Intimate Partner Violence Risk Assessment: Implications for Women's Safety

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Multi City Intimate Partner Femicide Study

Funded by: NIDA/NIAA, NIMH, CDC, NIJ VAWA R01 DA/AA1156

HOMICIDE IN BATTERING RELATIONSHIPS

- 40 - 50% OF US WOMEN KILLED BY HUSBAND, BF OR EX (vs. 5-8% of men) (9 times rate killed by a stranger)
- 7th leading cause of premature death for US women; #2 cause of death-African & Native American women 15-34 yo
- Immigrant women at increased risk in NYC (Wilt '04)
- US – At least 2/3 of women killed – battered prior – if male killed – prior wife abuse in 75% of cases (Campbell, '92; Morocco et al, '98)
- More at risk when leaving or left (Wilson & Daly, '93; Campbell et. al. '01; Websdale '99) – 1st 3 mos & 1st year - but *eventually* more safe
- Women far more likely victims of homicide-suicide (29% vs. .1% male in US)
- 44-47% of women killed seen in health care system before killed (Sharps, Campbell '02; Wadman & Muelleman '99)

INTIMATE PARTNER FEMICIDE BY PERPETRATOR IN TEN CITIES (N= 311)



Intimate Partner Homicide in Delaware – '96-'06 - 2007 Report

www.ndvfri.org/index.php?id=37956#D

- 66 victims – 18 perpetrator suicides (27%)
- 92 total deaths
- 4:1 ratios – males to females (36 women; 12 men)
- 46% leaving or attempting -7% active PFA (4% expired)
- Children affected
  - 15 or 21% - child present during the homicide;
  - 31 children on premises
  - 2 children killed
  - 2 women pregnant when killed

Femicide in Delaware - Violence Policy Center www.vpc.org (2004)

- 2 femicides - .48 per 100,000 women in 2003 (1.35 US overall)
- #42 in country – BUT in 2002 - #8 in country with 9 femicides (2.15 per 100,000) & 18 in 2001 - #6 in country
- 8-9 attempted femicides for each IP femicide – so at least 36 women almost killed and 4 women killed each year in Delaware by intimate partners
- Approximately 27 children per year witness the event or first to find the body; another 40 lose their mother or know she has been almost killed by the father or an intimate partner
- Is Delaware taking care of those children?

IP Homicide & the Children

- Domestic Violence related homicides – of children – 17% of cases of IP homicide in FL – a child also killed (Websdale ’99) – 49% of cases reported child abuse prior
- Children often witness or first to find body in femicides – national study of IP femicide (“He Killed My Mommy” Lewandowski,Campbell et al’04)
  - Of 175 cases of actual and attempted homicides of mothers (cases with children) – 71% of cases – child either witnessed homicide or first to find body
  - Yet less than 60% received any counseling
  - Custody battles – 40% to mother’s kin; 12% to father’s (killer) kin; 5% split between mother’s & father’s; 14% to others –
  - 8% of cases prior reported child abuse

Femicide in Delaware – IP Femicide – 50%



U.S. INTIMATE PARTNER HOMICIDE RATE DECLINE 1976-02 FBI (SHR, 1976-02; BJS '05)



a = no ex's

Decline in Intimate Partner Homicide and Femicide

- Decline in male victimization in states where improved DV laws and services - resource availability (Browne & Williams ’89; ’98, Dugan, Nagin, & Rosenfeld ‘99)
- Exposure reduction - increased female earnings, lower marriage rate, higher divorce rate (Dugan, Nagin & Rosenfeld ’99; Smith & Brewer ’90)
- Gun availability decline (Wilt ‘97; Block ‘95; Kellerman ‘93, ‘97- gun increases risk X3) – special issue of Evaluation Review ’06 – Sorenson, Special Editor
- Decrease is 9% for white females, 81% for black males, 56% for white males, 49% for African American females

U.S. INTIMATE PARTNER HOMICIDE RATES & DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SERVICES 1976-9

(Resources per 50 million - Dugan, Nagin & Rosenfeld '03)



INTIMATE PARTNER HOMICIDE: KILLED BY GUNS US '76-'05 (SHR) (>2/3 of intimates)



Special Issue of *Evaluation Review* Vol 30, 6/06 – S. Sorenson (Ed)

