



IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

TZE POONG LIU,)
)
 Defendant-Below,)
 Appellant,)
) No. 121, 2014
 v.)
) On Appeal from the Superior
STATE OF DELAWARE,) Court of the State of
) Delaware in and for
 Plaintiff-Below,) New Castle County
 Appellee.)

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

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Dated: May 2, 2014

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NATURE AND STAGE OF PROCEEDINGS

In 1991, Appellant Tze Poong Liu (hereinafter "Liu") was convicted of three counts of Murder First Degree and three counts of Felony Murder in Superior Court. The Supreme Court affirmed Liu's convictions on direct appeal. *Liu v. State*, 628 A.2d 1376 (Del. 1993). Liu filed a Rule 61 Motion pro se, which motion was denied by Superior Court in February 1995. *State v. Liu*, 1998 WL 413449 (Del. Super.). Liu appealed from Superior Court's 1995 Order denying him post-conviction relief.

On the advice of counsel, Liu withdrew his appeal of Superior Court's denial of post-conviction relief given counsel's representation that he would file a new trial motion in Superior Court on Liu's behalf.

Liu's counsel failed to file the promised new trial motion in Superior Court, and Liu again sought post-conviction relief in Superior Court. Although Superior Court ruled that counsel's failure to file the promised new trial motion was not ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court reversed on January 31, 2013, ruling that counsel's failure to file the promised new trial motion was ineffective assistance of counsel. *Liu v. State*, 2013 WL 411408 (Del. Supr.) The matter was remanded to Superior Court "with leave for Liu, with the assistance of counsel, to file and prosecute a proper motion for a new trial in the Superior Court." *Liu supra* at *2

On September 20, 2013, Liu, with the assistance of counsel, filed his motion for a new trial. (Appellant's Appendix, A48-A61) On November 8, 2013, the State filed its response to Liu's motion for a new trial. (Appellant's Appendix A62-A81) On February 14, 2014, the Superior Court denied Liu's motion for a new trial. On March 7, 2014, Liu appealed Superior Court's denial of his new trial motion.

This is Liu's opening brief.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Superior Court's February 29, 2012 Memorandum Opinion summarized the underlying facts:

"William Chen's (Chen) wife, daughter and mother were killed in a fire that was deliberately set at his Claymont home located on Compass Drive in the early morning hours of March 9, 1988. Chen testified that he went down to the first floor because he had been awakened by smoke and noise and saw the figure of a female intruder in the living room. At first, he assumed the figure was that of his mother but later stated that it was Chao. Chen opened the front door to let the smoke out and was forced out of the house as flames flashed through his home. Gasoline had been poured strategically around the house to block every major exit from the home. A witness, Steven Green, had given a taped statement to an investigating deputy attorney general purportedly stating that he had seen someone around Chen's house before the fire started.

The ensuing investigation revealed that Chen had been involved in a turbulent adulterous relationship with a woman from New York City named Vicky Chao. There was a love triangle involving defendant, Chao and Chen. Chen then testified that Chao had come to his Claymont home nine days before the fire, argued with his wife and mother and threatened to cause "big trouble."

During Chao's interview by the authorities, she implicated Liu. She claimed Liu wanted to kill Chen and forced her to drive down with him from New York City to Delaware in his yellow taxicab early that morning. During the trip to Delaware, Liu stopped to fill a plastic jug with gasoline. At approximately 4:30 a.m. on the day of the fire, a neighbor of Chen

witnessed a yellow cab with two occupants driving very slowly on a street adjacent to Compass Drive. The car went slowly down to the end of the street which was a cul-de-sac and turned off its lights. The neighbor testified that the occupants appeared to be looking for a particular house. The cab went back up that street, turned onto Compass Drive and drove up to the victims' house. When they arrived at Chen's home, Chao waited in the cab while Liu exited the car. Chao stated that when Liu returned to the car, his hand was bleeding and he said that he had set fire to the house.

