

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

ZANDER PACHIS,¹

Respondent Below,
Appellant,

v.

RENEE QUAYLE,

Petitioner Below,
Appellee.

§

§ No. 284, 2025

§

§ Court Below—Family Court
§ of the State of Delaware

§

§ File No. CN24-05338

§ Petition No. 24-24207

§

§

§

ZANDER PACHIS,

Respondent Below,
Appellant,

v.

RENEE QUAYLE,

Petitioner Below,
Appellee.

§

§ No. 339, 2025

§

§ Court Below—Family Court
§ of the State of Delaware

§

§ File No. CN24-05338

§ Petition No. 24-24187

§

§

§

ZANDER PACHIS,

Respondent Below,
Appellant,

v.

RENEE QUAYLE,

Petitioner Below,
Appellee.

§

§ No. 372, 2025

§

§ Court Below—Family Court
§ of the State of Delaware

§

§ File No. CN24-05338

§ Petition No. 24-24187

§

§

§

§

¹ The Court previously assigned a pseudonym to the appellant and uses pseudonyms to refer to the appellant's children in this order under Supreme Court Rule 7(d).

Submitted: September 26, 2025
Decided: October 7, 2025

ORDER

Upon consideration of the emergency motions to stay and the responses, it appears to the Court that:

(1) Zander Pachis has filed the following appeals: (i) Appeal No. 284, 2025 from a Family Court order, dated June 11, 2025, granting Renee Quayle sole legal custody and primary residential placement of the parties' children ("Custody Order"); (ii) Appeal No. 339, 2025 from a Family Court order, dated July 30, 2025, denying his motion for a continuance in ancillary proceedings ("Continuance Order"); (ii) Appeal No. 372, 2025 from a Family Court order, dated August 29, 2025, dividing the marital property, which included the sale of the marital residence, and denying Quayle's request for alimony ("Property Division Order").

(2) On September 5, 2025, Pachis filed a motion for emergency stay of the Property Division Order, specifically the sale of the marital residence, in the Family Court. He did not offer any explanation for why a stay pending appeal was appropriate or necessary. Quayle opposed the motion. On September 15, 2025, the Family Court denied the motion.

(3) On September 11, 2025, Pachis filed a motion for an emergency stay of the Property Division Order, including sale of the marital residence, in this Court pending resolution of all of his appeals. He also requested consolidation of the

appeals. In the motion, Pachis primarily argues that the Property Division Order should be stayed because there is an automatic stay in place as a result of bankruptcy proceedings. Quayle opposes the motion, arguing that there is no automatic stay in effect because Pachis is pursuing his third bankruptcy petition within one year of his filing of two previous bankruptcy petitions that were dismissed.² Quayle also emphasizes that the parties previously agreed to a contract for the sale of the marital residence, further delay risks the consummation of that contract, and that a prompt sale is necessary to ensure the payment of significant marital debts.

(4) We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a stay under the abuse of discretion standard.³ In his Family Court motion, Pachis made no effort to satisfy the four-factor test established by *Kirpat, Inc. v. Del. Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm’n* for stays pending appeal.⁴ As to Pachis’s contention in this Court that an automatic stay is in effect as a result of his bankruptcy proceedings, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently dismissed his latest petition for bankruptcy and barred him from filing a bankruptcy petition for one year. The

² See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A) (providing that an automatic stay shall not go into effect “if a single or joint case is filed by or against a debtor who is an individual under this title, and if 2 or more single or joint cases of the debtor were pending within the previous year but were dismissed”).

³ *Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen*, 886 A.2d 502, 504 (Del. 2005).

⁴ 741 A.2d 356 (Del. 1998). The four factors are: (i) the appellant’s likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal; (ii) whether the appellant would suffer irreparable harm if a stay is not granted; (iii) whether the appellee would suffer substantial harm if a stay is granted; and (iv) whether a stay would serve the public interest. *Id.* at 358-59.

Bankruptcy Court also entered an order confirming that no automatic stay is in effect. The Family Court did not err in denying Pachis's motion for a stay.

(5) Because Appeal No. 339, 2025 was interlocutory at the time of filing and Pachis can challenge the Continuance Order in Appeal No. 372, 2025, Appeal No. 339, 2025 should be dismissed. Pachis's request for consolidation of Appeal Nos. 284, 2025 and 339, 2025 is granted.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to stay is DENIED, Appeal No. 339, 2025 is DISMISSED, and Appeal Nos. 284, 2025 and 372, 2025 are CONSOLIDATED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths
Justice