- 59% of IP Femicide – guns
- Frattaroli & Vernick; Frattaroli & Teret – DV Gun laws – infinite state variations, difficulties in implementation
- Vigdor & Mercy – Laws of removal with OP's most effective – in states where purchase restrictions in place – where OP's going into data base – AND OP possession prohibition – decrease in femicide & firearm femicide of 12-13% (overall IPH decrease by 10%)

“Prediction is very hard to do - especially if it is about the future”

Yogi Berra

Overview of Issues

- High demand for both lethality & reoffending risk assessment by criminal justice, advocacy, victim service, & health systems
  - Petrone vs. Pike – Pike Co. Probation Department in PA – successfully sued (settled) under a Section 1983 ruling for failing to recognize potential lethality in a batterer – gave low level – phone only - supervision & failed to assure completion of an adequate batterer intervention program
  - Other risk assessment instruments used for general probation purposes not accurate for batterers
- Low base rates
- Relatively young science in intimate partner violence & risk assessment particularly
- 4 interacting parts to consider - instrument, risk assessor, perpetrator & *one* specific potential victim (vs. sexual assault or mental health – MacArthur study)
- Fears that risk assessment will be used to limit service to victims
- High stakes with either false negatives or false positives

Overlapping Concerns

Similar;

Not the same



Risk Prediction 4 Quadrant Model

(Webster et. al. '94)

(A) TRUE POSITIVES
Predicted violence,
Violent outcomes
Sensitivity

(B) FALSE POSITIVES
Predicted violence
No violent outcomes

(C) FALSE NEGATIVES
No violence predicted,
Violence occurs

(D) TRUE NEGATIVES
No violence predicted,
No violence occurs
Specificity

Existing Risk Assessment Scales

Navy (DoD) FAP Risk & Safety	Victim & Offender -reoffend & safety (FA, MP, health)	Evaluation not finished (Stith, Milner '02-'04)
DV Mosaic (20) (deBecker)	Computerized/Victim (criminal justice) - lethality risk system	.65 under ROC severe re-assault
DVSI- R (Kirk Williams)	Offenders (criminal justice) short – reoffending	.71% under ROC (Williams & Grant, '06)
K-SID (Gelles & Lyon)	Offender – reoffend (CJ)	Some evaluation data
O.D.A.R.A. (Z. Hilton)	Offender - reoffend – (CJ)	77% under ROC ('04)
PSI (Duluth)	Victim & offender - both (advocates & criminal justice)	Process evaluation (CDC) - no outcomes
PAS (D. Dutton)	Offender – intervention programs, prevention	Cross sectional validation good
SARA (Kropp et al) B-SAFER	Offender (criminal justice) - reoffending	Most data published best if perp. psych exam
Danger Assessment (Campbell)	Victim- Lethality (Advocates, Health)	.69% under ROC reassault; .90% att. hom

Femicide Risk Study

Purpose: Identify and establish risk factors for IP femicide – (over and above domestic violence)

Significance: Determine strategies to prevent IP femicide – especially amongst battered women – Approximately half of victims (54% of actual femicides; 45% of attempteds) did not accurately perceive their risk – that perpetrator was capable of killing her &/or would kill her

RISK FACTORS FOR INTIMATE PARTNER FEMICIDE: RESEARCH TEAM

(Funded by: NIDA/NIAA, NIMH, CDC, NIJ VAWA R01 DA/AA1156)

- R. Block, PhD (ICJA)
- D. Campbell, PhD, RN (FSU)
- J. McFarlane, DrPH, RN (TWU)
- C. Sachs MD, MPH (UCLA)
- P. Sharps, PhD, RN (GWU)
- Y. Ulrich, PhD, RN (UW)
- S. Wilt, PhD (NYC DOH)
- F. Gary, PhD, RN (UFI)
- M.A. Curry PhD, RN (OHSU)
- N. Glass, PhD, RN (OHSU)
- J. Koziol-McLain, PhD, RN (JHU)
- J.Schollenberger MPH (JHU)
- A. Kellerman, MD, MPH (Emory)
- X. Xu, MSN (JHU)
- Kathryn Chouaf, MSN (JHU)

RISK FACTORS FOR INTIMATE PARTNER FEMICIDE: CITIES AND CO-INVESTIGATORS

(Funded by: NIDA/NIAA, NIMH, CDC, NIJ VAWA R01 DA/AA1156)