A forensic chemist found traces of gasoline in Liu's taxicab and on his pants and shoes seized from his New York apartment on March 10, 1988. In addition, a toll collector working at the Delaware Memorial Bridge on the morning of March 9, 1988 saw defendant in a taxi cab with a passenger crossing from Delaware to New Jersey. Despite defendant's statement to the authorities that he had never been to Delaware, defendant had driven Chao to Delaware nine days before the murder. *State v. Liu*, 1995 WL 413449 at *1-2 (Del. Super.)" *State v. Liu*, 2012 WL 2192939 (Del. Super.), *3-4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In the interest of justice, defendant Liu is entitled to a new trial given that the late disclosure of Chen's perjury regarding the Chen/Chao relationship prevented Liu from fully investigating that relationship while trial proceeded.

ARGUMENT

A. QUESTION PRESENTED

Did Superior Court err in denying's Liu's Motion for New Trial?
(Appellant's Appendix, A48-A61)

B. STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW

The Supreme Court reviews a trial judge's denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court will "overturn a discretionary ruling of the trial judge only when the ruling is based upon unreasonable or capricious grounds." *Horsey v. State*, 2006 WL 196438 (Del. Supr.), *3 citing *Swan v. State*, 820 A.2d 842, 350 (Del. 2003) and *Zimmerman v. State*, 628 A.2d 62, 565 (Del. 1993). If the appeal involves an alleged infringement of a constitutional right, then this Court's review is de novo. *Swan v. State*, 820 A.2d 342, 352 (Del. 2003).

C. MERITS

The Superior Court erred when it ruled that it was not prejudicial to Liu when the State did not disclose until mid-trial that its chief accusing witness, William Chen, had an ongoing adulterous relationship with Liu's co-defendant Vicky Chao.

The trial record regarding the Chen/Chao disclosure was as follows:

"MR. WOOD: That's fine. May I ask our social worker to take Mr. Chen outside, Your Honor?"

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WOOD: Don't let anybody talk to him. My next series of questions are going to elicit information, which is essentially, is that after William's marriage he continued to have sex with Vicky Chao. As Your Honor doubtlessly recalls, during the Chao trial, he testified that but for one occasion immediately after his release from jail in New York City in 1988 he did not have sex with Vicky Chao after he was married. I intend to ask William Chen why is that that he was not truthful during the Chao trial. I know of no way of doing that that makes any sense to anybody, especially including William given the translation difficulties, without referring to the fact he testified in the Chao trial." (March 19 transcript, p. 35, A84)

Said change in Chen's testimony had apparently been discovered by the State and disclosed to the defense after opening statements:

"**MR. WOOD:** Your Honor, I believe the record should reflect when I first learned of this change in testimony, and that was I guess a week ago today. I'm trying to remember what day it was that we had our last trial testimony last week before Mr. Gabay got – Tuesday, I think it was Tuesday. I interviewed Mr. Chen in my office Tuesday night and that's when I first learned of this. It's obviously Brady material, but Brady only requires that I disclose impeachment information to the defense in sufficient time for him to make appropriate use of the information. That's partly why I told Mr. Gabay this outside of the Court's presence before we got to this area of testimony, but obviously who's had ample time to make use of the evidence. The record should simply reflect my representations as to that." (March 19 transcript, p. 42, A91)

Both the Court and counsel's initial impression was that Chen's prior, untruthful testimony at co-defendant Chao's trial constituted perjury:

"THE COURT: Yes. The basic problem is that we have been informed by Mr. Wood that William Chen, who is on the witness stand testifying in this case, is about to testify to some things that are inconsistent with his testimony at the trial of State vs. Vicky Chao; in particular, that at that trial he denied continuing his sexual relationship with Vicky Chao after he was married, and now he intends to indicate that he did continue it after he was married. I would assume that that issue was somewhat material at the other trial. Certainly he was cross-examined as to it.

MR. WOOD: Your Honor, I think –

THE COURT: I think, therefore, there's a potential that this conduct might constitute perjury, so we've asked that a lawyer be found to talk with Mr. Chen about his rights.

