

restore Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) and Medicaid benefits, (ii) process a State Rental Assistance Program housing voucher, (iii) provide emergency hotel housing, and (iv) waive various fees and requirements. After service of the petition, the Superior Court scheduled an in-person hearing on Ingram’s petition for March 26, 2026. The DHSS/DSS Respondents moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Ingram had not exhausted her administrative remedies under 31 *Del. C.* § 520. The DHSS/DSS Respondents also contended that Ingram had not satisfied the criteria for issuance of a writ of mandamus.

(3) In a March 10, 2026 letter, the Superior Court advised Ingram that she had to submit any requests for action in the form of motions properly submitted to the Superior Court, not in emails. In a March 25, 2026 letter, the Superior Court advised Ingram that the next day’s hearing would be rescheduled in light of her communications that she was in the hospital. The court further stated that Ingram’s requests concerning her dispute with DHSS/DSS would not be considered until a rescheduled hearing when both sides could present their positions. And in a March 27, 2026 letter, the Superior Court informed Ingram that her numerous emails were inappropriately burdening court staff and that documents she sent by email instead of filing properly with the court would not be acted upon.

(4) Ingram then filed a petition and amended petition for a writ of mandamus in this Court. In the petitions, Ingram seeks issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the immediate release of SNAP and Medicaid benefits and the recusal of the Superior Court judge presiding over her petition. Ingram has also moved for emergency sanctions, alleging that the Department of Justice is improperly retaliating against her by pursuing a child support matter, and expedition.

(5) The Court’s “original jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus is limited to instances when the respondent is a court or a judge thereof.”¹ A writ of mandamus will only issue if the petitioner can show: (i) a clear right to the performance of a duty; (ii) that no other adequate remedy is available; and (iii) that the trial court has arbitrarily failed or refused to perform its duty.² “[I]n the absence of a clear showing of an arbitrary refusal or failure to act, this Court will not issue a writ of mandamus to compel a trial court to perform a particular judicial function, to decide a matter in a particular way, or to dictate the control of its docket.”³

¹ *In re Hitchens*, 600 A.2d 37, 38 (Del. 1991). *See also* Del. Const. Art. IV, § 11(6).

² *In re Bordley*, 545 A.2d 619, 620 (Del. 1988).

³ *Id.*

(6) To the extent Ingram requests that this Court direct the DHSS/DSS Respondents to release funds to her, we lack jurisdiction to do so.⁴ To the extent Ingram asks for a writ of mandamus compelling the Superior Court to order the DHSS/DSS Respondents to release funds to her, she has not shown a clear right to performance of a duty or that the Superior Court arbitrarily failed or refused to perform such a duty. The Superior Court scheduled an in-person hearing on Ingram's petition. After Ingram indicated that she was hospitalized, the Superior Court continued the hearing. If Ingram sought an alternative to an in-person hearing on her petition, then she had to file the appropriate motion in the Superior Court.⁵ Her sending of unauthorized emails was not a substitute for the proper filing of a motion. This Court will not compel the Superior Court to decide a matter in a particular way or dictate control of the Superior Court's docket.⁶

(7) As to Ingram's request that the Court order the Superior Court judge to recuse herself, the Superior Court docket does not reflect that Ingram filed a motion

⁴ See *supra* n.1. See also *In re Brown*, 99 A.3d 226, 2014 WL 3728081, at *1 (Del. July 24, 2014) (TABLE) (dismissing petition for writ of mandamus directed to the DHSS in connection with a dispute pending in the Justice of the Peace Court).

⁵ She may also follow the procedures for making an accommodation request under the Americans with Disabilities Act. See ADA Public Notice, <https://courts.delaware.gov/aoc/ada.aspx>.

⁶ See *supra* n. 3. See also *In re Martinez*, 179 A.3d 822, 2018 WL 509103, at *1 (Del. Jan. 22, 2018) (TABLE) (dismissing petition for a writ of mandamus directing the Superior Court to grant the petitioner's pending motion).

for recusal of the judge. Even if Ingram had properly filed such a motion, the Court will not issue a writ of mandamus compelling a trial judge to decide a matter in a particular way.⁷ Ingram would also have an adequate remedy in the appellate review process if the Superior Court denied her motion for recusal.⁸

(8) Ingram has not established any basis for issuance of a writ of mandamus. Nor has she shown any entitlement to an award of sanctions. Her request for expedition is moot.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is DISMISSED. The motion for sanctions is DENIED. The motion for expedition is DENIED as MOOT.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.
Chief Justice

⁷ See *supra* n.3. See also *In re Webb*, 23 A.3d 66, 2011 WL 2685731, at *1 (Del. July 11, 2011) (TABLE) (dismissing petition for a writ of mandamus compelling the recusal of a Chancery Master).

⁸ See *supra* n.3. See also *In re Taylor*, 309 A.3d 424, 2023 WL 8379200, at *2 (Del. Dec. 5, 2023) (TABLE) (dismissing petition for a writ of mandamus reversing the Superior Court's interlocutory decision because the petitioner had an adequate remedy in the appellate review process).