Baltimore	P. Sharps (GWU)
Chicago	B. Block (ICJA)
Houston	J. McFarlane (TWU)
Kansas City, KA&MO	Y. Ulrich (UW)
Los Angelos	C. Sachs (UCLA)
New York	S. Wilt (NYDOH)
Portland, OR	M. A. Curry (OHSU)
Seattle, WA	Y. Ulrich (UW)
Tampa/St. Pete	D. Campbell (FSU)
Wichita, KA	Y. Ulrich (UW)

RISK FACTORS FOR INTIMATE PARTNER FEMICIDE: 11 CITIES

(Funded by: NIDA/NIAAA, NIMH, CDC, NIJ VAWA R01 DA/AA1156)



Case Control Design

	Data Source
CASES - women who are killed by their intimate partners	Police Homicide Files Proxy informants
CONTROLS - women who are physically abused by their intimate partners (second set of nonabused controls – for later analysis)	Women themselves

Addition of Attempted Femicides

	Data Source
CASES - women who are killed by their intimate partners	Police Homicide files Proxy informants
CONTROLS - women who are physically abused by their intimate partners	Women themselves
CASES - women who are <u>ALMOST</u> killed by their intimate partners	Women themselves – to address issue of validity of proxy information

Definition: Attempted Femicide

- GSW or SW to the head, neck or torso.
- Strangulation or near drowning with loss of consciousness.
- Severe injuries inflicted that easily could have led to death.
- GSW or SW to other body part with unambiguous intent to kill.
- If none of above, unambiguous intent to kill.

Recruitment of Attempted Femicides

- From police assault files – difficult to impossible in many jurisdictions
- From shelters, trauma hospital data bases, DA offices – attempted to contact consecutive cases wherever located – many victims move
- Failure to locate rates high – but refusals low (less than 10%)
- Telephone interviews – subsample of 30 in depth
- Safety protocols carefully followed

In Depth Interviews (N = 30) (Nicolaidis et. al. 2003, J of General Internal Medicine)

- Interviews conducted on phone or anywhere woman wished
- Baltimore, Houston, Kansas City, Portland, Tampa, & Wichita – approximately 15% from each city
- Age 17-34 – 40% African American, 40% Anglo, 20% Hispanic; across income categories
- 10 (67%) had history of escalating physical &/or sexual assault; 5 (17%) with minor violence and controlling behavior, 2 with controlling behavior only; 2 with NO history of violence OR controlling behavior – similar to larger study

In Depth Interviews (N = 30)

- Even so, 14 women (almost half) said they had NO clue how dangerous he was – but with DA, all but 3 could have been identified
- 73% of cases – significant relationship change – majority – she was leaving him but in 4 cases he had left her but got enraged when she started seeing someone else or wouldn't take him back when he changed his mind
- About 30% – clearly at risk – she was scared & we would have been scared for her – about 55% could have been identified with skilled risk assessment – but 15% almost totally out of the blue

PRIOR PHYSICAL ABUSE & STALKING EXPERIENCED ONR YEAR PRIOR TO FEMICIDE (N=311) & ATTEMPTED FEMICIDE (N=182)

	Femicide	Attempted
Prior physical abuse	70%	72%
Increased in frequency	66%	54%
Increased in severity	62%	60%
Stalked	87%	95%
No prior physical abuse	30%	28%
Stalked	58%	72%

INTIMATE PARTNER ABUSED CONTROLS (N = 356)

- Random sample selected from same cities as femicide and attempted femicide cases
- Telephone survey conducted 11/98 - 9/99 using random digit dialing
- Women in household 18-50 years old & most recently celebrated a birthday
- Women abused (including sexual assault & threats) by an intimate partner w/in 2 years prior – modified CTS
- Safety protocols followed

Sample – (only those cases with prior physical abuse or threats)