MR. WOOD: It should be noted that according to Section 1235 of Title 11, material is defined as a statement which, regardless of its admissibility under the Rules of Evidence, could have affected the course or the outcome of the proceeding. At least to me, at first blush it's little questionable whether these statements are material because I think, at least my reading of things was that nobody believed the denial in the first trial but it would still be at least perjury third degree.

THE COURT: Certainly there is the argument that could be made that it did in fact play a material role.

MR. WOOD: Right, there's an argument.

MR. CAPONE: Does he become a suspect in these murders now?

MR. GABAY: Not until I'm done with him."

(March 19 transcript, p. 43-44, A92-A93)"

The late disclosure of Chen's perjury about his ongoing sexual relationship with co-defendant Vicky Chao was a surprise that deprived Liu of his right to a fair trial. Specifically, with the Chen/Chao mid-trial surprise, Liu's counsel could not develop in his opening statement, nor suddenly gather during trial, any evidence showing the frequency of ongoing sexual encounters and communications between William Chen and Vicky Chao during the period of time leading up to the arson. Such an investigation would have been time-consuming, and could not have been adequately developed by Liu's counsel during trial, given the likelihood that said relationship was centered in New York City. The details of the Chen/Chao relationship necessarily would have to have been thoroughly investigated prior to trial to prove any theory of the case that Chen and Chao had combined to commit the arson. The State's late disclosure of Chen's perjury regarding the ongoing nature of the Chen/Chao relationship made such an investigation impossible, mid-trial.

In its decision denying Liu's New Trial Motion, the Superior Court concluded:

"Although Liu can satisfy the first two prongs of the *Brady* analysis, his claim fails under the third prong. The first prong is met, as Chen's testimony regarding the recency of his relationship with Chao is at least impeaching and possibly exculpatory. With respect to the second prong, it is unclear for how long the fact of Chen's changed testimony was withheld by the State. Regarding the third prong, however, Liu cannot demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different had the change in testimony been disclosed earlier or if a continuance had been sought and granted. Indeed, the change in Chen's testimony was consistent with Liu's trial strategy. Also, Liu had an opportunity to cross-examine Chen regarding the testimony and challenge Chen's credibility as a witness." *State v. Liu*, 2014 WL 605455 (Del. Super.)

***5**

The Superior Court failed to recognize, though, that Liu's "opportunity to cross examine Chen" and the fact that "the change in Chen's testimony was consistent with Liu's trial strategy" were inadequate substitutes for concrete evidence that could have been collected by Liu and offered to the jury regarding details of the Chen/Chao relationship. Evidence documenting the frequency of communications and interactions between Chen and Chao would have more strongly supported a defense theory that Chen and Chao had combined to murder Chen's family and to frame Liu. The courtroom forensic skills of Liu's counsel were no substitute for concrete evidence, which evidence only a time-consuming investigation could have developed.

Courts have recognized that the late disclosure of exculpatory material may violate a defendant's right to due process. Thus, in *Leka v. Portundo*, 257 F. 3d 89 (2nd Cir. 2001), the Court said:

"The limited Brady material disclosed to Leka could have led to specific exculpatory information only if the defense undertook further investigation. When such a disclosure is first made on the eve of the trial, or when trial is under way, the opportunity to use it may be impaired. The defense may be unable to divert resources from other initiatives and obligations that are or may seem more pressing. And the defense may be unable to assimilate the information into its case. See *United States v. Cobb*, 271 F.Supp. 159, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (Mansfield, J.) ("[T]here may be instances where disclosure of exculpatory evidence for the first time during trial would be too late to enable the defendant to use it effectively in his own defense, particularly if it were to open the door to witnesses or documents requiring time to be marshalled and presented.").

Moreover, new witnesses or developments tend to throw existing strategies and preparation into disarray.

