTINUED:

TOTAL DRUG DIVERSION FEE ORDERED	
TOTAL CIVIL PENALTY ORDERED	
TOTAL DRUG REHAB. TREAT. ED. ORDERED	
TOTAL EXTRADITION ORDERED	
TOTAL FINE AMOUNT ORDERED	
FORENSIC FINE ORDERED	
RESTITUTION ORDERED	2581.21
SHERIFF, NCCO ORDERED	
SHERIFF, KENT ORDERED	
SHERIFF, SUSSEX ORDERED	435.00
PUBLIC DEF, FEE ORDERED	100.00
PROSECUTION FEE ORDERED	100.00
VICTIM'S COM ORDERED	
VIDEOPHONE FEE ORDERED	4.00
DELJIS FEE ORDERED	4.00
SECURITY FEE ORDERED	40.00
TRANSPORTATION SURCHARGE ORDERED	
FUND TO COMBAT VIOLENT CRIMES FEE	60.00
SENIOR TRUST FUND FEE	
<hr/>	
TOTAL	3,324.21

RESTITUTION SUMMARY

STATE OF DELAWARE
VS.
RONDAIGES A HARPER
DOB: 03/31/1995
SBI: 00656335

CASE NUMBER:
1303016992

AS TO IS13-04-0215 :
The defendant shall pay restitution
joint/severally as follows:
\$ 705.00 to MARGARET SMITH
\$ 1876.21 to GEICO

AGGRAVATING-MITIGATING

STATE OF DELAWARE
VS.
RONDAIGES A HARPER
DOB: 03/31/1995
SBI: 00656335

CASE NUMBER:
1303016992

AGGRAVATING

LACK OF AMENABILITY
CUSTODY STATUS AT TIME OF OFFENSE
PRIOR VIOLENT CRIM. ACTIVITY
VULNERABILITY OF VICTIM
NEED FOR CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT
UNDUE DEPRECIATION OF OFFENSE

APPROVED ORDER

7

July 25, 2014 11:07

OB