	Number
FEMICIDE CASES	220
ATTEMPTED FEMICIDE CASES	143
ABUSED CONTROLS	356

Sociodemographic comparisons



Mean Age
Fem/Att Perp = 36
Abuse Perp = 31
Fem/Att Victim = 34
Abuse Victim = 29

DANGER ASSESSMENT (Campbell '86)

www.dangerassessment.org

- Developed in 1985 to increase battered women's ability to take care of themselves (Self Care Agency; Orem '81, 92) – original DA used with 10 samples of 2251 battered women to establish preliminary reliability & validity
- Interactive, uses calendar - aids recall plus women come to own conclusions - more persuasive & in adult learner/ strong woman/ survivor model
- Intended as lethality risk instrument versus reassault (e.g. SARA, K-SID) - risk factors may overlap but not exactly the same

Danger Assessment – Independent Predictive Validity Studies - Reassault

- (Goodman, Dutton & Bennett, 2001) N = 92; 53% returned; successful prediction of reabuse, DA stronger predictor than CTS2 (4.2 vs. 2.8 OR per 1 SD DA vs. CTS2)
- Women's perception of danger stronger predictor than any of the 10 DA items available in criminal justice records – (Weisz, Tolman, & Saunders, 2000)
- Heckert & Gondolf ('02; '04) N = 499 – DA- 66% sensitivity but 33% false positives - Women's perception of risk PLUS DA best model (over SARA & K-SID) but women's perception of risk by itself not quite as good as DA

DANGER ASSESSMENT - Actual (N = 263) & Attempted (N=182) Femicides & Abuse Victims (N=342)*

Reliability (Coefficient Alpha)

- Attempted Femicide Victims	.75
- Abused Control Victims	.74
- Actual Femicides	.80

*** Presence of DA items within one year prior to femicide and attempted femicide and within one year prior to worst incident of physical abuse experienced by abused controls**

DANGER ASSESSMENT SCORES

	Mean	SD
Abused Controls	2.9*	2.8
Attempted Femicide	7.9	3.2
All Femicides	7.1	3.4
Femicide w/o suicide	7.0	3.6
Femicide/suicide	7.4	3.2

Attempted and Femicide scores significantly higher than abused controls (*p<.05)

DANGER ASSESSMENT ITEMS COMPARING ACTUAL & ATTEMPTED FEMICIDE SURVIVORS (N=493) & ABUSED (WITHIN PAST 24 MONTHS) CONTROLS (N=427) (*p < .05)

	Att/Actual	Control
Physical violence increased in frequency*	56%	24%
Physical violence increased in severity *	62%	18%
Partner tried to choke victim *	50%	10%
A gun is present in the house *	64%	16%
Partner forced victim to have sex *	39%	12%
Partner used street drugs *	55%	23%
Partner threatened to kill victim *	57%	14%
Victim believes partner is capable of killing her *	54%	24%
Perpetrator AD Military History (ns.)	16%	22%
Stalking score*	4.6	2.4

VICTIM & PERPETRATOR OWNERSHIP OF WEAPON IN FEMICIDE (N = 311), ATTEMPTED FEMICIDE (N = 182), ABUSED CONTROL (N=427) & NON-ABUSED CONTROL (N=418) CASES



$\chi 2=125.6$, $P< .0001$

Arrest, Protective Orders & Weapon Use

- 48 (33.6% of 156) of attempteds were shot
  - 15 of the 45 (33.3%) with data - perpetrator either had prior DV arrest or PO at the time of the incident
- 91 of 159 (57.3%) femicides that had weapon information were shot
  - Of 74 with data, 27 (36.5%) had a prior DV arrest or had a restraining order at the time of the incident
- According to federal legislation – these men should NOT have had possession of a gun

DANGER ASSESSMENT ITEMS COMPARING ACTUAL & ATTEMPTED FEMICIDE SURVIVORS (N=493) & ABUSED (WITHIN PAST 24 MONTHS) CONTROLS (N=427) (*p < .05)

	Att/Actual	Control
Partner is drunk every day *	42%	12%
Partner controls all victim's activities *	60%	32%
Partner beat victim while pregnant *	36%	7.7%
Partner is violently jealous of victim (says things like "If I can't have you,no one can")*	79%	32%
Victim threatened/tried to commit suicide	7%	9%
Partner threatened/tried to commit suicide *	39%	19%
Partner is violent toward victim's children*	9%	3%
Partner is violent outside house*	49%	38%
Partner arrested for DV* (*not* criminality)	27%	15%
Partner hurt a pet on purpose	10.1%	8.5%