The opportunity for use under Brady is the opportunity for a responsible lawyer to use the information with some degree of calculation and forethought." (*Leka* at 101, 103)

Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has observed:

"The majority of our sister circuits have held that while the untimely disclosure of Brady material does not constitute a constitutional violation in itself, it may violate due process if the defendant can show

he was prejudiced by the delay." *U.S. v. Burke*, 571 F.3d 1048, 1055-56 (10th Cir. 2009)

In the interest of justice, defendant Liu is entitled to a new trial given that the late disclosure of Chen's perjury regarding the Chen/Chao relationship prevented Liu from fully investigating that relationship while trial proceeded.

CONCLUSION

The Court should reverse the decision below and remand the matter for a new trial where the Chen/Chao adulterous relationship can be fully investigated and developed for the jury.

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STATE OF DELAWARE,) Court of the State of
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, James J. Haley, Jr., attorney for Appellant, do hereby certify that I caused the attached Appellant's Opening Brief to be served by File & ServeXpress on May 2, 2014 upon:

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Dated: May 2, 2014

**IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY**

STATE OF DELAWARE)	
)	
v.)	Cr. A. No. 88001915DI
)	
TZE POONG LIU,)	
)	
Defendant.)	

Upon Defendant's Motion for a New Trial – DENIED

Submitted: November 12, 2013

Decided: February 14, 2014

ORDER

Defendant Tze Poong Liu has filed a Motion for a New Trial contending that the interest of justice militates in favor of a new trial. Defendant Liu was charged with several counts of murder, along with co-defendant Vicki Chao. The victims were the wife, daughter, and mother of William Chen. Liu was charged with the intentional murder of the three victims, as well as felony murder of the three victims whose deaths occurred from an intentionally set fire at Chen's home in Claymont, Delaware on March 9, 1988. Liu was also charged with the attempted murder of Chen, as well as arson, burglary in the first degree and conspiracy first degree and second degree.

Chao's trial took place first, in 1989. At Chao's trial, William Chen testified in the State's case-in-chief that his intimate relationship with Chao was limited to one sexual encounter

after Chen married his wife. Chao was convicted on August 14, 1989 of three counts of intentional murder and three counts of felony murder, among other charges.¹

Liu's trial took place almost two years later, from March 11, 1991 to May 28, 1991. William Chen also testified as a witness as part of the State's case-in-chief. However, as discussed below, Chen's testimony changed from the testimony he offered at Chao's trial to the testimony he offered at Liu's trial. Ultimately, Liu was convicted of three counts of murder, three counts of felony murder, and arson, attempted murder, conspiracy and burglary.

Liu's trial began on March 11, 1991. After the second day of trial on March 12, 1991, the State met with Chen to prepare for Chen's testimony the following week. The State learned that Chen intended to testify differently at Liu's trial than he had testified at Chao's trial. Specifically, Chen intended to testify that he had sexual relations with Chao on more than one occasion since Chen's marriage. The next day of trial was March 18, 1991. Chen was sworn as a witness and began testifying.

At some point on or prior to Tuesday, March 19, 1991, the State disclosed to defense counsel that Chen's testimony would be different than it had been at Chao's trial. The record does not reveal the date on which the State disclosed to Liu's counsel that Chen would testify differently than he had previously testified about Chen's relationship with Chao. Nevertheless, on March 19, before Chen testified about his relationship with Chao after Chen's wedding, the State notified the Court that the State had learned about the expected changed testimony and had revealed the information to the defense. Chen was still on the witness stand when the State notified the Court on the record, and Chen had not yet testified inconsistently with his prior testimony.

¹ Chao was later re-tried and acquitted of the three intentional murder counts and convicted of the three felony murder charges.

Defense counsel for Liu did not seek a continuance and did not raise any concerns that Chen's changed testimony would alter Liu's trial strategy or disrupt his defense.

Before the direct examination of Chen continued, the Court recessed so that a lawyer for Chen could be secured. Once a lawyer was present to represent Chen's interests, the direct examination continued and Chen testified that his intimate relationship with Chao had continued after Chen's marriage. Chen testified that he had sexual relations with Chao on more than one occasion since Chen's marriage. Chen acknowledged that Chen was testifying on this subject contrary to his prior testimony at Chao's trial when Chen said he only had sex with Chao once after Chen was married.

