IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE,)
)
V.)
)
SHA'MIR SUDER,)
)
Defendant.)
)

ID No. 1901005656

Date Submitted: February 25, 2024 Date Decided: March 21, 2024

ORDER

Upon consideration of Defendant Sha'mir Suder's ("Suder") Motion for Sentence Modification ("Motion"),¹ Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b), statutory and decisional law, and the record, **IT APPEARS THAT:**

(1) On July 22, 2019, Suder pled guilty to Assault First Degree (IN19-08-0087-W) and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony ("PFDCF") (IN19-02-0088-W).² On November 8, 2019, Suder was sentenced as follows: for Assault First Degree, 25 years at Level V, suspended after 2 years at Level V for 6 months at Level IV, followed by 18 months at Level III; for PFDCF, 10 years at Level V.³

¹ D.I. 42. Although Suder states that his letter is to let the Court know he is "putting in a commutation," his letter requests a sentence modification.

² D.I. 20.

³ D.I. 34.

(2) Suder filed the instant Motion on February 28, 2024.⁴ Suder claims he has completed the minimum mandatory portion of his sentence, and he asks the Court to discharge the remaining time on his sentence for probation.⁵ In support of his Motion, Suder states he has learned from his prior actions and is no longer involved in gang activity.⁶

(3) Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b) governs motions for modification of sentence.⁷ The purpose of Rule 35(b) is to "provide a reasonable period for the Court to consider alteration of its sentencing judgments."⁸ Rule 35(b) contains procedural bars for timeliness and repetitiveness.⁹ Under Rule 35(b), the "[C]ourt may reduce a sentence of imprisonment on a motion made within 90 days after the sentence was imposed" and will consider untimely motions "only in extraordinary circumstances or pursuant to 11 *Del. C.* § 4217."¹⁰ Furthermore, the Court cannot modify the minimum mandatory portion of a sentence.¹¹

(4) Suder's Motion is procedurally barred. His Motion is untimely since it was filed over four years after his sentencing—well past the 90-day deadline.¹² The

⁴ D.I. 42.

⁵ D.I. 42.

⁶ Id.

⁷ Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b).

⁸ State v. Remedio, 108 A.3d 326, 331 (Del. Super. 2014).

⁹ Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b).

 $^{^{10}}$ *Id*.

¹¹ 11 Del. C. § 4204(d); D.I. 27.

¹² D.I. 27. Suder's sentence does not fall under 11 Del. C. § 4217.

Court does not find any "extraordinary circumstances" exist to warrant an extension of the 90-day deadline.¹³ Therefore, the Court finds the sentence is appropriate for all the reasons stated at the time of sentencing.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Sha'mir Suder's Motion for Sentence Modification is **DENIED**.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Jan R. Jurden Jan R. Jurden, President Judge

cc: Original to Prothonotary Erika R. Flaschner, DAG Sha'mir Suder (SBI # 00795035)

¹³ See State v. Redden, 111 A.3d 602, 607 (Del. Super. 2015) (explaining that extraordinary circumstances must specifically justify the delay, be beyond the movant's control, and *be the reason the movant was prevented from timely filing*) (emphasis added).