Nonsignificant Variables of note

- Hurting a pet on purpose -10% of attempteds/actual victims vs. 8.5% of controls
  - BUT – some clear cases of using cruelty to a pet as a threat to kill
  - WAS a risk for women to be abused (compared with nonabused controls) (AOR = 7.59 – Walton-Moss et al ’05)
  - AND more (but still not sign.) risk in attempted femicide sample – perhaps proxies not as knowledgeable about pets – warrants further investigation
- Perpetrator military history – 16% actual/attempteds vs. 22% of controls

Risk Models

- Femicides with abuse history only (violence & threats) compared to abused controls (*N=181 femicides; 319 abused controls – total = 500 (18-50 yo only)
- Missing variables
  - variables had to be excluded from femicide model due to missing responses – if don't know – no – therefore underestimate risk
- Logistic Regression Plan – comparing cases & controls
  - Model variable in blocks – background characteristics – individual & couple, general violence related variables, violent relationship characteristics – then incident level
  - Interaction terms entered – theoretically derived

Significant ($p<.05$) Variables (Entered into Blocks) before Incident (overall fit = 85% correct classification)

Perpetrator unemployed	OR = 4.4
Perpetrator gun access	OR = 5.4
Perpetrator Stepchild	OR = 2.4
Couple Never Lived Together	OR = .34
Highly controlling perpetrator	OR = 2.1
Estranged X Low control (interaction)	OR = 3.6
Estranged X Control (interaction)	OR = 5.5
Threatened to kill her	OR = 3.2
Threatened w/weapon prior	OR = 3.8
Forced sex	OR = 1.9
Prior Arrest for DV	OR = .34

Significant (p<.05) Variables at Incident Level

Perpetrator unemployed	OR = 4.4
Perpetrator Stepchild	OR = 2.4
Couple Never Lived Together	OR = .31
Threatened w/weapon prior	OR = 4.1
Highly controlling perpetrator	OR = 2.4
Estranged X Low control (interaction)	OR = 3.1
Estranged X Control (interaction)	OR = 3.4
Perpetrator Used Gun	OR = 24.4
Prior Arrest for DV	OR = .31
Trigger - Victim Leaving (33%)	OR = 4.1
Trigger – Jealousy/she has new relationship	OR = 4.9

Femicide – Suicide Cases (32% of femicide cases in study – 29% US)

- Significant explanatory power for same femicide – suicide risk factors.
  - Partner access to gun
  - Threats with a weapon
  - Step child in the home
  - Estrangement
- Unique to femicide – suicide:
  - Partner suicide threats – history of poor mental health
  - Married
  - Somewhat higher education levels (unemployment still a risk factor), more likely to be white

CONCLUSIONS

- ALL DV IS DANGEROUS
- But 10 or more yeses on revised scale very dangerous
- Much more sensitive & specific if weighted items used – ROC curves – area under curve .91 (vs.88 & .83 original version) with acceptable PPV at identifiable higher and lower danger ranges

ROC Curve Analysis – 92% under the curve for Attempted Femicides; 90% for actuals



Instructions for Scoring Revised Danger Assessment

- Add total number of “yes” responses: 1 through 19. _____
- Add 4 points for a “yes” to question 2. _____
- Add 3 points for each “yes” to questions 3 & 4. _____
- Add 2 points for each “yes” to questions 5, 6, & 7 _____
- Add 1 point for each “yes” to questions 8 & 9. _____
- Subtract 3 points if 3a is checked. _____

Total _____

Note that a yes to question 20 does not count towards total in weighted scoring

Danger Assessment Certification

_____

has completed the
Danger Assessment Training Program
and is **certified** to use the
Danger Assessment and Levels of Danger Scoring System
to evaluate the level of danger in domestic violence cases.