Liu seeks a new trial.² As grounds, Liu argues that the late disclosure by the State of witness Chen's intention to testify differently at Liu's trial than Chen had testified at Chao's trial should have prompted the Court to continue Liu's trial and allow Liu additional time to investigate. The State responds that a new trial is not mandated in the interest of justice because Liu did not request a continuance at the time of the disclosure; Liu had full opportunity to question Chen on the stand; and Liu has not articulated how his trial strategy would have changed if the trial was continued. Indeed, according to the State, Chen's conflicting testimony was actually consistent with Liu's trial strategy that Chen's testimony should be disregarded by the jury as not credible.

In consideration of Liu's Motion for New Trial, THE COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS:

1. When testifying as a witness during Chao's trial in 1989, Chen testified that he had only one sexual encounter with Chao after his marriage.

² On remand, the Delaware Supreme Court directed this Court to consider Liu's motion for new trial on its merits and without regard to procedural deficiencies. *Liu v. State*, 61 A.3d 619, at *2 (Table) (Del. 2013).

2. Liu's trial began on Monday, March 11, 1991.
3. On or about Tuesday, March 12, 1991, after the trial had recessed for the day, the State met with Chen to prepare his testimony for the next trial day. The State became aware that Chen would testify that Chen had more than one sexual encounter with Chao after Chen's marriage.
4. The next trial day was Monday, March 18, 1991. Chen was called as the second witness on that trial day.
5. On Tuesday, March 19, 1991, while Chen was still subject to direct examination, but before Chen began testifying about the frequency of Chen's sexual encounters with Chao after Chen's marriage, the State notified the Court that Chen's testimony on this subject would be different than it had been at Chao's trial. Furthermore, the State made a record that the State had since disclosed the anticipated change in Chen's testimony to Liu's defense counsel. This colloquy took place on the record, outside the presence of the jury, and after Chen was removed from the courtroom.
6. Defense counsel for Liu did not seek a continuance or make any comment whatsoever about needing to perform additional investigation.
7. Court recessed to secure counsel for Chen because there were concerns that Chen's changed testimony might subject him to prosecution for perjury.
8. Once counsel was secured for Chen, Chen's direct examination continued on March 19, 1991.
9. Liu's counsel attacked Chen's credibility in a vigorous cross-examination. Indeed, in his closing argument, Liu's defense counsel stated that Chen's testimony at Chao's trial had

not been credible when Chen stated he had only had sex with Chao on one occasion after Chen got married.

10. A Motion for New Trial may be granted upon a motion by the defendant “if required in the interest of justice.”³
11. The United States Supreme Court held in *Brady v. Maryland* that due process is violated when evidence favorable to the defendant that is material to guilt or punishment is suppressed by the prosecution.⁴ In order to determine if a *Brady* violation exists, the Court uses a three-prong test: (1) whether favorable evidence exists that is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the favorable evidence is withheld by the State; and (3) there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would be different if the information was disclosed to the defendant.⁵ In analyzing the third prong of the test, a “reasonable probability” includes “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” such that prejudice to the defendant has resulted from the State’s failure to disclose the evidence.⁶
12. Three recent Delaware Supreme Court decisions have examined a motion for a new trial in the context of a delayed disclosure by the prosecution to the defense or an alleged *Brady* violation.
13. In *State v. Wright*, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s finding that there was a *Brady* violation. The defendant was convicted of first degree murder arising out of a robbery at the Hi-Way Inn bar and liquor store.⁷ Forty minutes before the Hi-Way Inn

³ Super. Ct. Crim. R. 33.

⁴ *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

⁵ *Saunders v. State*, 2013 WL 6157181, at *2 (Del. 2013) (slip copy).

⁶ *State v. Wright*, 67 A.3d 319, 325 (Del. 2013).