Jacquelyn C Campbell, PhD, RN, FAAN Anna D Wolf Chair Associate Dean for Faculty Affairs The Johns Hopkins University School of Nursing		Date
NAME OF VICTIM:		

Danger Assessment Scoring			Revised 2004
Add total number of "Yes" responses, 1 through 19. Add 4 points for a "Yes" to question 2 Add 3 points for each "Yes" to questions 3 and 4. Add 2 points for each "Yes" to questions 5, 6 and 7. Add 1 point for each "Yes" to questions 8 & 9 Subtract 3 points if 3a is checked			
Levels of Danger Less than 8	Variable Danger	TOTAL	
8 – 13 14 -17 18 or more	Increased Danger Severe Danger Extreme Danger		Use of this Danger Assessment Scoring system is restricted to _____ Danger Assessment Certified xx/xx/2005

Cutoff Ranges - VISE

- Based on sum of weighted scoring place into 1 of the following categories:
  - Less than 8 - “variable danger”
  - 8 to 13 - “increased danger”
  - 14 to 17 - “severe danger”
  - 18 or more - “extreme danger”

Tentative suggestions for ranges

- NEVER DENY SERVICES ON BASIS OF DA or ANY OTHER RISK ASSESSMENT AT CURRENT STATE OF KNOWLEDGE
- **Variable danger range** – be sure to tell women level can change quickly – watch for other signs of danger, believe their gut
- **Increased and severe danger** – advise women of risk, assertive safety planning; consult with judges, high level of supervision recommendations
- **Highest level** – advise of serious danger – take assertive actions – call for criminal justice or other professional help -- recommend highest bail, highest probation supervision

Comparisons on Cutoffs – Sensitivity/Specificity

	Femicides	Attempteds	Specificity
Variable Danger < 8	90%	92%	69%
Increased Danger: 8 – 13	86%	90%	70%
Severe Danger: 14 – 17	83%	86%	80%
Extreme Danger: 18 +	57%	48%	98%

Revised DA Scores (ANOVA p<.000)

Group	N	Mean	SD
Not abused	407	-1.54	2.35
Abused Controls	328	2.80	5.61
Attempted Femicides	108	14.87	7.28
Actual Femicides	132	15.20	7.20

Conclusions

- Danger Assessment has some support for validity in a large national case control study
- DA can be an important basis for safety planning but use of cutoffs can now be used with great caution
- Has been revised with this data – ranges were determined – & tested with attempted femicides
- Additive scoring in front, algorithm on back
- Further evaluated (along with DVSI, K-SID & Mosaic in large prospective “Risk Assessment Validity Evaluation” supported by NIJ)

GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR RISK ASSESSMENT IN DV

- More sources of information the better – "gold standard" for information is victim – without information from victim, cutoffs for lethality risk problematic – criminal record check important
- Perpetrators will minimize perpetration
- No actuarial methods for DV, few independent evaluations – use any cutoffs with great caution – DVSI best if criminal justice records only & SARA with psych evaluation
- Instrument improves "expert judgment" – but clinician wisdom important also
- Never underestimate victim's perceptions (Weisz, 2000; Gondolf, 2002) but often minimize victimization – therefore victim assessment of risk not enough if low

Implications for Policy & Safety Planning

- Clinical assessment (psychiatry, psychology) needs specific DV training
- Batterer intervention - she needs to stay gone until he completes & his attendance monitored
- Employment issues – especially for African American men
- Protective order for stalking - or use stalking laws
- Issues with various “risk” lists included in safety planning

Implications for Policy & Safety Planning

- Engage women's mothering concerns & skills (Henderson & Erikson '97 '93; Humphreys '93; Sullivan et. al.'00)
- If she says she's going to leave, cannot leave face to face
- Importance of forced sex & stepchild variables – not on most risk assessment instruments
- Make sure she knows entire range of shelter services
- Be alert for depressed/suicidal batterer
- Batterer intervention programs working with partners

Gun Issues

- Get the gun(s) out!!! Implementation of Brady Bill – judges need to order removal of *all* guns – specify in search warrants & PO's
- VA law – No removal language at incident
- With both "permanent" & temporary protective order (TPO – about ½ states) – but prohibits purchase, transport only – not possession
- PO information not entered into federal data base (most states it is)
- Convictions for DV misdemeanors & felonies are entered & flagged – prohibits purchase (but only at licensed dealer, not gun shows) but not possession for misdemeanor offenders
- No removal/disarming language - (about 10 states) but judges can still order removal
- No firearm prohibition on face sheet of PO – (about ½ states)

Intimate Violence Risk Assessment Validation Study – J. Campbell, C. O'Sullivan & J. Roehl – NIJ #2000WTVX0011

- N = 782 women who had accessed system through calling police, civil court, shelter or hospital ED's – NY & CA (LA County)
  - Relatively severely abused – 43% severe abusive tactic from CTS last 6 mos
  - 60% retention from Time 1 – more severely abused. employed & Latina less like to return
  - 38% foreign born; 28% African American; 48% Hispanic/Latina

NIJ "RAVE" study

- Women randomly assigned to 2 of 4 risk assessment methods
  - Also CTS, WEB scale, HARASS
  - Also 40 other items hypothesized to increase risk
  - Also 2 items to assess victim's perceived risk
- Recontacted 6 – 12 months later – interviewed by phone
  - Also a criminal justice record check for violent crime & DV offenses – only identified of the assaults women reported
  - 31% of victims were reassaulted according to victim reports & an additional 16% stalked – yet only 6% of men rearrested for DV & 11% for other crimes
- Women – especially those who saw themselves at high risk took many impressive protective actions – all kinds
- Their accuracy of perception of re-assault – significantly better than chance but

Areas ROC curve (excluding 27 victims w/no exposure to abuser) with potential confounders

- Chance - .50
- Any & severe re-assault – all significant at <.01
  - DA - .67; .697
  - DV-MOSAIC .618; .647
  - DVSI - .60; .616
  - K-SID - .60; .62
  - Victim perception .62; .62
- Instruments/method = to or improved on victim assessment
- But none of approaches without serious margin of error
- DV MOSAIC most accurate for threats & stalking

Effects of protective actions on **severe** re-assault during follow-up

Baseline report	e^B	Wald	*p*
Not cohabitating or intimate	0.95	0.1	.832
No voluntary contact with abuser (T2)	**1.07**	**0.1**	**.757**
Went someplace he couldn't find her	**1.92**	**6.2**	**.013**
Shelter	**0.40**	**6.8**	**.007**
Got protective order	1.13	0.2	.643
Filed criminal complaint	1.41	2.14	.143
Abuser arrested for T1 incident	**0.62**	**4.0**	**.044**

Effects of protective actions on minor-moderate re-assault during follow-up

Baseline	e^B	Wald	*p*
Not cohabitating or intimate	1.37	1.54	.215
No voluntary contact with abuser (T2)	**0.28**	**19.7**	**<.001**
Went someplace he couldn't find her	1.57	2.2	.137
Shelter	**0.30**	**5.6**	**.018**
Got temp protective order	**0.60**	**4.4**	**.045**
Filed criminal complaint	0.90	0.2	.673
Abuser arrested for T1 incident	0.84	0.04	.839

Effects of protective actions on **stalking** during follow-up

Baseline	e^B	Wald	*p*
Physical abuse sev./freq.	0.94	1.2	.265
Not cohabitating or intimate	**2.78**	**11.6**	**.001**
No voluntary contact with abuser (T2)	1.03	0.01	.905
Someplace he couldn't find her	**2.10**	**6.7**	**.010**
Shelter	0.72	0.8	.371
Got temp protective order	**1.76**	**4.4**	**.036**
Filed criminal complaint	**1.66**	**4.5**	**.033**
Abuser arrested for T1 incident	0.77	1.2	.268

Conclusions re: protective actions' effects on re-assault

- Going to shelter at T1 significantly reduced risk of severe and moderate assaults
- No voluntary contact with abuser during follow-up reduced risk of moderately severe assaults
- Arrest at T1 reduced severe assaults
- OP/RO reduced moderate assaults
- Some protective actions at T2 likely to be response to assaults during follow-up
- Places she thinks he can't find her – often after a while, someone tells

Visitation & Abuse during Follow-Up

- 75% children in common with abuser
- 52% - abuser having visits w/ children
- 51% of visits by court order
- Unsupervised – 73%

  Supervised – 27%
- 24%: Physical abuse, threats or intimidation during exchange for visits

Women's Statements After Risk Assessment Process (NIJ RAVE study)

- "I never knew – this makes me much more resolved to not go back"
- "I'm gonna' go get that permanent thing (PO) – I wasn't gonna' go through the hassle before but now I surely will"
- "Damn…. He is really dangerous, isn't he? I keep foolin' myself about that – now I *know* I gotta *do* something"
- "I knew he was scary but no one believed me – I'm going to keep pushing now"
- Quote from a woman in Canada after doing the DA "It was like filling in a piece of a puzzle – I could finally see the whole picture"

As important as the “instrument or system” – the protocol – Elements Needed:

- Agreement on purpose of risk assessment in system
- Approach to victims if involved
  - What is said to encourage participation
  - What is said regarding use of results – confidentiality
  - If perpetrator – what are legalities of use of results
- Who conducts the risk assessment – first responders? In depth assessors?
  - Credentials – training necessary

Protocol - continued

- What happens to results
  - What is communicated to victim
  - What is communicated to system – what parts and for what use
  - Where is paperwork stored – who has access
  - How can victim access later?