⁷ *Id.* at 321.

robbery, another liquor store 1.5 miles away was robbed and witnesses' descriptions for the perpetrators were similar to the descriptions of those responsible for the Hi-Way Inn robbery and murder.⁸ The State did not disclose this evidence to the defendant and the defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, which was granted by the Superior Court.⁹ In reviewing the third prong of the *Brady* analysis, the Supreme Court found that no prejudice to the defendant was demonstrated.¹⁰ Although the information of the similar robbery could have been exculpatory, the police investigated and decided that there was no connection between the two robberies. Moreover, the evidence of the similar robbery did not bolster the defendant's defense, that he was somewhere else with friends, nor did it create any other reasonable probability of a different outcome.

14. The Supreme Court also reversed the Superior Court's decision on appeal in *Valentin v. State* on the grounds of a *Brady* violation.¹¹ A jury found the defendant guilty of various offenses including failure to stop at the command of a police officer and reckless driving.¹² During trial preparation, the defendant's counsel requested discovery from the State which included requests of statements relating to the credibility of prosecution witnesses and an opportunity to review reports and statements of trial witnesses.¹³ At trial, an officer testified to the existence of a recording made during the officers' pursuit of the defendant between the officers and a dispatcher regarding the movements of the defendant's car.¹⁴ The recording was not disclosed to the defendant's trial counsel prior

⁸ *Id.*

⁹ *Id.* at 324.

¹⁰ *Id.* at 325.

¹¹ 74 A. 3d 645 (2013).

¹² *Id.* at 646.

¹³ *Id.* at 647.

¹⁴ *Id.* at 648.

to trial.¹⁵ The defendant testified that he did not know that the truck that approached him was a police truck because no emergency lights were on and, once the lights were on, the defendant testified that he thought the officers were going to hit him.¹⁶ After the defendant was convicted, he appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that although the dispatch recording was consistent with the officer's testimony, no sirens could be heard in the background of the recording, which is consistent with the defendant's defense.¹⁷ In reviewing the third prong of the *Brady* test, the Supreme Court determined that the State's failure to produce the recording prejudiced the defendant.¹⁸ The State's case was based on the officers' testimony and the pursuit of the defendant and, therefore, the failure to disclose the recording deprived the defendant of an opportunity to impeach the officers' testimony regarding the pursuit.¹⁹

15. Finally, in *Saunders v. State*, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's denial of the defendant's motion for a mistrial after the State made a delayed disclosure of a recorded statement by one of the State's witnesses.²⁰ The defendant was arrested for purchasing cocaine from a confidential informant.²¹ During trial, a Drug Enforcement Agency agent testified about a conversation that occurred between the agent and the confidential informant and stated that a recording of the conversation existed.²² Prior to the second day of trial, the State made the recording available to the defendant. The defendant moved for a mistrial on the ground that the withholding of the recorded

¹⁵ *Id.*

¹⁶ *Id.*

¹⁷ *Id.*

¹⁸ *Id.* at 651.

¹⁹ *Id.* at 652.

²⁰ *Saunders*, 2103 WL 6517181, at *1.

²¹ *Id.* at *1.

²² *Id.*

statement constituted a *Brady* violation.²³ The trial judge denied the request and allowed defense counsel time to review the recorded statement and an opportunity to cross-examine the witness.²⁴ The Supreme Court found that the defendant was not prejudiced by the delay in disclosure because the confidential informant was cross-examined extensively by the defendant's counsel and counsel declined to recall the agent after reviewing the recording.²⁵ Moreover, the Supreme Court held that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction independent of the evidence contained in the recording that otherwise would have been challenged.²⁶

16. Liu's motion fails under the third prong of the *Brady* violation analysis.
17. The State met with Chen on March 12, 1991, before Chen was sworn as a witness, to prepare Chen for his testimony. Chen disclosed to the State that he had sex with Chao on more than one occasion following Chen's marriage, which was contrary to how Chen testified in Chao's trial.
18. The State disclosed Chen's changed testimony with respect to this information to Liu's counsel prior to March 19, 1991.
19. When the State disclosed to Liu's defense counsel that Chen would testify differently than he had testified at Chao's trial, defense counsel did not request a continuance.
20. After Chen took the stand and began his testimony but before Chen testified about whether he continued his intimate relationship with Chao after Chen's marriage, the State disclosed the anticipated changed testimony to the Court and also informed the Court that the State had already disclosed this information to defense counsel.

²³ *Id.* at *2.

²⁴ *Id.*

²⁵ *Id.*

²⁶ *Id.* at *3

21. The Court recessed to secure a lawyer to represent Chen before he testified since Chen's sworn testimony would be different from sworn testimony Chen had offered previously in Chao's trial.
22. Liu's trial continued that same day.
23. Chen testified that he and Chao had sex on more than one occasion after Chen married.
24. Although the disclosure of the change in Chen's testimony regarding the continuation of Chen's intimate relationship with Chao was delayed, Liu suffered no prejudice. Liu's counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine Chen and counsel explored the changed testimony fully.
25. The delayed disclosure of the relationship between Chen and Chao did not cause Liu to change his defense or trial strategy. In fact, the extent of the relationship between Chen and Chao also was consistent with Liu's strategy and defense. Chen's change in testimony was consistent with Liu's strategy that Chen's credibility should be rejected by the jury. In closing argument, Liu's counsel challenged Chen's credibility, relying heavily upon Chen's changed testimony to discredit Chen.
26. Although the relationship between Chen and Chao was material to the case, all parties were already well aware of the relationship that existed between Chen and Chao. Disclosure of the relationship between Chen and Chao after Chen's marriage was essential to the State's case, but it also bolstered Liu's defense.
27. Moreover, the delayed disclosure of the information did not create a reasonable probability of a different outcome. The State presented sufficient evidence for Liu's conviction independent of Chen's testimony. Liu was a New York City taxicab driver. Liu had rearranged his schedule with the driver with whom he shared his taxicab so that

Liu could have the cab for the night on which the murders took place. A neighbor of Chen's testified at Liu's trial that the neighbor saw a yellow taxicab early on the morning of the murders on the street adjacent to Compass Drive, the street on which Chen lived and where the crimes occurred. The neighbor testified that he observed the taxicab driving slowly down the cul-de-sac and saw the lights of the taxicab being extinguished. The neighbor testified that the occupants of the taxicab seemed to be looking for a specific house. The neighbor saw the taxicab turn onto Compass Drive and drive up to Chen's house. A forensic chemist testified that traces of gasoline were found in Liu's taxicab, on Liu's pants, and on Liu's shoes. A toll collector for the Delaware Memorial Bridge who was working on the morning of the arson and murders stated that he saw Liu driving a taxicab with a passenger after they crossed the bridge.

28. Although Liu can satisfy the first two prongs of the *Brady* analysis, his claim fails under the third prong. The first prong is met, as Chen's testimony regarding the recency of his relationship with Chao is at least impeaching and possibly exculpatory. With respect to the second prong, it is unclear for how long the fact of Chen's changed testimony was withheld by the State. Regarding the third prong, however, Liu cannot demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different had the change in testimony been disclosed earlier or if a continuance had been sought and granted. Indeed, the change in Chen's testimony was consistent with Liu's trial strategy. Also, Liu had an opportunity to cross-examine Chen regarding the testimony and challenge Chen's credibility as a witness.
29. The interest of justice does not require a new trial. Defendant Liu was not prejudiced by the timing of the disclosure by the State. There is no reasonable probability that the

outcome of the trial would have been different if Liu's defense counsel had been informed of Chen's changed trial testimony at an earlier date. There was overwhelming evidence of Liu's guilt separate and apart from Chen's testimony.

NOW, THEREFORE, this 14th day of February, 2014, Defendant Tze Poong Liu's Motion for a New Trial is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Andrea L. Rocanelli

Honorable Andrea L. Rocanelli