Maryland Process – 2004- 07 – Washington Post 10/2/07 http://www.mnadv.org/lethality.html

- Under leadership of Dave Sargent – sargent47@msn.com – (retired DC officer) & Maryland Domestic Violence Network
- Coalition – researchers, criminal justice, advocates - identified need for risk assessment for first responders
- Identified need for quick lethality risk assessment (vs. re-assault)
- Based on research (modification of DA) & practitioner/first responder wisdom – identified 10 factors
  - e.g. – query about stepchild felt too dangerous

Maryland Process Continued

- Protocol developed – any of first 3 items (or 3 of next 8)
  - Victim told of high risk
  - Told first line of defense is advocacy network – told about options available there – full range of services
  - Urged to call DV shelter hotline – officer dials
  - She can talk but does not have to – officer gives case specifics if she does not want to talk – questions & safety planning advice given
  - She is given one last opportunity to talk to advocate
  - Protective Order information also offered

Maryland Protocol – top 3

- Has he/she threatened to kill you or your children?
- Has he/she used a weapon against you or threatened you with a weapon?
- Do you think he/she might try to kill you?

Yes to any one screens in

Maryland Protocol – any 3 additional triggers protocol

- Does he/she have a gun or can get one easily?
- Has he/she ever tried to choke you
- Is he/she violently jealous or control most or all of your daily activities?
- Have you left him or separated after living together or being married in the past year?
- Is he/she unemployed?
- Has he/she threatened or tried to kill self?
- Do you have a child that he/she knows is not his/hers?
- Does he/she follow or spy on you or leave threatening messages?

Is there anything else that worries you about your safety? – assessor judgment about response

Maryland Pilot

- 142 Screens completed in 1 month – 3 jurisdictions
  - 85 victims (62% of the 142 screens) "screened in"
  - 52 (62% of the 85 positive screens) spoke with a counselor
  - 2 (of 3 top 3) factors with highest number of positive responses
    - Severe jealousy and controlling factor (77 yeses out of 142)
    - Strangulation (choking) factor (73 out of 142).
- Screens not problematic to administer - 95% of officer screens were understandable according to victims & to officers administering the Screens
  - 82% of officers said the Screen was "very easy" to "fairly easy" to administer
  - Screens very consistent with full DA - 89% at Severe-Extreme
- In depth interviews - consensus among counselors – made the danger “seem more real” to women – 1 police officer recounted a case where he felt like the protocol saved a life

Maryland Process

- Several meetings and emails for agreement on process
- Training for first responders and advocacy system
- Training video developed
- Pilot roll out 8-9/04

Maryland Network Lethality Assessment

- Full rollout – 2006 – 60 jurisdictions (20 more added 11/1 including Baltimore County)
- Outcomes – almost one in three (284) of the 900 women who talked to a DV Advocate on the scene later showed up at a domestic violence services agency -- for a protective order, shelter, counseling, support group or other service.
- On the Eastern Shore
  - 90% of 354 victims had not received domestic violence services in the past (86% of high risk had never before sought help)
  - But 60% of those told that high risk talked to an advocate at the scene

Ideal Process Model



MISSED OPPORTUNITIES: PREVENTION - 83% of Cases

VICTIMS

- Police Contacts - 66% of stalked & battered women
- Any Medical Visit - 56% (27% ED visits only)
- Shelter Contacts - 4% of battered women
- Substance abuse Tx - 6%

PERPETRATORS

- Prior Arrest - 56% of batterers (32% of non)
- Mental Health System - 12%
- Substance Abuse Tx - 6%
- Child Abuse - 11% of batterers; 6% of non

Never forget who it's for -

"please don't let her death be for nothing – please get her story told"

(one of the Moms)